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begun to reevaluate the nature and impact of household financial decisions. While standard 
economic theory assumes individuals are fully rational, the devastation of the crisis suggests 
households may be subject to systematic biases that can have significant effects on the 
economy. Chapter 1 asks whether consumer sentiment has an impact on asset prices, 
particularly during the boom and bust of housing prices that instigated the most recent financial 
crisis. Empirically identifying a link between sentiment and prices is challenging, however, as 
measures of investor beliefs are difficult to construct.  This paper develops the first measures of 
sentiment across local housing markets by quantifying the tone in local housing newspaper 
articles. The sentiment index forecasts both the boom and bust of housing prices by more than 
two years, and can predict over 70 percent of the variation in national housing prices above and 
beyond economic fundamentals. Chapter 2 then asks whether households can time the own 
versus rent decision successfully and generate profitable savings.  Using 29 years of historical 
data, this essay creates robust measures of the costs of owning and renting and evaluates 
whether owning or renting was less expensive ex-post across 39 metropolitan areas in the United 
States. We find that households can potentially time their homeownership profitably and can save 
as much as 50 percent of annual rent costs using a few simple trading rules. Chapter 3 
addresses whether the lack of household financial literacy has significant consequences for 
household wealth. We find that an overwhelming majority of households lack basic financial skills 
and that financial literacy appears to have a significant effect on wealth above and beyond other 
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CHAPTER 1
QUANTIFYING ANIMAL SPIRITS:
NEWS MEDIA AND SENTIMENT IN THE HOUSING MARKET⇤
Cindy K. Soo
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Sentiment or “animal spirits” has long been posited as an important determinant of asset prices,
but measures of sentiment are difficult to construct and often confounded by asset fundamentals.
This paper provides a first empirical test of the role of sentiment in the run-up and crash of
housing prices that instigated the great financial crisis of 2008. I develop the first measures of
sentiment across local housing markets by quantifying the positive and negative tone of housing
news in local newspaper articles. I find that my housing sentiment index forecasts the boom
and bust pattern of house prices at a two year lead, and can predict over 70 percent of the
variation in aggregate house price growth. Consistent with theories of investor sentiment, I find
that my sentiment index not only predicts price variation but also patterns in trading volume.
Estimated effects of sentiment are robust to an extensive list of observed controls including
lagged fundamentals, lagged price growth, subprime lending patterns, and news content over
typically unobserved variables. To address potential bias from latent fundamentals, I develop
instruments from a subset of weekend and narrative articles that newspapers use to cater to
sentiment but are plausibly exogenous to news on fundamentals. Estimates remain robust to
instrumental variable estimation, suggesting bias from unobserved fundamentals is minimal.
⇤I am deeply indebted to my advisors Fernando Ferreira, Joe Gyourko, Olivia Mitchell, Michael Roberts, and Todd
Sinai for their continual encouragement and guidance. I am very grateful to Nick Barberis, Mark Duggan, Alex Edmans,
Alex Gelber, Joao Gomes, Todd Gormley, Vincent Glode, Daniel Gottlieb, Philipp Illeditsch, Raimond Maurer, Greg
Nini, Christian Opp, David Musto, Devin Pope, Nikolai Roussanov, Robert Stambaugh, Robert Shiller, Kent Smetters,
Luke Taylor, Jeremy Tobacman, Maisy Wong, Yu Yuan and numerous participants in the 2011 Whitebox Graduate Stu-
dent Conference, the 2011 TransAtlantic Doctoral Conference, the Wharton MicroFinance Brown Bag, and the Wharton
Applied Economics Seminar for their helpful suggestions and comments. I owe special thanks to Eugene Soltes and
Kumar Kesavan, and greatly appreciate the constant support from my classmates in the Wharton Applied Economics and
Finance PhD program. I gratefully acknowledge support from the Connie K. Duckworth Fellowship, the Bradley Foun-
dation, the S.S. Huebner Foundation, and the Pension Research Council/Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement
Research. All errors are my own. © 2012, Soo. All rights reserved.
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1 Introduction
Sentiment, broadly defined as the psychology behind investor beliefs, has long been posited
as an important determinant of asset price variation (Keynes (1936); Shiller (1990); Kothari and
Shanken (1997); Baker and Wurgler (2002); Shiller (2005)). However, identifying an empirical
link between sentiment and prices presents two major challenges. First, beliefs are by definition
unobservable and therefore not straightforward to quantify. Second, it is difficult to separate effects
of sentiment from underlying economic fundamentals. If fundamentals jointly determine sentiment
and asset prices, then an empirical correlation between a proxy for sentiment and prices may reflect
effects from latent fundamentals rather than the role of sentiment (Baker and Wurgler (2006)).
The goal of this paper is to quantify the role of investor sentiment in asset price formation and
address both of these challenges in novel ways. I use the run-up and crash of U.S. housing prices
from 2000 to 2011 as my laboratory to examine the role of sentiment. This is an important and
useful setting for several reasons. First, housing is a significant sector of the economy. Over two-
thirds of U.S households own a home and invest the majority of their portfolio in real estate (Tracy
et al. (1999); Nakajima (2005)). The housing crash also greatly impacted the financial sector, as
banks and financial institutions held significant investments in mortgage-backed securities and other
housing related assets. Second, the housing market provides greater power for identifying potential
effects of sentiment. Unlike the stock market, which is dominated by large institutional investors,
housing is primarily traded by individual buyers who are likely more subject to sentiment. Finally,
the recent housing cycle is an important setting to examine the effect of sentiment because standard
economic explanations for the housing boom have so far been difficult to reconcile empirically.
Observed fundamentals that accounted for nearly 70 percent of the variation in national house price
growth from 1987 to 2000, explain less than 10 percent of the variation from 2000 to 2011 (Lai and
Van Order (2010)). While there was much discussion of the potential role of sentiment, empirical
evidence of this theory has been limited and largely anecdotal.
This paper provides the first measures and empirical test of sentiment in the housing market. I
measure sentiment by capturing the qualitative tone of housing news from local newspapers. Specif-
ically, I calculate the difference between the share of positive and negative words across newspaper
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articles each month. I construct sentiment indices corresponding to each of the 20 city markets cov-
ered by the Case-Shiller home price index. This methodology builds on work from Tetlock (2007)
and a growing number of studies that construct proxies for sentiment in the stock market with me-
dia coverage. This strategy is also motivated by literature on asset price bubbles that claims the
media reflects sentiment through an incentive to cater to readers’ preferences over a particular asset
(Kindleberger (1978); Galbraith (1990); Shiller (2005)). I present a simple theoretical model that
formalizes these arguments and illustrates how news media may relate to sentiment.
I find that my sentiment index forecasts the boom and bust trend of housing prices by more
than a two year lead. Figure 1 shows that aggregate sentiment increases rapidly and peaks in 2004,
well before the peak of national house prices in mid-2006. This pattern is also evident across cities.
Cities that experienced dramatic rises and declines in house prices are preceded by similar cycles
in sentiment, whereas cities with milder price changes are led by more subdued sentiment growth.
Furthermore, I find that my sentiment measure can explain over 70 percent additional variation in
national house price movements above and beyond observed fundamentals. This is significant as
prior studies have found standard fundamental determinants to account for only a limited fraction
of house price variation after 2000.1 Nonetheless, interpreting these effects as sentiment is limited
without a validation of media sentiment as a reflection of investor beliefs.
External validations of sentiment proxies are naturally difficult to provide since investor be-
liefs are unobservable (Baker et al. (2012a)). In this paper, I validate my measure of sentiment by
comparing it with surveys of investor expectations in the housing market. I find that my sentiment
measure is highly correlated with housing market confidence indexes from the Survey of Consumers
and the National Association of Home Builders. In particular, home buyer survey confidence also
peaks in 2004, reflecting similar timing to trends in my composite index. Case et al. (2012) im-
plement annual surveys of home buyer expectations and similarly find that long term expectations
peak in 2004, well ahead of house prices. These surveys are otherwise limited in frequency and
geographic scope, but reaffirm the overall time-varying trends in my sentiment indices.
1For example, Glaeser et al. (2010) find that lower real interest rates can explain only one-fifth of the rise in house
prices from 1996 to 2006. He et al. (2012) examine the role of liquidity in the housing boom, and find that their model
can account for approximately one-fifth of house price run up from 1996 to 2006.
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Still, all of these measures may potentially capture variation in fundamentals. I first address
this by controlling for an exhaustive sequence of fundamental determinants of house prices. I find
that the predictive power of sentiment on house prices not only remains robust in significance, but
also in magnitude. The stability of the estimates suggests that bias from unobservable factors is less
likely. I find that estimates also remain stable to the inclusion of additional controls for subprime
lending trends. While not considered a typical housing fundamental, subprime credit exhibited
unprecedented expansion with the growth of house prices in many cities (Mian and Sufi (2009);
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011); Goetzmann et al. (2012)). The richness of my news dataset also
allows me to control for the content of news articles directly. News may report on harder-to-quantify
fundamentals that I do not observe. Thus, I control for the share of positive minus negative words
in any article that directly mentions a fundamental in its text and find that this does not affect my
results. Furthermore, I find that sentiment not only predicts house price variation but also patterns in
transaction volume. This result is consistent with existing theories and empirical studies of investor
sentiment (Odean (1998, 1999); Scheinkman and Xiong (2003); Barber and Odean (2000, 2008)).
Interestingly, sentiment leads volume first and is followed by prices another year later. This evidence
supports a hypothesis that search frictions in the housing market likely induce lags between changes
in sentiment, housing transactions, and prices.
While these results are highly suggestive, the positive association between my sentiment in-
dex and house prices may still be driven by latent fundamentals. I present two candidate instruments
for sentiment by isolating a subset of housing news articles that cater to reader sentiment but are
plausibly exogenous to news on fundamentals. The first is my measure of sentiment calculated only
over housing articles published over the weekend. Weekend articles tend to cater to readers who
have preferences for lighter content, and are arguably exogenous to news on fundamentals since
official press releases on economic data can only occur on a weekday. The second proposed instru-
ment is my measure of sentiment calculated only over narrative housing news articles. Narratives
cater to sentiment through a human interest appeal, and are plausibly exogenous to fundamentals
because they consist of anecdotal stories rather than actual information. Of course, the validity of
these instruments relies on the assumption that information on fundamentals is not being reported
4
on or somehow related through these subset of news articles. I acknowledge and test for a number of
possible violations of this assumption, and find that results are consistent with the exclusion restric-
tion. Given this, I show that the predictive power of sentiment remains robust both in significance
and magnitude even after instrumenting for sentiment.
This paper provides evidence that sentiment may have a significant effect on house prices,
and challenges standard explanations of the housing boom and bust that rely solely on fundamentals.
The results of this paper suggest that if a fundamental drove house prices during this period, then
it would also have had to drive expectations at a two year lead to prices both nationally and across
cities. Furthermore, to be consistent with the empirical data, this fundamental would fail to explain
prices from 1987 to 2000 but suddenly begin to drive expectations and prices differently from 2000
to 2011. This paper does not advocate that fundamentals did not play any role, but that the evidence
suggests sentiment played an economically important role as well.
These findings complement a number of empirical studies that attempt to quantify sentiment
and provide evidence for its effect on asset prices (Edmans et al. (2007); Baker and Wurgler (2006,
2007); Baker et al. (2012a); Baker and Stein (2004); Greenwood and Nagel (2009); Barber et al.
(2009); Brown and Cliff (2005)). At the same time, the evidence in this paper relates to a large body
of work that explores determinants and consequences of the last housing boom and bust (Pisko-
rski et al. (2010); Avery and Brevoort (2010); Haughwout et al. (2011); Bhutta (2009); Bayer et al.
(2011); Glaeser et al. (2008); Gerardi et al. (2008); Ho and Pennington-Cross (2008)). This paper
also generally relates to a larger literature that explores housing price dynamics and more specif-
ically to studies that explore the role of expectations in the housing market (Genesove and Mayer
(2001); Piazzesi and Schneider (2009); Goetzmann et al. (2012); Arce and López-Salido (2011);
Burnside et al. (2011); Favilukis et al. (2010)). Finally, this paper contributes to research that links
media coverage to trading activity and shows that media sentiment can be used to predict asset prices
beyond stock market applications (Tetlock (2007); Tetlock et al. (2008); Tetlock (2011); Antweiler
and Frank (2004); Barber and Loeffler (1993); Dougal et al. (2012); Dyck and Zingales (2003);
Engelberg (2008); Engelberg and Parsons (2011); Garcia (2012); Gurun and Butler (2012)).
Section 2 presents a model that describes the relationship between news, sentiment, and
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prices. Section 3 describes how I construct my database of newspaper articles and set of observed
fundamentals. Section 4 details how the sentiment index is calculated. Section 5 and 6 present the
main empirical and instrumental variable results respectively. Section 7 concludes and discusses
potential avenues for future work.
2 Theoretical Motivation
In this section, I present a simple theoretical framework that illustrates the potential relationship
between the news media, investor sentiment, and housing prices. I specifically measure sentiment
with news because prominent literature on bubbles and panics commonly stress that the news media
has an important relationship with investor beliefs (Kindleberger (1978); Galbraith (1990); Shiller
(2005)). They argue that newspapers have a demand-side incentive to cater to reader preferences,
and will spin news according to readers’ opinion over assets they own. Economic models of media
slant make similar arguments in the context of readers’ political preferences. Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) assume that readers have a disutility for news that
is inconsistent with their beliefs, citing psychology literature that show people have a tendency to
favor information that confirms their priors.2 Indeed, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) find empirical
evidence that readers have a preference for news consistent with their beliefs and news outlets
respond accordingly. This framework adapts models of investor sentiment (De Long et al. (1990a);
Copeland (1976); Hong and Stein (1999)) and models of media slant (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010);
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)) to show how news relates to investor sentiment and asset prices.
Agents: I assume there are two types of agents in the economy: fully rational traders and imperfectly
rational optimists that have a preference for news that confirms their priors. Agents are otherwise
identical in utility maximization and risk aversion parameters. In each period t, the fraction of
optimistic traders are present in the economy each period at measure µt , and fully rational agents are
present in the economy at measure (1 µt). All agents have constant absolute risk aversion where g
denotes the common coefficient of risk aversion. Thus, the allocation to the risky asset is unaffected
by the accumulation of wealth. For simplicity, I assume there is no consumption decision, no labor
2This tendency is called confirmatory bias in the psychology literature (Lord (1979); Yariv (2002)).
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supply decision, and no bequest. The resources agents have to invest are completely exogenous. In
each period, agents choose an optimal allocation of housing, Xt , to maximize the following:
max
Ht
E[ e 2gWt+1 ]
subject to the budget constraint:
Wt+1 =Wt(1+ r f (1  t))+Xt [Pt+1+Dt+1 Pt(d t +mt +(1  t t)(1+ r f +p t)]
whereWt represents wealth in period t. Agents allocate wealth between a risk-free asset that guar-
antees a risk-free rate of r f > 0 each period and a risky asset of housing that pays dividends, Dt ,
in the form of housing services each period. Housing is in supply quantity Qt each period, and the
risk-free asset is in perfectly elastic supply. The price of housing stock is denoted by Pt . I assume
housing depreciates at rate dt , requires maintenance and repairs at a fraction of house value mt ,
and incurs property tax liabilities at rate pt . Furthermore, all investors must pay a marginal income
tax of tt , but may deduct property taxes from taxable income and otherwise borrow or lend at the
risk-free rate r f . This represents the user cost of housing as formalized by Poterba (1984). For ease
of notation going forward, let wt = dt +mt +(1  tt)(1+ r f +pt).
Maximizing expected utility over Xt yields the following optimal demand function for hous-
ing:3
Xt =
EPt+1+Dt+1 Ptw t
2gEs2Pt+1
. (1)
Since this is just a linear demand function, for simplicity let the above be represented by:4
Xt = at  wPt (2)
3With normally distributed returns, maximizing the above is the same as maximizing mean-variance utility. I rewrite
the agents problem such that they maximize the following expected utility each period: EU = E[Wt+1]  gs2Wt+1 =
Wt(1+ r f )(1  tt)+Xt [EtPt+1+Dt+1 wtPt ] XtgEts2Pt+1 , where s2Wt+1 is the one-period ahead variance of wealth and
s2Pt+1 is the one period ahead variance of price. This follows the set up in De Long et al. (1990a).
4
where a = EPt+1+Dt+12gEs 2Pt+1
and w = wt2gEs 2Pt+1
.
7
Rational traders demand housing according to equation (1), but I assume optimists overestimate the
expected price of housing relative to rational traders by an additional positive parameter q .5 Thus
relative to rational traders, optimists shift their demand curves upward by an additional q .
XOptt = at +q  wPt (3)
Newspapers: I also assume that optimistic investors have a preference for news that confirms their
positive beliefs. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) model this preference by assuming readers have a
quadratic disutility for news that conflicts with their priors, and derive an equation for newspaper
readership approximately equal to a  (Sn   Si)2 where a is a constant, Snt is slant reported by
newspaper n, and Sit is the overall level of sentiment in city i and period t. In this framework, the
overall level of sentiment in the economy is equal to the fraction of optimists, µt , multiplied by
their level of optimism, q . Thus, Sit = µtq , and the optimal level of news slant that maximizes a
newspaper’s readership is equal to:
S⇤nt = Sit = µtq (4)
Thus news slant, or the sentiment in news, directly reflects the overall level of reader sentiment.
Equilibrium Price: Given the presence of µt optimists and (1 µt) rational traders, equilibrium is
characterized by setting demand equal to supply, (1 µt)(a wPt)+µt(a+q  wPt) = Qt . Thus
the equilibrium price equals:
Pt =
(at +µtq  Qt)
w
(5)
Equation 5 reveals that investor sentiment has a positive association with prices ( dPt)dµ tq > 0 ). Using
equation 4, we can rewrite equation 5 in terms of news sentiment:
Pt =
(at +S⇤nt  Qt)
w
(6)
Then the price change from t to t+1 can be expressed by:
5Conversely, this framework could also apply to a set of pessimists who underestimate the expected price of housing
by a negative parameter q .
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4Pt+1 = 1w [(4at+1)+(4S
⇤
nt+1)  (4Qt+1)] (7)
where 4Pt+1 = Pt+1 Pt . Thus Equation (7) predicts that changes in news sentiment (4S⇤nt+1) are
positively associated with changes in prices (Pt+1). Positive fundamentals such as dividends, Dt ,
will also drive prices up, while increasing costs and housing stock will have dampening effect on
prices. If there are no optimists in the market (µt = 0) or sentiment remains unchanged, then prices
will equal Pt =
(a Qt)
w and are only moved by changes in fundamentals and rational expectations in
a, b , and Qt .
Examining the effect of sentiment in the housing market allows me to analyze not only the
time-varying effects of sentiment but also the cross-sectional effect of sentiment across different
local housing markets. Let4Pit = Pit Pit 1 be the change in prices in city i and4Pjt represent the
changing prices in city j. The difference in house price changes across cities can be written as:
4Pit  4Pjt = 1w [(4ait  4a jt)+(4S
⇤
i,nt  4S⇤j,nt)  (4Qit  4Qjt)] (8)
Equation 8 shows that if the price increase from t 1 to t is greater in city i than in city j, then this
is due to either a greater increase in components in4ait or in investor sentiment (proxied by news
sentiment4S⇤i,nt).
Trading Volume. Increasing sentiment driven by the rising demand from optimists in the econ-
omy has further implications for trading volume in each housing market. Suppose the fraction of
optimists increases from t to t+ 1 such that µt+1 > µt . Trading volume, Vt+1, is then equal to the
additional demand for housing from the fraction of optimists period to period:6
Vt+1 = µt+1XOptt+1  µtXOptt
=
1
w
(Snt+1 Snt)(a Q) (9)
Equation 9 illustrates that as sentiment increases, trading volume will be pushed upward. The
greater the demand from optimists is relative to the previous period, the greater the volume of
6I assume that a and Q stay constant here to make the effect of sentiment clear.
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trades. This framework predicts that positive changes in sentiment should lead to increases in trading
volume.
Lagged Effect. The above framework assumes that news only reflects investor sentiment. However,
Shiller (2005) argues that news media can simultaneously fuel sentiment if readers misperceive
optimism in the news for real information about fundamentals the housing market. Housing, in
particular, is a widely held household investment by individual buyers. Thus the average housing
investor is likely less financially sophisticated than the typical stock market investor. Survey evi-
dence shows that a majority of Americans do suffer from surprisingly low levels of financial literacy
(Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a,b)). Even more sophisticated investors may find it difficult to process
quantitative data on market fundamentals. Indeed, Engelberg (2008) provides empirical evidence
from earnings announcements that qualitative information on positive fundamentals is especially
difficult to process. News slant can make it difficult for readers to separate true information from
sentiment, and can subsequently affect trading behaviors. Empirical studies on political media slant
show that the media has been able to shift public opinion and voting behavior (DellaVigna and Ka-
plan (2007); Gerber et al. (2009)). Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that different local media
coverage of the stock market drives different trading outcomes across markets. If this is the case,
then news sentiment in period t can also drive investor sentiment in future periods, µt+1q , and prices
would be positively associated with both contemporaneous and lagged values of news sentiment,
Sntand Snt k.
Furthermore, this framework also assumes that transactions in the housing market are imme-
diate and costless. The transaction process of buying a home is by no means immediate, and the
search process for a home can actually take several months. Thus there can be several lags between
a change in sentiment and its effect on prices, and potentially no contemporaneous effect at all.
If news slant does feed sentiment, then this can also take some time to diffuse and spread across
investors.7 Thus I consider the effect of both contemporaneous and lagged effects of sentiment in
my empirical estimations.
7Hong and Stein (1999)model a gradual diffusion of news where only a fraction of traders receive innovations about
dividends in each period.
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3 Data Description
3.1 Newspaper Articles
My approach to measuring sentiment requires the text of newspaper articles covering the housing
market. My source for news articles is Factiva.com, a comprehensive online database of newspa-
pers.8 Factiva categorizes its articles by subject, and provides a code that identifies articles that
discuss local real estate markets. This code is determined by a propriety algorithm that remains
objective across all newspapers and years. This subject code covers new and existing home sales,
housing affordability indices, and housing price indices as well as supply side indicators on housing
starts, building permits, housing approvals, and construction spending. Routine real estate property
listings are not included. Wire-service articles are also generally excluded, as syndicated stories
cannot be redistributed and typically do not appear in the Factiva database. This exclusion is ac-
tually preferable to capturing the local sentiment unique to each city. Wire-service articles are
typically those that cover topics of more general national interest, supplied to local newspapers by
large media companies such as the Associated Press. Excluding such articles ensures each city’s
sentiment measure is only based on news articles written by local staff writers. To that end, I also
exclude any additional republished or duplicate news stories from other news outlets.9
I download all newspaper articles covering the housing market between January 2000 and
August 2011 from the major newspaper publication in each of the following 20 cities: Atlanta,
Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami,
Minneapolis, New York, Phoenix, Portland, San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and Wash-
ington, D.C. I retrieve a total of 19,620 articles.
I then apply a second automated script to parse information from each article. I not only
extract the text of the articles, but also useful information on the the date, headline, author, section,
and copyright. My database contains each individual word of an article with its corresponding date,
8Other similar newspaper databases are Lexis Nexis and NewsBank. Factiva.com arguably has the most comprehen-
sive coverage.
9I do not, however, exclude stories that are written by local staff writers but may comment on the housing market of
other cities. While an article may comment on other cities, publication of these articles may be in response to a local
interest in reading housing news. In a follow up paper, I provide evidence that suggests news mentions of other cities is a
mechanism through which a contagion of sentiment is spread.
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word position, author, and originating newspaper. My final dataset consists of a total 15,295,393
words. I then implement a final script that produces counts of positive and negative words and total
words across housing articles by city and month.
Table 1 summarizes some descriptive statistics on the collected articles by city. Most cities
have one major newspaper that dominates the news market, with the exception of Boston, Detroit,
and Los Angeles, which have two. Some Associated Press articles remain in the sample, but make
up less than 6 percent of the collected articles. Approximately 20 percent of the articles are found
in the front or “A” section of the newspapers. Additionally, 20 percent are found in a special real
estate section. Furthermore, over 30 percent of the articles are published in local news or regional
editions of the newspaper. Otherwise, the majority of articles are reported in a general news or
business section.
3.2 Housing Fundamentals and Additional Variables
The goal of this paper is to identify an effect of sentiment on house prices. However if housing
market fundamentals also affect my news sentiment proxy, then estimating an effect of sentiment
on house prices will suffer from omitted variable bias. In particular, a positive shock to fundamentals
may simultaneously drive both sentiment and prices upward, biasing coefficient estimates upward.
Thus, controlling for these fundamentals is key to identification. Since the true model of house
prices is unknown, I apply a “kitchen sink” approach and assemble as many housing market inputs
and ouputs that may account for the variation in house prices.
Rents. The “fundamental value” of an asset typically refers to its present discounted value
of future cash flow. As noted in Section 2, the model assumes housing pays dividends in the form
of rental services. I acquire measures of monthly rents from two sources: REIS and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). REIS provides average asking rents on rental units with common character-
istics with single family homes. REIS reports monthly data on actual rental values which I normalize
to match price indexes (100=January 2000). I also obtain residential rents from the Consumer Price
Index Housing Survey implemented by the BLS. The BLS reports rents of primary residences as a
part of the shelter component of the consumer price index. I include the BLS measure of rents as a
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robustness check and report the results using REIS rental indices.
Supply. I measure changes in housing supply using data on building permits and housing
starts for the U.S. Census Bureau. Housing starts are the total new privately owned housing units
started each month. Building permits are those authorized for new privately owned housing units in
each city. I also include a measure of supply elasticity developed by Saiz (2010) with the Wharton
Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI) created by Gyourko et al. (2008).
Employment and Unemployment. A number of models highlight the importance of labor
market variables on housing demand (Roback (1982); Rosen (1979); Nakajima (2011); Mankiw
and Weil (1989)). I attain monthly employment levels and local unemployment rates by city from
the BLS. I also test various measures of employment such as civilian labor force, or employment
rates by particular sector, age, and industry.
Population and Income. I attain measures of income and population growth by city from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). I also use income data on loan applicants from the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA requires lending institutions file reports on all mortgage
applications, and thus provides an exceptional profile of the pool of potential home buyers.
Interest Rates. A large focus of the debate over the housing crisis has been on the role of low
real interest rates and availability of easy credit. Theory shows that low interest rates should lead
to increased housing demand and higher prices (Himmelberg et al. (2005); Mayer and Sinai (2009);
Taylor (2009)). I include measures of both real and nominal interest rates relevant to home buyers.
I use the national 30-year conventional mortgage rate from the Federal Reserve Board. Following
Himmelberg et al. (2005), I calculate real interest rates by subtracting the Livingston Survey 10-
year expected inflation rate from the 10-year Treasury bond rate. The standard user cost formula of
housing suggests a 10-year rate, rather than a short-term rate, is more sensible when approximating
the duration of mortgages. I also include measures of the the 10-year treasury bill rate and the
6-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).
Subprime Lending and Leverage. Studies also hypothesize that the availability of credit
should boost housing demand and prices are likely more sensitive in cities where homeowners
are highly leveraged (Stein (1995); Lamont and Stein (1999)). Thus, I attain loan-to-value ratios
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come from a comprehensive new micro dataset provided by DataQuick10, an industry data provider
(Ferreira et al. (2010)). DataQuick provides detailed transaction level data on over 23 million arms
length housing transaction from 1993 to 2009. Loan-to-value ratios include the total amount of
mortgage debt including not only the primary but also any debt up to three loans taken to finance
the home. This dataset covers transactions cover 16 cities in my sample. I also use the percent of
subprime mortgages as calculated by Ferreira and Gyourko (2012). The share of subprime loans in a
city is the share of loans issued by any of the top twenty subprime lenders ranked by the publication
Inside Mortgage Finance.
Housing Prices and Volume. I measure home prices for each city from 2000 to 2011
with monthly indexes calculated by Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller home price index. I use their
composite-20 home price index to measure aggregate prices. The S&P/Case-Shiller price indices
estimate price changes with repeat sales to control for the changing quality of houses being sold
through time. The overall average price index over all twenty cities is 147.3, with the highest,
280.9, occurring in Miami December 2006 and the lowest hitting 67.68 in Detroit the March of
2010. The Case-Shiller Composite 20 index aggregates prices of all 20 major metropolitan areas
into composite index and has a slightly higher mean of 157.2 with less variance over time. As a
further robustness check, I also test quarterly home price indices calculated by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA). Since DataQuick covers transaction level data across cities, I also calcu-
late the volume of transactions as an additional dependent variable. This dataset covers transactions
for most of cities in my sample and is available monthly.
4 Measuring Sentiment in the News
4.1 Textual Analysis of News Articles
I capture news sentiment through a textual analysis of newspaper articles. Textual analysis is a
increasingly popular methodology used to quantify the tone and sentiment in financial documents.11
For example, a number of finance and accounting studies have applied textual analysis techniques
10Data provided by DataQuick Information Systems, Inc. www.dataquick.com.
11Alternative labels for textual analysis are content analysis, natural language processing, or information retrieval.
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to capture the tone of earnings announcements, investor chat rooms, corporate 10-K reports, IPO
prospectuses, and newspaper articles (Engelberg (2008); Antweiler and Frank (2004); Li (2006);
Loughran and Mcdonald (2011); Tetlock (2007); Jegadeesh and Wu (2011); Hanley and Hoberg
(2010); Kothari et al. (2009); Feldman and Segal (2008); Henry (2008)). Many of these papers
have linked the sentiment of these documents to outcomes such as firm earnings, stock returns, and
trading volume. Tetlock (2007), one of the most well known of these papers, quantifies the negative
tone of the popular Wall Street Journal newspaper column “Abreast the Market.” His results support
the tone of news as as robust proxy for stock market sentiment.
I apply the most standard methodology employed by this literature, which quantifies the
raw frequency of positive and negative words in a text. These papers typically identify words as
positive or negative based on an external word list. External word lists are preferred because they are
predetermined and less vulnerable to subjectivity from the author. A number of previous papers start
with general positive or negative word lists provided by Harvard IV-4 Psychological Dictionary.
Existing studies have found, however, that these general tonal lists can contain irrelevant words and
lead to noisy measures (Tetlock et al. (2008)). For example, Engelberg (2008) points out words
on the general Harvard positive list such as company or shares have limited relevance in capturing
positive tone and can unintentionally capture other effects in finance applications. Indeed, several
papers have specifically found limited use for the general Harvard positive list (Tetlock (2007);
Engelberg (2008); Kothari et al. (2009)). A recent study by Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) shows
that the noise introduced by the general Harvard negative word list can also be substantial and argues
that word lists should be discipline-specific to reduce measurement error.
To balance these concerns, I still use a predetermined list from the Harvard IV-4 dictionary
to reduce subjectivity, but choose one that specifically reflects how the media spins excitement over
asset markets. Shiller (2008) asserts that “the media weave stories around price movements, and
when those movements are upward, the media tend to embellish and legitimize ’new era’ stories
with extra attention and detail.” He argues that the media employs superlatives that emphasize price
increases and upward movements. For example, a news article may describe markets as “skyrock-
eting,” “soaring,” “booming” or “heating up.” For this reason, I use the Harvard IV-4 lists Increase
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and Rise, words associated with increasing outlook and rising movement.12 Nonetheless, these lists
still include a few words such as people and renaissance that are clearly irrelevant and would result
in obvious misclassifications. I manually remove these words, but simultaneously expand the re-
maining words with their dictionary synonyms.13 For example, skyrocket is a synonym of soar, but
not included in the original Harvard lists. I exclude synonyms that correspond to an alternative def-
inition of the original word. Following Loughran and Mcdonald (2011), I also expand the list with
inflections and tenses that retain the original meaning of each word. Thus counts for the root word
skyrocket, for example, also include skyrockets, skyrocketed, and skyrocketing. The original Harvard
IV-4 lists include 136 words and the expanded list, including inflections and synonyms, contains 403
words. Table 2 reports a sample of positive words and their corresponding word counts. I repeat the
above process to create negative word lists using the converse Harvard IV-4 lists Decrease and Fall.
4.2 Calculating the Sentiment Index
Using an automated script, I generate counts of positive words by city and month. I calculate the
fraction of positive words in city i and month t by simply dividing the number of positive words by
the total number of words each month. The share of positive words is represented by:
Posit =
#positivewords
#totalwords it
(10)
An alternative method is to calculate the share of positive words in each individual article and then
average across articles; I try both methods and they do not make a difference in values. To be
conservative, I focus my analysis and report my results based on the leading text of an article. An
article may intend to express a negative tone with the first half of its text, but contain a number
of positive words in the latter half. Thus, tabulating word counts over the full text can potentially
overestimate the share of positive words. Nevertheless, the share of positive words based on the full
text of the articles is highly correlated with the share based on the leading text.
Still, positive words in a text may be simultaneously surrounded by a number of negative
12These lists can be found at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/⇠inquirer/Increas.html and
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/⇠inquirer/rise.html.
13My dictionary source for synonyms is Rogets 21st Century Thesaurus, 3rd Edition.
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words. I address this issue by subtracting the share of negative words from the share of positive
words. I define the fraction of negative words by the analogous expression:
Negit =
#negativewords
#totalwords it
(11)
and define the housing news sentiment index by:
Sit = Posit  Negit (12)
where i and t denote the city and month respectively. I additionally adjust both negative and positive
word counts for negation using the terms: no, not, none, neither, never, nobody. I consider a word
negated if it is preceded within five words by one of these negation terms.14 Finally, I apply a
backwards 3-month moving average to smooth the series and reduce noise.15 The window for
each reporting month is based on data for that month and the preceding two months. This mirrors
the same 3-month moving average used to calculate the S&P/Case-Shiller home price indices. In
addition, I apply the same normalized weights used to create the Case-Shiller Composite-20 home
price index to create an analogous Composite-20 housing sentiment index.
I create a number of alternate versions of the baseline index sentiment index for robustness.
For example, I calculate a version of the index that uses the full, rather than just the leading, text
of the articles. I also construct a version that accounts for not only the tone of news, but also the
frequency of housing articles published each month. Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) also suggest a
“term-weighted” index that adjusts for the commonality and frequency of a word across documents.
I find that the results remain robust to these alternative versions. Details on alternate versions and
their correlations with the baseline index are available in the 7.
14Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) apply the same strategy except with a preceding word distance of three words.
Textual analysis studies in the computer science field use a preceding distance of five words, so I opt for the wider
window.
15Baker et al. (2012b)suggest a 36-month backward moving average to smooth a monthly series of an economic policy
uncertainty index.
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4.3 Validating Sentiment Index Patterns
Figure 3 plots my composite-20 housing news sentiment index with the Case-Shiller composite-20
housing price index across time. My housing news sentiment index exhibits a striking boom and
bust pattern, and appears to forecast the rise and fall of aggregate housing prices by more than
two years. My sentiment index peaks in January 2004, while the housing price index peaks 30
months (2.5 years) later in July 2006. This aggregate pattern is driven by similar patterns across in
individual cities. Figure 2 plots individual sentiment indexes across time for a sample of six cities.
As in the composite index, cities such as Las Vegas and Phoenix that experienced large swings
in house prices were preceded by similar swings in news sentiment. Conversely, cities with more
moderate increases in housing prices such as Atlanta and Minneapolis, do not appear to have clear
trending patterns in news sentiment. Plots for all cities are available in Figure A.1.
One concern might be that these patterns reflect some coincidental manifestation of text
across newspaper articles. While Figure 2 shows that the pattern of sentiment varies across cities,
it is possible that the boom and bust pattern of words is common across all subjects and not neces-
sarily specific to housing. To address this issue, I collect a random sample of articles that cover any
subject or topic. I then compute a “random” sentiment index using the same methodology I used
to create my housing sentiment index. If my index really reflects sentiment in the housing market,
then we would not expect to see the same pattern arise from a random set of news articles. Figure
3 reveals that the random index is a relatively flat line, and does not exhibit any discernible trend.
This suggests that the sentiment index is at least specific to housing news.
Validating the sentiment index as a proxy for investor beliefs is naturally more challenging.
By definition, beliefs are unobservable, but there exist some surveys that ask investors about the
housing market. Existing survey measures are limited in frequency or geographic variation, but
can be used to validate overall trends in my composite sentiment index. The Survey of Consumers
(SOC) run by the University of Michigan and Reuters surveys a nationally representative sample
of 500 individuals each month on their attitudes toward personal finances, business conditions, and
buying conditions. One of these questions refers to the buying conditions in the housing market.
Specifically, the SOC asks consumers, “Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or bad time
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to buy a house?” Respondents answer “yes,” “no,” or “do not know.” Figure 4 plots the percentage
of respondents that answered “yes” across time. This simple question on home buyer confidence
reveals a strikingly similar pattern to my composite-20 housing sentiment index. The percentage of
positive home buyers also peaks well before housing prices, by more than a two year lead. Surveyed
home buyer confidence actually appears to lead housing news sentiment slightly, from two to six
months. This lead is consistent with a theory that news sentiment responds to consumer sentiment
in the market. Interestingly, the increase in survey confidence is also followed by a similar increase
in news sentiment in 2008. Both of the increases occur before the temporary rebound of the housing
market in 2009, but fall again afterwards.
Case and Shiller (2003) implement even more detailed surveys of home buyer behaviors and
provide more detailed perspective on investor expectations. They directly ask respondents how
much they expect their house price to grow over the next ten years. Answers in 2003 revealed
astonishingly high expectations; with respondents expecting prices to rise an average of 11 to 13
percent annually. Case et al. (2012) recently updated these surveys each year from 2003 to 2012.
Their survey covers just four suburban areas, but the similarity in timing of sentiment across the
same cities in my dataset is significant. They find that long-term expectations of home buyers also
peak in 2004, the same time as my sentiment index.
Panel B in Figure 4 further plots my sentiment index with an index of home builder confi-
dence constructed by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB). The NAHB implements
a monthly survey of their members, asking builders and developers to rate the current market con-
ditions of the sale of new homes, the prospective market conditions in the next 6 months, and the
expected volume of new home buyers. The NAHB index weights these answers into one index to
represent an aggregate builders’ opinion of housing market conditions. Figure 4 shows that builder
confidence index in the housing market declined significantly at similar timing to my sentiment in-
dex. Builder confidence peaks in 2005, suggesting a slight lag to home buyer confidence. My senti-
ment index highly correlates with survey measures of housing market confidence in both trends and
timing, suggesting that news sentiment does reflect investor beliefs over the housing market. Still,
both survey and news sentiment may still be driven by changes in fundamentals. I address effects
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from both observed and unobserved fundamentals in the following sections.
5 Does Sentiment Reflect Changes in Observed Fundamentals?
5.1 Sentiment Effects on House Price Growth
In this section I test the empirical predictions of the effect of sentiment on prices in Section 2 and
analyze whether the results reflect variation in observed fundamentals. I first test the predicted effect
of sentiment on prices across time using the composite index. I approximate Equation 7 with the
following estimating equation:
Dpt = a0+
K
Â
k=0
bkLkDsnt + gDxt +dm+nt (13)
where a lowercase letter represents a log operator (pt = lnPt) and D denotes the first difference such
that Dpt = lnPt   lnPt 1. Lk is a lag operator such that lags LkDsnt = lnSn,t k  lnSn,t k 1. Vector
xt controls for changes in observable fundamentals that drive housing prices over time. House price
growth may generally coincide with increased home buying in particular seasons of the year (such
as the summer), so I include a set of monthly fixed effects, dm, to control for price changes due to
seasonality. I assume the error term nt is heteroskedastic across time and serially correlated, and
calculate Newey and West (1987) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation up to twelve lags.
Taking log differences provides a convenient approximation of growth period, but also ad-
dresses concerns of nonstationarity. Serial correlation in house prices have been well documented
(Case and Shiller (1989, 1990)). Estimates will still be consistent if prices and sentiment are serially
correlated, as long as this correlation weakens over time.16 However if both prices and sentiment
are nonstationary and contain unit roots, then a regression of Equation 8 could result in a signifi-
cant estimate of sentiment even if the series are completely unrelated. First differencing also has
an additional benefit of removing any linear time trend in price levels. For estimates to be consis-
16In other words, to ensure that prices and sentiment are stationary and weakly dependent, weak dependence is gener-
ally defined as occurring when the correlation between observations xt and xt+h of a series approaches zero “sufficiently
quickly” as h! •.
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tent, I also impose an assumption that the error term nt is uncorrelated with fundamentals and both
contemporaneous and lagged values of news sentiment. Making this assumption is useful because
it does not require that the error term be independent from future values of news sentiment. This is
important because it does not rule out feedback from prices onto future values of news sentiment. In
particular, newspapers may put a positive spin on news by emphasizing certain past price increases
over others.
The effect of sentiment on prices is captured by the coefficients bk. Each individual coefficient
bk represents the effect of the one-time change in sentiment growth in period t k on the equilibrium
price growth in time t. Conceptually, the lagged coefficients bk represent the lagged adjustment path
of prices to sentiment.17 As noted in the last section, Figures 1 reveals that composite sentiment
peaks in 2004, suggesting a lag structure of nearly three years. Ultimately, I am interested in the
accumulated effect of sentiment on prices, represented by the sum of the coefficients, ÂKk=0 bk For
ease of notation going forward, let b = ÂKk=0 bk.
Table 4 tests the the hypothesis that b > 0 against the null that Ho : b = 0. If news sentiment
simply reflects price movements or information about fundamentals that is already in prices, then b
will not be significantly different than zero. Column (1) estimates equation 13 without any control
variables. The first row reports the total accumulated effect of sentiment, b , on the current t monthly
growth in prices. The subsequent rows groups the summed lagged effect of sentiment by years.
The estimated coefficient describes the proportional relationship between the percentage change
in lagged sentiment and prices. An estimated coefficient equal to one would indicate that monthly
price and lagged sentiment growth have a one-to-one relationship. Estimates show that a one percent
appreciation in the sum of lagged sentiment is associated with a monthly price appreciation of
approximately 0.8 percentage points. This is significant relative to the mean of monthly housing
price appreciation across this period of 25 basis points.
Nonetheless, the estimated effect of sentiment may still be due to changes in fundamentals.
For example, if news sentiment reports on a fundamental not yet incorporated into prices, then b
17It is important to note that all estimations rely on assumptions over a particular lag structure on the data. I select this
structure using a number of standard model selection criteria, but each has its acknowledged benefits and drawbacks. In
addition, the lag structure restricts my estimation sample period. Since my measures for sentiment being in January 2000,
my estimation evaluates prices beginning in 2003.
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may still be greater than zero but biased upwards. To address this concern, columns (1) through (6)
add an increasing number of fundamental controls to the specification. I add each of the fundamental
controls sequentially to test the stability of b . Column (2) controls for rental growth, column (3)
adds variables for real interest rates and 30-year mortgage rates, and column (4) adds housing supply
variables including new housing starts and building permits. Column (5) controls for additional
labor market variables for employment, unemployment, and changing labor force, while column (6)
includes controls for changing population and income. I do not present the individual coefficients
for each control variable as they are not the primary interest of my analysis, but the coefficients are
either generally in the right direction or not significantly different than zero. Estimates of b remains
remarkably robust with the inclusion of each additional control and decline neither in significance
nor magnitude. As argued by a number of previous studies, the stability of my estimates to the
sequential addition of controls suggests bias from unobserved factors is less likely (Altonji et al.
(2005); Angrist and Krueger (1999)).
Figure 5 plots the predicted prices first using only fundamentals, and then using sentiment.
The plot shows that sentiment growth is able to fit both the boom and subsequent bust of prices.
In contrast, fundamentals explain a portion of the boom, but are not able to fit the subsequent bust
in prices. Consistent with prior studies, observed fundamentals are not able to explain much of
the variation in prices on their own. The adjusted R2 from running a regression with fundamental
controls only is 0.10.18 Adding in lagged sentiment explains an additional 75 percent of the variation
in price growth, increasing the R2 to 0.85. From 2004 to 2006, aggregate housing prices increased
by 33 percent. Observed fundamental controls account for approximately 9 percentage points, while
sentiment explains an additional 24 percentage points.
Column (7) adds in monthly fixed effects to control for any seasonal variation in housing
prices. The magnitude of b actually increases by 10 basis points. Alternatively, the effect of senti-
ment could simply be capturing a linear time trend in house price changes. Column (8) shows that
controlling for a simple linear time trend does reduce the magnitude of b somewhat, but estimates
18However, these same fundamentals were able to explain a significant variation in prices historically. As detailed in
the next section, running a regression with the same fundamentals prior to this period (from 1987 to 2000) results in an
adjusted R2 of 0.69.
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remain positive and significant. Further examination reveals that the coefficient estimate on the lin-
ear time trend (not shown) is negative, fitting the bust of the housing prices rather than the boom.
Sentiment still largely accounts for the run-up in aggregate house prices.
Column (9) applies a specification that includes lagged measures of fundamentals. Search
frictions in the housing market could also potentially affect the immediate effect of fundamentals
(Wheaton (1990); Stein (1995); Krainer (2001)). Not all lags can be included due to high collinear-
ity among fundamentals, but I select as many lags as possible with the same model selection criteria
used to select the lag structure of sentiment. The effect of sentiment again remains positive, signif-
icant, and robust in magnitude. Column (10) reveals that the only variable able to drive down the
magnitude of b are lagged measures of the price growth itself. This is not surprising as the pre-
dictability of house prices has been well documented (Case and Shiller (1989); Cutler et al. (1990)).
Still, coefficient estimates of sentiment growth remain positive. In the following panel estimation,
the predictive effect of sentiment remains both positive and significant beyond lagged price growth.
Still, estimations in Table 4 are limited to a small number of observations (N = 94) and only
accounts for variation in aggregate price growth. Table 5 utilizes the full panel dataset and tests
whether sentiment has an effect on prices across cities. I estimate this effect with the following
regressions:
4pit = a0+bLkDsn,it + gDxit +dm+ ci+nit (14)
where i denotes each city. In some specifications I also control for unobserved heterogeneity across
cities with city dummies, ci. I assume errors are heteroskedastic across time and serially correlated
within city, and cluster Newey and West (1987) standard errors by city assuming auto-correlation
up to twelve lags. The number of observations between Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 vary slightly
since I do not have rental data for Las Vegas, but I do include Vegas when I estimate the effect of
sentiment without controlling for fundamentals. Also, rental data is only available through October
2009 for most of cities. Column 1 has more observations since my sentiment indexes are available
through August 2011. Some newspapers do have gaps in coverage by Factiva at various points in
time, and thus are missing sentiment measures for those months.
Column (1) estimates regression 14 without any additional controls. Estimates of b are even
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larger in magnitude than in the aggregate specification, with an estimated coefficient for b of 1.12.
Adding in fundamentals sequentially between columns (1) and (2) does not change the magnitude
or significance of the results, and including all fundamentals actually increases the total effect of
sentiment slightly to 1.22. The robustness of this estimates confirms the stability of b from the
composite estimation, and further reduces concerns of that bias from unobserved fundamentals.
Column (3) of Table 5 adds city fixed effects to the specification. Trading behavior in different
markets may have particular characteristics that affect the differences in house price movements
across different cities. Some cities may have inherently higher or lower house price levels (for
example, New York may have high house prices due to particular characteristics of its location,
financial center, etc.) that corresponds to innately optimistic newspapers. Transforming prices
into growth terms normalizes fixed differences in house price levels across cities. Nonetheless,
some markets also may also have coincidentally higher house price and news sentiment changes.
Including city fixed effects removes any differences in house price appreciation due to time-invariant
unobservable characteristics. The estimated effect of sentiment actually increases in magnitude after
controlling for city fixed effects. This suggests that a large part of the predicted effect of sentiment
can be attributed to its effect on price growth across time.
Columns (4) and (5) add month and year fixed effects. Adding just month fixed effects
does not affect the results, estimates do not appear to be driven by seasonality. Including both
month and year fixed effects drops the estimated coefficient by about half the magnitude. This drop
in magnitude reflects the common trends in price growth across markets. The most recent boom
of housing markets was notable because it was appeared to be a coordinated movement across
many markets. Nonetheless, even with month and year dummies, the sentiment index still has a
positive and significant predictive effect on price appreciation both statistically and economically.
The coefficient implies that a one percent increase in accumulated sentiment growth predicts a 0.6
percentage change in price growth (monthly). This is still large compared to the average monthly
house price growth of 16 basis points across cities during this period. Column (6) alternatively
controls for a linear time trend, which drives down the magnitude slightly from column (4). As in
the aggregate estimates, the coefficient on the linear time trend is negative, fitting the bust of prices
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in many places but not the boom.
In column (7), I add lagged fundamentals and find that the magnitude of the effect declines
slightly to 0.87, but is still positive and economically significant. Column (8) of Table 5 sepa-
rately tests whether sentiment has any predictive effect from price growth above and beyond lagged
prices. While the b drops to 30 basis points, the estimated effect of sentiment remains positive and
significant. As in the aggregate specification, most of the explanatory power of lagged price growth
comes from the first few lags (Dpt 1). Lagged prices beyond the preceding year do not have much
predictive power for future prices, whereas sentiment growth leads prices by more than two years.
Estimating over the whole sample period conceals whether the results are driven by the boom
or bust period housing prices, or both. In columns (9) and (10), I split the sample and estimates
the effect of sentiment on prices separately for each time period. Column (9) estimates equation 14
with data before July 2006, and Column (10) runs the regression with data July 2006 and afterwards.
Concurrent with plots in Panel B of Figure 4, I find that sentiment predicts both the boom and bust
of housing prices across cities. Estimated effects are positive, significant, and large in magnitude,
while the magnitude of b is slightly larger for the bust than the boom. This is consistent with the
observation that not all cities experienced a rise in housing prices, but a majority experienced a
subsequent bust.
5.1.1 Subprime Conditions
One concern for the results in Table 4 and 5 is that estimates could instead reflect a spurious cor-
relation between news and the rise in the availability of credit and subprime lending patterns. The
extraordinary rise in house prices from 2000-2005 was also accompanied by an unprecedented ex-
pansion of mortgage credit, particularly in the subprime market (Mian and Sufi (2009); Glaeser
et al. (2010)). Easing lending standards and rising approval rates opened homebuying to a new set
of consumers, which potentially allowed a new group of homebuyers to shift aggregate demand and
drive up house price growth (Keys et al. (2010, 2012); Mian et al. (2010)).19 Mian and Sufi (2009)
19Other papers that explore subprime lending explanations and the role of mortgage securitization in the housing crisis
are Bajari et al. (2008); Danis and Pennington-Cross (2008); Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011); Gerardi et al. (2008);
Goetzmann et al. (2012); Mayer and Pence (2008); Mayer et al. (2010); Haughwout and Tracy (2009) Adelino et al.
(2009); Campbell et al. (2011); Foote et al. (2008); Mayer et al. (2009); Mian and Sufi (2009); Mian et al. (2010);
25
show that lending to subprime zip codes grew rapidly from 2002 to 2005, and sharply fell as house
prices declined. Thus if news simply documents the rise and fall in subprime lending, then not
controlling for these patterns may misrepresent the effect of b .
I address this possibility by including additional controls for credit and subprime lending in
Table 7. Column (1) in Table 7 adds controls for the changes in the six-month London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR). Estimations in Tables 4 and 5 already include changes in overall the real
interest rate and 30-year mortgage rate, but many adjustable-rate subprime mortgages were set at
an initial fixed rate for the first two years and then indexed to changes in the LIBOR six-month
rate (Mayer et al. (2009); Gerardi et al. (2008)). Column (1) includes the full set of controls from
column (5) in Table 5, including fundamentals, lagged fundamentals, month and city fixed effects.
Including changes in the 6-month LIBOR rate has no effect on the results, and the estimated effect of
sentiment is still positive and significant. The estimate also remains robust in magnitude compared
to estimates in column (5), Table 5.
Column (2) additionally controls for the fraction of subprime mortgages and average loan-
to-value ration in each city. I do not have measures for subprime lending and applicant income for
Atlanta, Charlotte, Dallas, and Minneapolis. Thus, regressions in columns (2)-(5) only include data
from 16 cities. Additionally, measures of subprime lending, loan-to-value, and applicant income
are only available through 2008. Thus, estimations in columns 2-5 are limited to five years of data
(2003-2008), and restricted to observations where both data on subprime lending and sentiment
indexes are available. Nonetheless including trends of subprime lending and loan-to-value ratios
does not significantly change the results. The estimated effect of sentiment on price growth declines
slightly, but by less than 5 basis points. In column (5), I include additional measures of income,
but specific to those reported by mortgage applicants. The effect of sentiment is again remarkably
robust. b decreases slightly by 5 basis points, but remains positive and significant in magnitude.
Only including additional lags of the subprime variables reduces estimates of b more substantially,
but estimated effect of sentiment remains economically significant.
Piskorski et al. (2010).
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5.2 Sentiment Effects on Housing Trading Volume
Existing theories of sentiment also links sentiment to trading volume (Harrison and Kreps (1978);
De Long et al. (1990b)). For example, Baker and Stein (2004) reason that when limits to arbitrage
are very costly, optimistic investors are more likely to trade and drive up volume. Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003) and Odean (1998) make related arguments based on overconfident investors. The
model similarly provides testable empirical predictions for housing sentiment and trading volume.
Equations 9 suggests a relationship between changes in sentiment and trading volume levels. Thus,
I estimate the effect of sentiment on trading volume in the housing market with the following spec-
ification:
vit = j0+kLkDsn,it +Dxit +dm+ ci+xit (15)
where vit represents the de-trended log volume of housing transactions in each month t . I measure
trading volume in de-trended log levels to address concerns of nonstationarity in levels of volume
in the housing market. I follow a de-trending methodology applied to volume in Campbell et al.
(1993). I also control for all observed fundamentals, quarterly fixed effects, and city fixed effects,
and lagged fundamentals. As in equation 13, k represents the sum of coefficients for all lags of
sentiment.
Figure 6 plots the composite-20 housing sentiment index and volume of housing transactions
over time. I construct a composite measure of transaction volume by aggregating the number of
transactions in each city and weighting each measure with the normalized weights used to calculate
the composite-20 Case-Shiller home price index. Figure 6 shows that sentiment not only forecasts
the pattern in prices, but also foreshadows a rise and fall in volume. Interestingly, volume appears
to peak before prices. The plot shows that volume begins to drop at the end of 2005, while prices
do not begin to decline until July 2006. Sentiment thus still precedes volume by approximately a
18 months (1.5 years). This pattern provides a potential explanation for the long lead in sentiment
to prices. Figure 6 suggests that sentiment moves first and leads to housing transactions in the
following year, and this increased trading activity shows up in housing prices another year later.
Table 7 presents the results for regression 15. I select a model that includes K = 18 lags i.e.
27
a year and six months. Note that my volume data ends in July 2009 so that my sample period is
shorter than in my estimations for prices. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the effect of sentiment on the
composite-20 measure of transaction volume, and Columns (4)-(6) estimates over the panel dataset
across cities. Consistent with predictions in Equation 9, the growth in sentiment has a positive
association with increases in transaction volume levels. Columns (1) and (4) runs the regression
with any additional controls. Sentiment growth has a positive and significant accumulated effect on
trading volume both in the composite and panel data. Specifically, a one percent increase across
monthly lags of sentiment growth leads to a 4.7 and 3.5 percent increase in the volume of housing
transactions in the composite and panel regressions respectively.
As in our regressions above, a primary concern is that this positive effect instead reflects pos-
itive changes from fundamentals. Thus, Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include the same set of housing
fundamentals used to explain housing prices as well as month and city fixed effects. In the compos-
ite regressions, the estimated coefficient for k remains robust to the inclusion of fundamentals in xit ,
and further increases in magnitude after controlling for month fixed effects. In the panel regressions,
including fundamentals, lagged fundamentals, month, city fixed effects reduces the magnitude of
the k in the panel regressions, but the effect of sentiment growth on volume remains positive and
significant. Column (6) shows that a one percent positive appreciation in lagged sentiment leads to
a 1.6 percent increase in transaction volume after controlling for lagged fundamentals. This is still
well above the mean of detrended log volume (-.02). These results are consistent with empirical ev-
idence that connects investor sentiment to trading volume (Barber and Odean (2000, 2008); Odean
(1999)). The correlation between volume and prices has also been previously documented in the
housing market (Stein (1995)). Genesove and Mayer (1997) provide empirical evidence that behav-
ioral biases such as loss aversion might explain positive price-volume correlations in the housing
market.
6 Does Sentiment Reflect Changes in Unobserved Fundamentals?
The previous section shows that sentiment, proxied by the tone of news, has a predictive effect for
house price growth and transaction volume above and beyond a number of observed housing fun-
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damentals. In this section I address whether this effect instead reflects effects from unobserved fun-
damentals. As noted in the previous section, the robustness of the estimates to the inclusion of each
additional control is already strongly suggestive that bias from unobservables is less likely. Further-
more, the lead in sentiment growth to prices suggests that prices move in response to sentiment and
not the reverse. One might be worried that these indexes actually overlap since Case-Shiller home
price index is reported using housing transactions from previous months. However news sentiment
leads prices by more than two years, and the Case-Shiller home price index is calculated over trans-
actions from the current month and the previous two months. Even if there is some further delay in
reported transactions, news sentiment peaks at such a significant year lead that it very unlikely due
to some mechanical delay in the reporting of prices. Still, prediction does not eliminate the possibil-
ity that news is reporting information on unobserved fundamentals not yet incorporated into prices.
Search frictions in the housing market could delay the effect of both sentiment and fundamentals on
price growth.
If the housing sentiment index is affected by unobserved fundamentals, estimates of senti-
ment in Tables 4 and 5 may be potentially biased. The extent of this bias depends on whether xit
includes the key set of fundamentals that drive house price growth. If only minor fundamentals are
missing, then estimates may still be biased but only minimally. I can assess whether my observed
vector xit appears to miss any important housing fundamentals by testing whether it explains prices
well during periods where sentiment is not suspected to be a factor. Table 8 splits the sample into
two periods, pre- and post-2000, and estimates the effect on prices with fundamentals alone. If xit
sufficiently controls for important determinants of housing prices, then these variables should ex-
plain changes in price growth during the “pre-bubble” period, i.e. before 2000. The adjusted R2 in
column 1 shows that fundamentals explain almost 70 percent of the variation in composite housing
prices before January 2000. I use the composite-10 price index since the composite-20 index is
only available starting in 2000. Similar to the composite-20 index, the Case-Shiller Composite-10
home price index is a weighted average of ten major U.S. cities., which includes Boston, Chicago,
Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington,
D.C. In contrast, the same fundamentals explain very little of the change in prices after 2000 with
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an adjusted R2 equal to only 0.092. Columns 3 and 4 similarly show that fundamentals have greater
explanatory power for housing prices across cities prior to 2000. Local fundamentals do explain at
least 23 percent of the variation in prices after 2000, but are able to explain 1.55 times more prior
to 2000. Fundamentals are more significant in cities that did not experience rapid growth in prices.
These results suggest that if that my news sentiment index is affected by articles on unobserved
fundamentals, then bias from these variables are at least minimal.
Still, the housing sentiment index may be contaminated by news reports on unobserved fun-
damentals. I exploit the richness of my data to isolate any articles that discuss housing fundamentals
and partial out their effect directly. I identify any article that mentions words related to housing fun-
damentals using stem words such as “unemployment”, “mortgage rates”, or “taxes.” Tetlock et al.
(2008) employ a similar strategy to identify news articles that discuss firm fundamentals. The ad-
vantage of this strategy is that I can identify articles that discuss fundamentals that I both observe
and do not observe. I then directly control for fraction of the positive minus negative words in these
news stories that mention fundamentals in my estimations. If information on fundamentals from
these articles subsequently drive prices, then controlling for words in these articles should drive
down the significance and magnitude of the results in Section 5.
Table 9 show that the estimated effects of sentiment on price growth remain robust to control-
ling for news content over fundamentals. I create individual measures of these “media fundamen-
tals” and evaluate their effect on prices separately. I control for all lags of these measures as well as
all observed controls. Columns (1) through (7) adds a control for articles discussing each housing
fundamental to test the stability of b . Column (2) shows that the estimate drops after controlling for
news articles discussing credit conditions, but the remains stable with the addition of remaining me-
dia fundamentals. Column 2 reports an estimated coefficient for the accumulated effect of sentiment
approximately equal to 0.5, an almost one-to-two proportional relationship between lagged senti-
ment changes and monthly price growth. The estimated effect of positive news sentiment remains
significant, positive, and large in magnitude.
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6.1 Weekend and Narrative News Content
Results in Section 5 show that sentiment predicts price growth at a significant lead of more than two
years, and estimated effects remain highly robust to the sequential addition of observed controls.
The observed set of fundamentals explains a significant amount of variation in price growth prior to
2000, suggesting it is unlikely effects are due to a key omitted fundamental after 2000. In addition,
the estimated effect does not appear to be driven by articles that discuss fundamentals in its text. To
narrow the identifying variation further, I isolate two subsamples of the news articles that cater to
reader sentiment but are less likely to be affected by information on fundamentals.
The first set I isolate are those articles that are published on the weekend. Weekend articles
are likely correlated with sentiment because it must cater to readers who prefer content lighter in
nature. Indeed, research on newspaper readership shows that lighter readers are concentrated on the
weekend. The Readership Institute of Northwestern University conducted a survey of 37,000 news-
paper readers in 2000 and found that readership is highest on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, driven
by the greater proportion of “light” readers on the weekend. Light readers are those who spend
fewer than 16 minutes reading the newspaper a week, whereas heavy readers pay attention to the
news every day. Furthermore, the survey reports that these readers appear to be light readers of all
news alternatives, including television news, magazines, and internet websites.20 Thus these readers
are more likely to be those who are more subject to sentiment and demand articles that cater to their
preferences. This is consistent with why Saturday and Sunday editions of newspapers typically in-
clude additional sections, such as entertainment and sports, in order to draw readers who are more
subject to sentiment. At the same time, weekend news articles are less likely to reflect information
on fundamentals as market news tends to be reported during the business week. Furthermore, any
press releases on fundamentals data can only occur on a working weekday. Thus, news stories on
the weekend are more likely to be exogenous to official news reports on fundamentals. Because my
dataset includes the exact date of each story, I am able to identify the exact day of the week each
article is published. Thus, I create a weekend instrument that only analyzes the tone of articles that
occur on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.
20Survey reports can be found at http://www.readership.org/reports.asp
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Examining a smaller subset of articles allows me to run further falsification tests on the as-
sumption that they are less likely to reflect news on fundamentals. For example, one concern might
be that news releases on fundamentals are increasingly released on Friday and then reported over
the weekend. If this is the case than the increase of positive or negative words on the weekend may
be the result of increasing news releases concentrated at the end of the week. To test this possibility,
I compile a dataset of of all the press release dates on various housing fundamentals. Specifically, I
organize the schedule of press releases from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and regional data
from the Census. Table 10 reports the correlation of the weekend instrument with the percentage
of news reports released on Friday. The first row reports the correlation of all BLS news releases
and the subsequent rows reports the correlation with regional and employment releases. Column 2
reveals that the correlation with each are very low, suggesting the weekend instrument is not simply
reporting news occurring on Friday. The last two rows examine the correlation with Census releases
on new residential construction and sales. The weekend instrument is also uncorrelated with the
percentage of these releases occurring on Friday.
Another concern might be that news on fundamentals are reported during the working week,
but then summarized over the weekend. One way to address this issue is to control for the pattern of
positive and negative words that occur during the weekday. If weekday articles contain information
on fundamentals, then controlling for this content should address concerns that weekend content is
actually a proxy or response to weekday information. I control for the fraction of positive minus
negative words in weekday articles in both the first stage regressions Table 11 and instrumental
variable (IV) results in 12. A captured effect of sentiment is then narrowed to the differential
variation between weekend and weekday news.
I create an additional instrument that from the narrative articles in my sample. A narrative
article refers to one that narrates a story or account of events around particular individuals. Narra-
tive writing is also a particular writing strategy through which newspapers can reflect sentiment and
capture readers’ attention. The Readership Institute Survey reports that readers have high preference
for “people-centered news” or articles about local ordinary people. The study particularly encour-
ages newspapers to increase readership through this “approach to story-writing” and finds that it is
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how a story is written that matters more for reader satisfaction. At the same time, narrative articles
contain anecdotal stories, but tend to offer no actual data or news on fundamentals in the market.
The above narrative expresses an obvious optimistic view over the housing market, but contains no
actual news on any particular fundamentals. Thus, trends in news slant across narrative articles are
correlated with sentiment but plausibly exogenous from any actual news on fundamentals.
I identify narrative articles by locating those that discuss individual people. I isolate any
article that includes a name from name lists from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
the Census. The Social Security publishes a list of the 200 most popular first names of the 2000s.
I create a list of last names with the top 1000 most frequently occurring surnames in the 2000
census. I then define an article as narrative if it discusses any of these names in its first paragraph. I
exclude any articles that match a quoted statement by an individual in case these are cited statements
from various experts. I then analyze the share of positive and negative words in just the identified
“narrative” articles in my sample.
I then use share of positive and negative words over the smaller sample of weekend and
narrative articles as instruments for my overall measure of sentiment. These instruments are only
valid if they are sufficiently correlated with the housing sentiment index. I directly test the first-stage
relevance between sentiment and each of my instruments with the following first-stage regression:
4sn,it = a0+l4zit +h4xit +dm+ ci+uit (16)
where z represents the log of the candidate instrument. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 11 confirms that
changes in both the weekend and narrative instruments are positively and significantly correlated
with positive news sentiment. I test the strength of both instruments and report the F-statistics in
bold at the bottom of Table 11. The weekend instrument is stronger than the narrative instrument,
but both instruments have more than sufficient strength, with F-statistics well above the benchmark
of 10.
Table 12 presents the second-stage results of instrumenting for positive news sentiment. Col-
umn (1) presents the original ordinary least squares estimates with all controls from estimating
Equation 14. Columns (2) and (3) reports the results instrumenting for sentiment using the weekend
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and narrative index respectively. The estimated effect for sentiment on price growth remains pos-
itive, significant, and robust in magnitude. Instrumenting sentiment with the weekend instrument
actually increases the magnitude of the estimated effect of sentiment on price growth substantially.
While our main concern is addressing upward bias, noise from sentiment measures likely biases
standard ordinary least squares estimates downward. Estimates remain robust in magnitude after
instrumenting with the narrative index, though do not increase.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that sentiment has a significant effect on housing prices, particularly
during the boom and bust from 2000 to 2011. While there has been much discussion and interest in
the role of mass psychology or “animal spirits” in the most recent housing crisis, empirical support
for this argument has been limited due to the lack of sentiment measures for the housing market.
This paper provides the first measures of sentiment across local housing markets by capturing the
tone of local housing news across 20 major city newspapers.
I find that sentiment forecasts the boom and bust of housing markets by a significant lead,
peaking two years before house prices began to decline in 2006. Results show that sentiment growth
is positively associated with future price growth, and is able to explain a significant amount of
variation in the price changes above and beyond fundamentals. In particular, the housing sentiment
index is able to explain an additional 70 percent of the variation in national house prices beyond
observed fundamentals. Further evidence suggests these estimates are unlikely driven by latent
fundamentals. Estimates are significantly robust to the inclusion of an exhaustive list of controls
and remain robust to a novel instrumental variable strategy.
The findings of this paper have several potential implications. The evidence suggests that
sentiment has an important effect on asset prices, and raises questions over how behavioral factors
interact in economic contexts. Expectations and fundamentals likely have a more complex rela-
tionship, for example, perhaps where individuals systematically overestimate a positive shock from
lower interest rates or increases in credit supply. Indeed, studies on financial literacy suggest that
many investors are not able to appropriately compound interest or account for inflation (Lusardi
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and Mitchell (2007b)). Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) find supportive evidence that particularly
links money illusion to the run-up in housing prices. Furthermore, the ability of news to forecast
price movements suggests measures of market sentiment may be useful indicators to monitor em-
pirically. The central finding of this paper, however, highlights that sentiment plays an important
role on aggregate economic outcomes and suggests it deserves greater attention in future work.
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Appendix
A.1 Sentiment Index Robustness and Alternate Versions
Leading v. Full Text. The primary sentiment index used in this paper is the share of positive
minus negative words calculated over the leading text of housing articles each city-month. I create
a number of alternate versions of the baseline sentiment index for robustness. Table A.1 compares
the effect of sentiment on house price growth using different versions of the housing sentiment
index. Column (1) first presents the results using the baseline index, Posit  Negit . Column (2)
similarly applies the share of positive minus negative words, but calculated using the full text of
housing articles. Using the full rather than the leading text has no significant effect on the results, in
precision or magnitude. The bottom panel of Table A.1 reports the correlations of each alternative
with the baseline index, and shows that the full text version of the index is highly correlated with
the baseline.
News Intensity. Excitement over the housing market may be evident in not only the tone of
news articles, but also by how many articles cover the housing market each month. A newspaper
can cater to reader sentiment through both the slant and frequency of its housing news articles. Thus
to capture this dimension, I interact the baseline index with the share of housing articles published
by a newspaper each month. Specifically, this version can be represented by:
(Posit  Negit)⇤ # Housing Articles# Total Articles it
The share of housing articles is equal to the number of housing articles divided by the total number
of news articles (in any subject) in city i and month t. Column (3) shows that this version also has
no effect on the results, and is highly correlated with the baseline.
Positive v. Negative Index. Another informative robustness check is to separate the effect of
positive and negative words. If the baseline index is appropriately capturing sentiment, we might
expect the growth in the share of positive words to have a positive association with prices while the
share of negative words should have a negative association with house prices. Indeed, columns (4)
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and (6) shows that the effect of just positive words is positive while negative words has an opposing
negative effect. The baseline index has a greater predictive effect for house prices than just positive
or negative words alone, but both still have a significant effect on house price growth individually.
Term Weighted Index. Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) also propose an index that weights
each word in an article using the term-weighting formula:
wk j =
1+ logt fi j
1+ log(a)
log(
N
d fi
)
where N represents the total number of articles in the sample, d fi, the number of articles containing
at least one occurrence of the ith word, t fi j the raw count of the ith word in the jth document, and
a the total number of positive words in the article. The first term accounts for the frequency of
the term within each article but also applies a log transformation to attenuate the impact of high
frequency words. For example, the word soar may appear 32,000 times in our sample while the
word skyrocket only appears 10 times, but this does not mean soar is necessarily 3200 times more
important than the word skyrocket. The second term measures the importance of the term across
documents by dividing the total number of documents in the sample by the number of documents
containing the particular term. Thus the word soar will receive a high weight based on the first term,
but if it is a common word that appears in more than 90 percent of articles, then the second term
will decrease the first term by more than 90 percent. I apply this weighting formula to the share
of positive words and test to see this has a significant effect on the results in Column (5) of Table
A.1. The results show that term-weighted share of positive words has an almost identical impact on
house price growth as the non-weighted positive index.
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FIGURE 1: COMPOSITE-20 HOUSING SENTIMENT AND CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDEX
Note: This figure plots the composite-20 sentiment index and the composite-20 Case-Shiller housing price
index. Lines are smoothed for seasonal variation and noise with a 6-month backward and forward moving
average. Housing prices and sentiment are calculated using a 3-month backward moving average in empirical
estimations.
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FIGURE 2: HOUSING SENTIMENT AND CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDEXES BY CITY
Note: Figure 2 plots the housing sentiment index and housing price indexes for individual cities. Lines are
smoothed for seasonal variation and noise with a 6-month backward and forward moving average. Housing
prices and sentiment are calculated using a 3-month backward moving average in empirical estimations.
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FIGURE 3: RANDOM SENTIMENT PLACEBO TEST
Note: Figure 3 presents evidence that the pattern of positive minus negative words is specific to housing
articles. “Housing Sentiment” is the share of positive minus negative words calculated over newspaper articles
that cover the housing market. “Random” is the share of positive minus negative words across a random
sample of articles of any subject each city-month. As seen in the plot, random sentiment generally remains
relatively flat and does not exhibit the same boom and bust pattern as housing sentiment. Lines are smoothed
for seasonal variation and noise with a 6-month backward and forward moving average.
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FIGURE 4: VALIDATING SENTIMENT AGAINST SURVEYS OF HOUSING MARKET CONFIDENCE
Panel A. Housing Sentiment Index and Survey of Consumers Home Buyer Confidence
Panel B. Housing Sentiment Index and National Association of Home Builders Confidence Index
Note: Panel A plots the composite-20 housing sentiment index with a national survey of home buyer confidence. The
Survey of Consumers surveys a nationally representative sample of 500 consumers and asks whether they think it is a
good time to buy a home. Consumers answer “Yes/No/Don’t Know.” The green dashed line represents the percentage
of those surveyed who answered “Yes.” Panel B plots the composite housing sentiment index with a national survey
of members of home builder confidence. The National Association Home Builders asks members of their association
each month to rate the current market conditions of the sale of new homes, the prospective market conditions in the
next 6 months, and the expected volume of new home buyers. The NAHB index weights these answers into one index
to represent an aggregate builders’ opinion of housing market conditions. The timing the sentiment index coincides
with survey measures of confidence, suggesting that it is reflecting investor beliefs over the housing market. Lines are
smoothed for seasonal variation and noise with a 6-month backward and forward moving average.
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FIGURE 5: PREDICTING HOUSE PRICE GROWTH WITH SENTIMENT INDEX V. FUNDAMENTALS
Note: Figure 7 plots observed composite-20 prices and predicted prices. The dashed line represents prices predicted with
contemporaneous. fundamentals alone. The solid line plots prices predicted with positive sentiment only. The picture
illustrates that sentiment can explain a significant variation in prices. More importantly, sentiment fits the prediction to
the timing of the boom and bust, whereas fundamentals only predict a linear projection of prices.
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FIGURE 6: COMPOSITE-20 HOUSING SENTIMENT INDEX AND TRANSACTION VOLUME
Note: Figure 8 plots a composite-20 volume of housing transactions and my housing sentiment index. Data
for transaction volume comes from DataQuick. I calculate a composite-20 measure of volume using the same
weights used to create the Case-Shiller Composite-20 Home price Index. Lines are smoothed for seasonal
variation and noise with a 6-month backward and forward moving average.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR NEWSPAPER HOUSING ARTICLES
Newspaper Publication # Articles AP A-section Real Estate Local General
All Cities 19,620 6% 19% 20% 28% 45%
Atlanta The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 647 0 24 13 29 60
Boston Boston Herald/Boston Globe 966 3 23 15 24 43
Charlotte The Observer 556 14 23 28 17 33
Chicago Chicago Tribune 1,965 8 79 66 13 27
Cleveland The Plain Dealer 303 1 18 13 20 62
DC The Washington Post 1,171 6 13 38 27 24
Dallas The Dallas Morning News 1,294 0 3 0 74 22
Denver The Denver Post 432 1 13 0 11 83
Detroit Detroit News/Detroit Free Press 624 5 48 23 10 55
LA LA Times/LA Daily News 3,579 5 17 14 18 69
Las Vegas Las Vegas Review-Journal 588 0 15 0 4 92
Miami The Miami Herald 678 7 27 11 14 51
Minneapolis Star Tribune 625 1 17 20 1 79
NYC New York Times 1,372 4 19 33 17 42
Phoenix The Arizona Republic 1,921 0 19 5 52 29
Portland The Oregonian 509 2 18 16 35 42
San Diego The San Diego Union-Tribune 1,086 7 14 26 16 52
San Francisco The San Francisco Chronicle 530 0 27 8 8 81
Seattle The Seattle Times 398 29 25 36 5 59
Tampa Tampa Tribune 376 0 30 2 43 41
Note: Table 1 lists each city, its corresponding newspaper, and descriptive statistics for my sample of housing news
articles. My source for housing news articles is Factiva.com, which provides a subject code to identify articles that cover
housing market news. My sample covers articles from January 2000 to August 2011. “AP” lists the percent of articles that
are credited to the Associated Press. “A-section” refers to the percent of articles located in the front or “A” section of the
newspaper. “Real Estate” is the percent of articles that were published in a special real estate section of the newspaper.
“Local News” refers to those articles listed in the metropolitan or any specific regional news section of the newspaper.
Most of the articles are found in a general news or business news section of the newspaper. It is possible for one article
to show up in more than one category. For example, if an article is in the real estate section of the regional edition of the
newspaper than it would show up in both columns 6 and 7. Thus, the percents will not necessarily add up to 100 percent
for each city.
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TABLE 2: SAMPLE POSITIVE WORDS AND WORD COUNTS
word % of Total PosWord Count Freq.
BOOM 3.24 959
BOOST 1.17 348
BRIGHT 0.36 106
EXCEED 0.33 98
EXTEND 0.52 154
GOOD 2.29 678
GREAT 0.69 203
HEAT 3.1 917
HOPE 0.69 205
JUMP 2.67 790
LEAP 0.49 145
POSITIVE 0.3 89
SHOOT 0.44 130
SIZZLE 0.48 143
SKYROCKET 0.34 101
SOAR 2.23 660
SPIKE 0.32 96
SPRINGING 0.49 145
STRONG 2.4 711
SURGE 1.91 565
Note: This base list of positive words are from the word lists Increas and Riseword lists in the Harvard IV-4 Psychological
Dictionary. I use these lists to maintain the objectivity of a predetermined list, but also reflect how the media spins
excitement over asset markets. Shiller (2008) in particular argues that the media expresses a positive slant through
superlatives that emphasize price increases and upward movements. I then expand the original word list with synonyms,
alternate tenses, and inflections. I also eliminate obvious misclassifications. The original Harvard list consisted of 136
words while the extended Inc-NEW list contains 403 words. This table presents a sample of words and their corresponding
word counts.
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS – SENTIMENT, PRICES, VOLUME, AND FUNDAMENTALS
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Housing Sentiment Indexes :
Composite-20 139 1.093 1.716 -3.152 4.435
Cities 2515 1.102 2.606 -10.355 9.979
Case-Shiller Housing Price Indexes:
Composite-20 138 154.451 31.077 100.000 206.520
Cities 2760 144.543 40.856 64.030 280.870
Volume of Housing Transactions:
Composite-20 114 5326.172 1580.046 2538.817 9797.987
City 2046 4584.942 2762.715 160.000 21809.000
Fundamentals:
Real Interest Rate 138 1.833 0.812 -0.010 4.020
30-yr Mortgage Rate 138 6.087 0.933 4.230 8.520
LIBOR 6-month Rate 138 3.001 2.006 0.400 7.000
Rental Index 2242 113.317 12.255 89.661 154.958
Unemployment Rate 2760 6.074 2.461 2.100 16.600
Employment (Thousands) 2760 2161.150 1917.453 158.500 8757.600
Housing Starts 2760 1259.820 1099.021 49.000 6291.000
Building Permits 2760 1894.101 1534.131 57.000 20802.000
Log Population 2400 15.201 0.635 14.109 16.764
Log Income 2400 18.882 0.699 17.554 20.755
Average Loan-to-Value 1872 0.743 0.099 0.331 0.882
Share of Subprime Lending (in Amt) 1872 12.937 7.247 0.000 34.963
Log Loan Applicant Income 1728 11.450 0.265 10.939 12.192
Note: Housing sentiment indices in this table are the difference between the share of positive and negative words each
city-month (pos  neg/total), see Section 4 for full details on how the index is calculated. Data for the sentiment
indices go through July 2011, Case-Shiller home prices are reported with a two-month lag so are available through June
2011, volume of housing transactions are provided by DataQuick through June 2009, and rent is available from REIS
through October 2009. Composite-20 versions of the housing sentiment index and transaction volume are calculated
using the same normalized weights used to calculate the Composite-20 Case-Shiller index. There are some gaps in
newspaper coverage in the data, thus data for housing sentiment indices are not completely balanced. The index can only
be calculated for months where newspaper coverage is available in the data, thus some cities are missing sentiment index
data in months where the newspaper was not covered by Factiva. Details on the sources of the housing fundamentals are
available in Section 3.
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TABLE 6: SENTIMENT PREDICTS CITY HOUSE PRICES BEYOND SUBPRIME LENDING TRENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sum of Lagged Sentiment 0.830*** 0.778*** 0.769*** 0.692*** 0.421***
(0.148) (0.162) (0.161) (0.154) (0.135)
Year 1 Lags (L1+ ...+L12) 0.193*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.224*** 0.144***
(0.043) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.035)
Year 2 Lags (L13+ ...+L24) 0.304*** 0.290*** 0.287*** 0.263*** 0.169***
(0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.051) (0.049)
Year 3 Lags (L25+ ...+L43) 0.333*** 0.275*** 0.270*** 0.204** 0.108
(0.088) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.08)
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X
City Fixed Effects X X X X X
Fundamentals X X X X X
Lagged Fundamentals X X X X X
LIBOR 6-month rate X X X X X
% Subprime Loans . X X X X
Loan-To-Value . X X X
Loan Applicant Income . . X X
Lagged Credit Variables . . . X
Observations 1106 876 876 771 771
Adjusted R2 0.667 0.707 0.709 0.735 0.793
Note: * 10% significance, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. This table estimates the effect of sentiment across cities. The number of
observations decline from columns (1) to (2) because data for % of subprime loans are only available for 16 cities in the sample and
only through September 2009, observations further decline because loan applicant income from the HMDA database are only available
through 2008.Newey and West (1987) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation up to 12 lags are in
parentheses. Lk denotes the lag t   k. Sum of Lagged Sentiment sums all the coefficient estimates of current and lagged sentiment
growth together. The rows below break down total sum of the monthly lags of sentiment by lagged years. “Year 1 Lags” equals the
sum of lagged sentiment from L1 to L12, “Year 2 Lags” is the sum of lags L13 to L24, “Year 3 Lags” is the sum from lags L25 to L43..
The corresponding standard errors for the linear combination of estimates are reported in parentheses below. The lag structure is chosen
through a standard joint F-test. Including additional lags after L43 does not affect the results. Estimates of lagged logged sentiment
measure the impact of a one percent increase in the monthly growth of sentiment on the monthly growth in prices i.e. monthly capital
appreciation on housing.
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TABLE 7: SENTIMENT PREDICTS THE VOLUME OF HOUSING TRANSACTIONS
Composite Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sum of Lagged Sentiment 4.674*** 4.909*** 5.531*** 3.658*** 2.709*** 1.479**
(1.189) (1.337) (1.915) (0.678) (0.668) (0.594)
Year 1 Lags (L1+ ...+L12) 3.555*** 3.938*** 4.13** 2.957*** 2.355*** 1.381***
(0.890) (1.012) (1.681) (0.556) (0.532) (0.486)
Year 2 Lags (L13+ ...+L18) 1.119** 0.971 1.401 0.701*** 0.354* 0.098
(0.505) (0.874) (0.893) (0.208) (0.206) (0.153)
Rents . X X . X X
Interest Rate Variables . X X . X X
Labor Market Variables . X X . X X
Housing Supply . X X . X X
Population and Income . X X . X X
Month Fixed Effects . X X . X X
City Fixed Effects . . . . X X
Lagged Fundamentals . . X . . X
Observations 96 96 96 1578 1481 1437
Adjusted R2 0.430 0.613 0.595 0.068 0.261 0.507
Note: * 10% significance, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation up to 12 lags are in parentheses. This tables estimates the effect of sentiment on detrended log volume. I use detrended log
volume to address non stationarity concerns, and detrend volume following Campbell et al. (1993). Specifically, I subtract the one year
backward moving average. Newey and West (1987) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation up to 12
lags are in parentheses. Lk denotes the lag t   k. Sum of Lagged Sentiment sums all the coefficient estimates of current and lagged
sentiment growth together. The rows below break down total sum of the monthly lags of sentiment by lagged years. “Year 1 Lags”
equals the sum of lagged sentiment from L1 to L12, “Year 2 Lags” is the sum of lags L13 to L24, “Year 3 Lags” is the sum from lags L25
to L43.. The corresponding standard errors for the linear combination of estimates are reported in parentheses below. The lag structure
is chosen through a standard joint F-test. Including additional lags after L43 does not affect the results. Estimates of lagged logged
sentiment measure the impact of a one percent increase in the monthly growth of sentiment on the monthly growth in prices i.e. monthly
capital appreciation on housing.
57
TABLE 8: EXPLANATORY POWER OF OBSERVED FUNDAMENTALS PRE- AND POST-2000
Composite-10 Panel
Pre-2000 Post-2000 Pre-2000 Post-2000
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Rents 1.424*** 0.373 0.840*** 0.365**
(0.166) (0.704) (0.110) (0.179)
Interest Rate Variables X X X X
Labor Market Variables X X X X
Housing Supply X X X X
Population and Income X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X
City Fixed Effects . . X X
Observations 119 118 2136 2241
Adjusted R2 0.693 0.092 0.363 0.234
Note: * 10% significance, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation up to 12 lags are in parentheses. Lk denotes the lag t  k. Sum of Lagged Sentiment sums all the coefficient estimates of
current and lagged sentiment growth together. The corresponding standard errors for the linear combination of estimates are reported
in parentheses below. Estimates of lagged logged sentiment measure the impact of a one percent increase in the monthly growth
of sentiment on the monthly growth in prices i.e. monthly capital appreciation on housing. This table shows that they key set of
fundamentals explain prices much better prior to the suspected bubble period, post-2000. For example, the R2 in column 1 shows that
the key set of fundamentals is able to explain nearly 70 percent of the variation in aggregate price growth prior to 2000. After 2000,
however, this same set of fundamentals explains very little of the variation in price growth with an adjusted R2 = 0.09. This suggests
that the main set of results at least incorporate the key set of fundamentals that typically explain housing price growth, and that price
movements post-2000 must be due to some other variable. Thus, sentiment estimates in the main results are less likely driven by bias
from an unobserved fundamental.
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TABLE 10: CORRELATION OF WEEKEND INSTRUMENT WITH FRIDAY NEWS RELEASES
% of Releases on Friday Correlation with Weekend Instrument
All BLS 0.07
Any Metro or Regional -0.01
County Employment -0.04
Regional Employment -0.05
Metro Area Employment 0.00
CPI -0.02
PPI 0.14
New Residential Construction -0.02
New Residential Sales -0.01
Note: This table test for a possible violation of the exclusion restriction for the weekend instrument. The validity of
the weekend instrument relies on the assumption that no news on fundamentals is being released over the weekend.
One possible violation of this assumption is that news is increasingly released on Friday and therefore reported over
the weekend. I put together a database of the schedule of economic data releases from the BLS and the Census. This
table shows that the fraction released on Friday is uncorrelated with the share of positive minus negative words over the
weekend. The first column lists the types of press releases, including all releases by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, any
release on metropolitan or regional specific fundamentals, release on employment, measures of inflation, and housing
specific fundamentals from the Census. The second column reports the simple correlation between the fraction of these
releases that occur on Friday with the weekend instrument.
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TABLE 11: WEEKEND AND NARRATIVE INSTRUMENTS FOR SENTIMENT, FIRST-STAGE
Dep Var: Sentiment Growth, t=monthly
Weekend Narrative
Instrument 0.458*** 0.208***
(0.100) (0.031)
Weekday News Tone X .
Rents X X
Interest Rate Variables X X
Labor Market Variables X X
Housing Supply Variables X X
Population and Income X X
Month Fixed Effects X X
City Fixed Effects X X
Lagged Fundamentals X X
F-statistic 233.776 46.089
Observations 1856 1856
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.108
Note: * 10% significance, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
and auto-correlation up to 12 lags are in parentheses. Sum of Lagged Sentiment sums all the coefficient estimates of
current and lagged sentiment growth together. The corresponding standard errors for the linear combination of estimates
are reported in parentheses below. Estimates of lagged logged sentiment measure the impact of a one percent increase
in the monthly growth of sentiment on the monthly growth in prices i.e. monthly capital appreciation on housing. This
table reports the first-stage estimates of sentiment on the weekend and narrative instruments. The bottom panel reports
the F-statistic for the instruments in bold to test for instrument strength. Both instruments are sufficiently relevant to the
housing sentiment index, with F-statistics well above the benchmark rule of 10.
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TABLE 12: PREDICTING PRICE GROWTH USING POSITIVE SENTIMENT, IV RESULTS
OLS Weekend IV Narrative IV
(1) (2) (3)
Sum of Lagged Sentiment 0.837*** 1.247*** 0.805**
(0.096) (0.217) (0.382)
Year 1 Lags (L1+...+L12) 0.18*** 0.305 0.01
(0.035) (0.187) (0.304)
Year 2 Lags (L13+...+L24) 0.294*** 0.500*** 0.47**
(0.039) (0.153) (0.215)
Year 3 Lags (L25+...+L43) 0.363*** 0.441*** 0.326
(0.042) (0.091) (0.201)
Weekday News Tone . X .
Month Fixed Effects X X X
City Fixed Effects X X X
Fundamentals X X X
Lagged Fundamentals X X X
Observations 1106 1106 1106
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.647 0.648
Note: * 10% significance, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
and auto-correlation up to 12 lags are in parentheses. Sum of Lagged Sentiment sums all the coefficient estimates of
current and lagged sentiment growth together. The corresponding standard errors for the linear combination of estimates
are reported in parentheses below. Estimates of lagged logged sentiment measure the impact of a one percent increase
in the monthly growth of sentiment on the monthly growth in prices i.e. monthly capital appreciation on housing. This
table presents the original OLS estimates in column (1), and the instrumental variable estimates using the weekend and
narrative instruments in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The estimated effect of sentiment remains robust to both
instrumental variable strategies, suggesting bias from unobserved factors in the original estimates are less likely.
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Figure A.1: HOUSING SENTIMENT INDEX AND HOUSING PRICES, BY CITY
Note: See Figure 2 Notes.
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Figure A.1: HOUSING SENTIMENT INDEX AND HOUSING PRICES, BY CITY (CONT’D)
Note: See Figure 2 Notes.
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Abstract 
 
We create reliable measures of the cost of owning and the cost of renting that enable us to compare the 
level of rents and ownership costs across MSAs. We show that households can predict whether renting or 
owning will end up being less expensive ex post.  This exercise is more robust than trying to predict house 
price changes or housing returns because much of that uncertainty is inframarginal in the optimal own/rent 
decision, which depends only on the which tenure mode is cheaper.  We show that households can 
profitably time the home ownership decision.  Using several simple trading rules, we estimate that 
households can save as much as 50 percent of annual rental costs over a five-year period by timing the 
decision of when to buy a home.  The potential savings varies across cities.   !
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1    Introduction 
Pioneering work by Case and Shiller (1989) has documented significant predictability in 
the house price changes, such that a change in a given year predicts the same direction in the 
following year. From an asset pricing perspective, this predictability suggests an opportunity for 
investors to time the market and develop a profitable trading strategy. Despite the predictability 
of the housing market, recent studies find that empirical forecasts of house prices lack sufficient 
precision for investors arbitrage in practice (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2010). Still, the predictability 
of housing prices may be useful for the average homebuyer. For the typical household investor, 
the primary concern in facing the housing market is whether own versus rent. The average 
household makes a decision of when to own or rent in order to obtain housing at the lowest 
possible cost. Thus, timing the market for the household rests on the relative costs of owning 
versus renting. 
In this paper, we investigate whether the predictability of house price changes has any 
relevance for the household decision to own versus rent. Since the total cost of housing depends 
on the realization of the sale price of the house, predictability of house prices suggests that the 
costs of owning may also be forecastable (Hendershott and Van Order 1987; Poterba 1984). 
Nevertheless, the costs of rent may vary with the costs of owning such that the relative decision 
to own versus rent is still difficult to predict. Furthermore Poterba (1984) shows that if the 
housing market is in equilibrium, the marginal cost of owning should equal the cost of rent in 
steady-state.  
In order to reliably compare the costs of owning and renting, we first pin down the 
relative level of rents and house prices. Using extensive sets of both proprietary and Census 
household level data, we match housing and rental values across housing and buyer 
characteristics including the number of bedrooms, age of structure, and income quartiles.  With 
that data, we estimate the relative cost of owning and renting across 39 different metropolitan 
 68 
statistical areas (MSAs) from 1980 to 2009.   
We document a significant amount of predictability in the binary decision for the 
household to own versus rent relevant for the typical household. While theory suggests that the 
costs of owning and renting should be equal in equilibrium, we find that the relative costs of 
owning and renting are forecastable year to year. On average, if it is better to rent (own) in a 
given year and city, it is better to rent (own) respectively the next year. Overall, in many cities 
owning is generally cheaper than renting, though the difference in costs varies in magnitude 
across locations. 
We then develop several trading strategies for the binary own versus rent decision and 
compare the expected savings of using these strategies against less sophisticated trading rules. 
We find that a simple trading rule of choosing to own when it was cheaper to own in the 
previous year saves 13 percent of annual rent relative to always owning. A household can 
benefit even more relative to a simple strategy of always renting, saving more than 40 percent on 
average. While the amount of savings from this rule varies across cities, it is consistently 
positive. In some cities in the South, for example, it is almost always better to own than rent 
such that switching based on the trading rule produces minimal gains. In other cities, particularly 
those with more momentum in their house price changes, the savings from switching relative to 
always owning is much larger. While a more sophisticated rule based on a regression model 
performs better, it produces minimal savings above and beyond the simpler benchmark.  
We further extend our analysis to a multi-year holding period. Prior literature often 
focuses on the housing returns of a 1-year holding period, but the horizon for investing in a 
home is likely much longer for many households. We find that the difference in the cost of 
owning and renting is still predictable over longer horizons. For example, if it is better for an 
investor with a horizon of five years to own in a given year, then it is still likely better for him to 
own if he enters the market in the following year.  We find that a first-time homebuyer gains the 
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most savings if she waits to buy until she observes that is cheaper to own in the previous year. 
Otherwise, the she should continue to rent if it was cheaper to rent in the prior year. This simple 
strategy can save as much as 50 percent of annual housing costs over a 5-year period. 
In contrast to prior literature, we find that the tenure choice between owning and renting 
may be profitably timed. In a number of cities – but far from all – the savings from switching 
tenure mode following our trading rules is large enough to offset even sizeable transaction costs.  
The key is that the relative costs of owning and renting are so persistent that households do not 
need to change tenure mode very often to take advantage of them.  Like Case and Shiller (1989), 
we find that first-time homebuyers can save money by following a trading rule to decide whether 
to defer home buying for a year.  However, we also show that by making the own/rent decision 
serially, a household that decides to continue to rent will have the option the following year to 
continue to rent some more.  In most cities, we find that simple strategy can approach the lowest 
cost timing for buying a home. 
Our paper also contributes to several literatures besides the study of housing market 
efficiency.  We find that rental and owner-occupied housing markets do not appear to be in 
equilibrium (Diaz and Luengo-Prado 2008, Glaeser and Gyourko 2007, Verbrugge 2009).  Our 
work also has implications for the recent literature on housing risk that emphasizes the choice 
between owning and renting (Han 2008, Sinai and Souleles 2005, Ortalo-Magne and Rady 
2002).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the methodology 
and data used to calculate our measures of the cost of owning and cost of renting. Section 3 
presents the main results based on the 1-year costs of investing or renting a home. Section 4 
develops a profitable trading strategy based on these results. In section 5, we extend our analysis 
across greater horizons. Section 6 analyzes our results across different tax brackets, and the final 
section concludes. 
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2    Measuring the Cost of Owning and Renting 
 
2.1    Rent to Price Ratios 
 
To compare the relative costs of owning versus renting houses, we need estimates of the 
levels of house prices and rents for an otherwise-equivalent residence.  This presents several 
empirical challenges.  First, owned units and rental units may differ in physical and economic 
characteristics, and it is rare for researchers to observe rents and prices for the same unit 
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2010).  Second, commonly available house price indexes and rent 
indexes report only the growth in normalized prices or rents.  Instead, data that can match the 
level of house price and rental values are only observed at occasional points in time. 
Furthermore, if one uses a growth index to extrapolate prices or rents from one point in time to 
another, the extrapolated levels of prices or rents will not match observed levels in the years 
when they overlap. 
A number of prior studies have employed varying strategies to match house prices and 
rents for comparable residences and convert house price and rent indexes into levels, (Davis et 
al. 2008; Meese and Wallace, 1994; Cutts et al. 2005; Gallin 2004; Crone et al. 2004; Smith and 
Smith 2006).  Our approach is to apply a wide variety of methods to obtain a distribution of 
possible house price and rent series.  We estimate owning and rental costs in each city and year 
for each possible price and rent series.  This approach enables us to construct a rough estimate of 
the uncertainty around the relative costs of owning and renting that is due to measuring prices 
and rents with error.1 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Prior studies typically commit to one approach.  Meese and Wallace (1994) and Cutts et al. (2005) 
derive a rent-price ratio for specific metro at one or two points in time. Other studies such as Gallin (2004) 
calculated a relative rent to price ratio using just growth rates of prices and rents while ignoring the level. 
Crone et al. (2004) uses the American Housing Survey to create a biennial estimate of the national rent-
price ratio, though not by city. Davis et al. (2008) use a hedonic method to obtain predicted rents and 
housing values for a set of owners and renters respectively.!
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To implement this approach, we extract household-level micro data on the level of 
house values and rents values from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Decennial Census.  The 
Census data consists of a nationally representative sample of five percent of U.S. households and 
reports rents paid by renters, the market value of housing reported by owners, and household 
income and demographic variables. These surveys also include detailed data on house 
characteristics.2  
Using this data, we impute rental values to homeowners and house values to renters. We 
match rental and owner-occupied units based on the following characteristics: number of 
bedrooms -- including one, two, and three and more bedroom units; age of structure – whether 
built within the last 0-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, or 31 years or older; and buyer and 
renter income quartiles. For homeowners, we impute the average rent of rental units in the same 
cell.  Similarly, we impute the average house price of owner-occupied homes to rental units in 
the same cell.  We construct cells based on the three categories alone and in combination, and 
for each year separately, yielding 42 different imputations.  
We also employ a hedonic method to calculate corresponding housing and rental values 
based on housing characteristics. Specifically, we regress housing values on housing 
characteristics and imputed predicted house values for the units rented by renters.  Conversely, 
we regress rental values on a set of housing characteristics and use the estimates to predict rents 
for homeowners as in Davis et al. 2008.  We do this separately for each Census year, for another 
six imputations. 
We obtain average annual rental values by MSA from a proprietary source, REIS.3  
Using these values, we create three estimates of rent to price ratios:  (a) using matched rental and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!We drop any observations where the residence lacks complete plumbing, a kitchen, phone, or heat.  We 
also exclude group quarters and non-family units. !3!For robustness, we also used rent values from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ rent index and found little 
difference. !
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housing values from the Census; (b) using REIS rental values and matched Census housing 
prices; and using (c) REIS rents and a calculated REIS housing value based on the Census rent 
to price ratio.4  We calculate these rent-to-price ratios in each given Census base year, and then 
extrapolate the levels from each base year using normalized indices. We extrapolate house prices 
using annual growth rates for 39 MSAs from the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s constant-
quality repeat sales index from 1980 to 2010.  We calculate MSA-level rent growth rates using 
annual rental values from REIS. In the end, we obtain over 200 different estimated rent to price 
ratios per MSA per year, 1980-2009. 
2.2     Cost of Owning and Cost of Renting 
 
The annual cost of renting, !", is rent, !!, observed directly. The annual cost of owning, 
however, must be calculated.  Following prior literature, we apply the user cost formula to 
estimate the annual cost of owning.5  Nonetheless in contrast to prior work, we are interested in 
the realization of the user cost rather than the expectation.  Thus we substitute actual house price 
appreciation, !!!, into the traditional user cost formula in place of the expected capital gain, ![!!!]. Our estimate of the ex-post observed annual cost of owning is: !" = !! 1 − !!"# !"# !! + 1 − !! 1 − !"# !! +!! + 1 − !!! !!
− 1 − !!" !!! !!!!!!!!!!!(1)! 
where !! denotes the nominal interest rate, LTV is the loan-to-value ratio, !! is equal to the 
property tax rate, and !! is the rate of maintenance and depreciation. Mortgage interest is tax-
deductible at rate !!"#, property taxes are deductible at rate !!!, dividend and interest income is 
taxed at rate !!, and housing capital gains is taxed at the rate !!" .   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 i.e. Predicted REIS housing value = REIS rent * (Census Price/Census Rent) 5!For examples, see Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), Poterba (1984), Poterba and Sinai (2008).!
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We do not observe a household’s actual mortgage rate, so we approximate the 
household’s mortgage interest rate !! with the contemporaneous 30-year fixed mortgage rate 
from the Federal Reserve Board. Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2012) emphasize that 
households have a one-sided option to refinance to lower mortgage rates, which implies that our 
average proxy mortgage rate will be higher than the true average mortgage rate, and our 
calculations will err on the side of overestimating the cost of owning.  The opportunity cost of 
equity, !! 1 − !"# !!, is a latent variable.  We follow the prior literature by assuming that a 
household’s equivalent-risk alternative investment is to lend at the mortgage interest rate, !!. 
Following Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), property tax rates are allowed to vary 
by MSA using the estimates reported in Emrath (2002); and maintenance and depreciation are 
assumed to total 2.5 percent per year as in Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2007).  We assume 
a loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent, the typical cutoff most lenders require to separate high versus 
low risk borrowers and meet Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underwriting guidelines.6   
One significant difference between the user cost formula in equation (1) and that used in 
Poterba (1984), Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), and others, is that we do not include a 
risk premium for owning, usually denoted !.  The prior literature typically assumes a risk 
premium of 2.0 percent.7  However, recent work by Sinai and Souleles (2005, 2013) and 
Paciorek and Sinai (2012) implies that when comparing owning with renting – rather than 
considering owning in a vacuum – the net risk premium could be zero for households on the 
margin of home buying and negative for inframarginal homeowners.  Additionally, owning may 
be more or less expensive than renting because of differences in risk, and so we seek to estimate 
the cost difference rather than assume a risk premium. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Our results are not sensitive to this assumption since !!"# and !! are usually very close.  We have 
replicated our analysis with LTV=0.69, the average for young households according to the 2004 Survey of 
Consumer Finances as reported in Poterba and Sinai (20YY), and LTV=0.387, which is the average for all 
households, and obtain very similar estimates. 
7 See Campbell et al (2009) for estimates of a time-varying risk premium.!
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Across longer horizons, we estimate the cost of owning using a more general formula: 
!!!,!!! = !! − !!!!Π!!!!!!!! (1 + !!)! + !! +! !!Π!!!!!! (1 + !!)!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!(2)!!
where !! = !"# 1 − !!"# !! + 1 − !"# 1 − !! !!. Similarly, the cost of renting from year t 
to year t+k is equal to the sum of discounted rents from year t to t+k with values being 
discounted starting year t+1. We calculate the annual cost of renting over longer horizons with 
the following equation: 
!!!,!!! = !!Π!!!!!! (1 + (1 − !!)!!)!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!(3)!
 
For our baseline tables, we will set the income and deduction tax rates equal to the 
national average federal income rate and state average state income tax rate as reported by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  We acknowledge income tax rates vary across 
households within a housing market, and estimate the effects of varying the tax rate in Section 4. 
We will assume that the tax rate on housing capital gains, !!" , is always zero.8 
Following the discussion in Section 2.1, we do not estimate the rent, !!, or house price, !!, with certainty.  Instead, we observe !"!" = !"! + !!" and !"!" = !"! + !!" where the 
error terms represent noise in the process of extrapolating from rent and house price growth to 
the levels of those variables. 
3    Predictability of Cost of Owning and Renting 
We first estimate the relative costs of owning and renting assuming that a household is 
agnostic about future costs.  In such case, the fraction of the time in the past that owning turned !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!This is a common and reasonable assumption.  For most of our sample period, married households 
enjoyed a capital gains tax exclusion of $500,000 ($250,000 for singles) on their primary residence.  In the 
early to mid-1980s, the exclusion amount was lower and limited to older households.  However, younger 
households could defer capital gains taxes by purchasing a more expensive house.  In both cases, the 
effective tax rate typically was zero.  In practice, the capital gains tax on housing collects little revenue.  
See Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) and Shan (2011). 
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out to be less expensive than renting is the best predictor of whether owning will be less 
expensive than renting in the future.   
Using the rent and price series developed in Section 2, we calculate the distribution of 
the difference between the costs of owning and renting for each of the sample 39 MSAs each 
year.9 We treat each index as a separate observation; thus MSAs with less of a consensus across 
estimation methods will exhibit more variance in their relative costs of owning versus renting 
measures within a year.  
The first column of Table 1 reports one statistic from the estimated distribution: the 
probability that the cost of owning is less than the cost of renting (!" < !") across all measures 
and years by city. Overall, owning a house ends up being less expensive than renting during our 
sample period across all cities.  Nevertheless, the odds vary considerably across MSAs.  The 
first row reports the average across all MSAs, with the average in any given city in subsequent 
rows.  The probability that the cost of owning was less than renting is about 65 percent across all 
cities and never less than 50 percent in any individual MSA.  Owning was particularly dominant 
in Charlotte (it was cheaper 84 percent of the time), Atlanta (75 percent), and St. Louis (74 
percent).  It was least dominant in San Diego (51 percent), Seattle (53 percent), and Los Angeles 
(55 percent).   
In Table 1, we also report the estimated saving from owning a home versus renting.  We 
find that the average cost of owning over our sample period was less than the average rent across 
all MSAs.  The first row of column 2 shows that, averaged across all MSAs, it was nearly 30 
percent cheaper per year to own rather than to rent.10  Ex-post savings from owning ranged from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!We replicate all of our results restricting our rent and price series to 2 bedroom units, where rent and 
owned units have the most overlap. We find no significant difference in results. Comparable tables 
evaluating 2 bedroom units only are available in Appendix Tables 4-7.!
10 Savings are expressed as a percentage of average annual rent. 
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approximately 11 percent of annual rent (Cleveland) to 56 percent (Boston).11  Those MSAs 
where owning was more likely to be cheaper than renting do not necessarily generate the 
greatest savings from owning, however.  For example, owning was cheaper than renting 74 
percent of the time in Columbus, Ohio, but generated an average savings of just 21 percent of 
rent.  By contrast, owning in San Jose was cheaper than renting just 55 percent of the time, but 
generated a net savings of 53 percent of average rent. 
The reason for this pattern is that the savings from renting when renting is cheaper may 
be bigger or smaller than the savings from owning when owning is cheaper.  This reduces the 
correlation between whether owning is cheaper than renting and how much cheaper it is.  In 
theory – though this does not happen in our data – renting could provide such a large savings 
during the fraction of the time that renting is cheaper than owning that it could swamp the 
savings from owning during the majority of the time when owning is less expensive.  Instead, 
we see that, for a homeowner, the savings from owning when it was less expensive would have 
outweighed the losses from not renting when renting was cheaper, with the degree varying 
across MSAs.  This pattern can be seen in columns 3 and 4, which calculate the average !" − !" (expressed as a percentage of average annual rent) when it is cheaper to rent and 
cheaper to own respectively.  On average, when the cost of owning is greater than the rent, it is 
approximately 81 percent more expensive than renting. When it is cheaper to own, owning costs 
about 74 percent less than renting.  Across cities, the average owning premium ranged from 30 
percent (Atlanta) to 156 percent (San Jose) in years when it was cheaper to rent ex post, and the 
average owning discount ranged from 37 percent (Columbus) to 188 percent (San Jose) when it 
is cheaper to own.  (A discount of more than 100 percent can arise when the capital gain from 
owning a home for a year outstrips the annual carrying cost, yielding a profit.)  Cities like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we express the savings as a percentage of house price, as in 
Case and Shiller (1989).  Differences arise due to variation across MSAs in their price-to-rent ratios.  The 
savings in high P/R MSAs appear somewhat larger relative to annual rent and somewhat smaller relative 
to purchase price.!
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Columbus had very similar savings from owning (37 percent) or renting (40 percent) when the 
respective mode was cheaper.  San Francisco, by contrast, had a larger gap between owning (186 
percent savings) and renting (165 percent savings).  In a handful of cities – Austin, Indianapolis, 
and San Diego – the savings from renting in a year when renting was cheaper is much larger 
than the savings from owning in the years when owning was cheaper, yet owning was still 
cheaper on average because there were sufficiently few years where renting is the less expensive 
mode. 
Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that a household that planned never to move – so 
moving costs are not an issue – would save money, on average, in any MSA by always owning.  
Nonetheless, the wide dispersion in some MSAs between the average savings from owning 
when owning was cheaper, and the average savings from renting when renting was cheaper 
suggests that if a household could predict which tenure would be less expensive it could save 
money relative to always-owning or choosing its tenure mode randomly. 
Predictability of house price changes suggests that the relative cost of owning and 
renting might also be forecastable, since owning costs decline when house price growth is 
greater.  Indeed, a lengthy literature has found that house prices exhibit short-run momentum 
and long-run mean reversion, (Glaeser and Gyourko 2010).  Still, predictability of the relative 
cost of owning and renting does not necessarily follow from predictability of house price 
changes because rents also vary over time.  A negative correlation between house price changes 
and rent would make the relative cost of owning and renting less predictable than house prices 
alone, but a positive correlation would make the relative cost more predictable.   
In addition, the binary rent/own prediction is different than the continuous cost-of-
owning vs. rent forecast.  In some ranges of the relative costs of owning and renting – say, when 
owning is much more expensive than renting – errors in the forecast of the relative cost of 
owning or renting would not affect which option is less expensive.  In those ranges, when errors 
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in estimated owning or renting costs are inframarginal, predictions of whether owning or renting 
is cheaper could be more robust than forecasts of the differences in cost.  Conversely, when 
renting and owning costs are close, small forecasting errors can induce large swings in the rent 
versus own prediction.   
Table 2 asks if, in a MSA in a particular year, owning is more or less expensive than 
renting, does it have predictive power for whether owning or renting is cheaper the next year?  
We estimate the following logit forecasting regression: !(!" − !" > 0)!,! = !! + !!! !" − !" > 0 !,!!!! + !!!!!!!!!(4) 
The function !(!" − !" > 0)!,! equals one if the annualized cost of owning exceeds rent in city 
i and year t.  The unit of observation is a city × year × price/rent estimation method.  We cluster 
the standard errors by city × year to account for the correlation across estimation methods.12   
 We find that, in all cities in our sample, the lagged relative-cost indicator is positively 
correlated with the subsequent year’s indicator for whether renting is cheaper.  That is, years 
when renting is cheaper are more often than not followed by years when renting is cheaper.  
Likewise, if owning is cheaper, it is more likely to be cheaper again the next year.  The first 
column of Table 2 pools the MSAs and controls for MSA fixed effects, thus using variation over 
time and within-MSA to identify !!.  The estimated logit coefficient of 2.4 (standard error of 
0.11) corresponds to a 11 percent increase in the odds that owning will be more expensive than 
renting if it was more expensive than renting the prior year.  The second column adds year 
dummies, so the identifying variation is due to changes in whether an MSA’s cost of owning is 
above or below the rent for an equivalent property, after controlling for national changes in that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Since CO incorporates the change in house prices, measurement error in !!!! could potentially affect 
both the right- and left-hand-sides of the regression equation, inducing correlated measurement error.  
However, instrumenting for ! !" − !" > 0 !,!!!! with ! !" − !" > 0 !,!!!!  had little effect on the 
estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.  The MSA-specific coefficients in column 3 were affected more, 
but the qualitative results are the same.  See Appendix Table 2.   
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relationship.  The estimated logit coefficient, 2.5 (0.15), barely changes.13  The lagged indicator 
variable !(!" − !" > 0)!,!!! contains the bulk of the MSA-level information, whether time-
varying or not. 
 The last column of Table 2 estimates a separate logit regression, and thus a separate !!, 
for each MSA.  This column shows that in all MSAs, the lagged indicator for whether renting 
was cheaper than owning is positively correlated with renting being cheaper than owning the 
subsequent year.  The greatest persistence is in Detroit (3.9 with a standard error of 0.07), where 
years when owning is above-average more expensive than renting are 50 percent more likely to 
repeat.  The lowest persistence is found in Baltimore (1.3 with a standard error of 0.05), and is 
estimated to be just 3.7 percent. 
 One way to assess the quality of the model’s fit is to examine the percent of the time the 
model correctly predicts the relative expense of owning versus renting.  Results appear in Table 
3, where each of the columns matches the corresponding specifications from Table 2. For the 
binary decision to own or rent a home for one year, our results show that on average the forecast 
is correct approximately 80 percent of the time and ranges from a high of 93 percent in San 
Diego to a low of 73 percent in Phoenix.   
The reason for the model’s fit can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.  We estimate (!" −!")!,! = !! + !! !" − !" !,!!!! + !!! and plot the actual ex post difference between the cost of 
owning and the rent versus the cost difference predicted by the model, for the entire distribution 
of cost of rent measures across all MSAs (in Figure 1) and selected cities (in Figure 2).  Because 
this model predicts the serial correlation in cost differences, larger positive gaps in the cost of 
owning and renting are further to the northeast in the figures, whereas bigger negative gaps are 
further to the southwest.  For the country as a whole, as well as in the selected cities, there is a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!Estimated coefficients on the MSA fixed effects are available from the authors, but are almost always 
statistically insignificant.  !
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reasonably strong positive relationship between the actual and predicted cost difference.  
Nevertheless there is some noise, especially in a subset of cities.  A perfect fit would lie along 
the 45-degree line.  Instead, the predictions deviate from that. 
 Households have an easier job, however, as reflected by the specification in equation 
(6).  They do not need to forecast how much more (or less) expensive owning might be than 
renting, but rather they need only to predict whether owning will be more or less expensive than 
renting.  In Figures 1 and 2, when a point is in the top right or bottom left quadrants, the model 
gets that prediction right.  Only in the northwest and southeast quadrants is the forecast in error.  
For example, in Figure 1, there is a point where the predicted cost of owning is only slightly less 
than the cost of renting, but the ex post realization was that the actual cost of owning was much 
less than rent.  From the household’s perspective, though, the model got it exactly right: owning 
was forecasted to be cheaper than renting and, in hindsight, it was.  Accordingly, the 
corresponding data point lies in the bottom-left quadrant.  
There are a couple of factors that can make it more reliable to predict whether to own or 
rent.  In some cities, like Boston in Figure 2, the predicted relative costs of owning and renting 
are close to the actual, especially in the region around the origin where accuracy is especially 
important.  In other cities, such as Philadelphia, owning tends to be cheaper most of the time, so 
the forecast almost always prescribes owning, and therefore it almost always is right. 
4 Trading Strategy 
 
While observed differences in the cost of owning and renting are predictable year to 
year, can households exploit this predictability to time the purchase of their homes? We estimate 
the possible savings from using past information to influence future home buying/renting 
decisions.  We consider two approaches.  First, we allow households to switch between owning 
and renting as many times as they want.  Naturally, the savings from switching to the lowest-
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cost tenure mode will be offset – or, as prior research has typically found, overwhelmed – by the 
transactions costs of switching.14  Second, we consider the savings possible when making just 
one rent-to-own transition, so the transactions cost is essentially sunk.  The primary decision that 
typically falls into this category that of a first-time homebuyer determining whether to purchase 
a house in the current year or rent for one more year.  We will evaluate the potential savings 
from optimizing that one-year decision in this section.  It will turn out that a large benefit to 
timing the rent/own decision is that continuing to rent for one more year extends the option to 
rent again.  We will show in the next section that the option to continue renting has been 
valuable historically. 
We consider a household who is indifferent between owning and renting outside of the 
costs captured by our measures and has a one-year horizon for holding a home.  We simulate 
several possible tenure choice rules and evaluate them based on how close they are to the 
lowest-possible-cost of housing, which comes from always correctly picking whether owning or 
renting is cheaper.  The difference in the costs is reported in Table 4 and is expressed as a 
percentage of the average annual rent; a lower-cost strategy will exhibit a lower cost premium 
over the optimal tenure choices. 
We first simulate a simple trading rule: buy if the model reported in column 2 of Table 3 
predicts a household should own, and otherwise rent. We label this the “regression-based trading 
strategy” in Column 1 of Table 4.  On average, over the 1980-2009 period, households would 
have paid just 6 percent of annual rent per year more than the lowest-cost-option.  The cost 
premium varies across cities, ranging from just 1.6 percent in Atlanta to 17 percent in Houston.15  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14!The institutional features of the real estate market can impose significant transaction costs. Given the 
heterogeneity in both property types and individual preferences, households often face high search 
frictions in buying a home (Wheaton, 1990; Stein, 1995; Krainer, 2001). Selling a home also typically 
involves hiring a broker and paying commission fees. Households also likely incur substantial pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary moving costs from switching from owning to renting.!
15 This savings is based on in-sample fit of the prediction model.  We obtain very similar results when we 
predict out-of-sample by repeatedly fitting the regression model over rolling 10-year periods, always 
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The savings from the regression-based trading strategy can be seen by comparing its 
cost premium to a more naïve strategy, such as always owning (in column 3) or always renting 
(in column 5).  Both naïve strategies are on average more expensive than the regression-based 
strategy in all cities.  Across all MSAs, the cost premium for always owning averages almost 22 
percent of annual rent and for always-renting the premium is almost 50 percent of annual rent.  
(This result follows from Table 1, which showed that on average it was cheaper to own than rent 
during this time period.) On average, then, the regression-based strategy saved more than 15 
percent of rent annually vs. always owning and more than 40 percent of rent relative to always 
renting.  The magnitude of the difference varies by MSA; always-owning is fairly close in cost 
to the optimal tenure choice in Atlanta and Charlotte, and so the regression-based strategy does 
not do much better.  However, always-owning is especially expensive in Boston, Fort 
Lauderdale, Los Angeles, Palm Beach, Sacramento, and San Jose, so the regression-based 
strategy provides especially large savings in those cities.     
Since many households may not be able to generate own/rent forecasts from a logit 
regression model, we consider an alternative strategy where a household simply chooses to own 
if owning was cheaper than renting in the prior year, and otherwise chooses to rent.  For most 
cities, this simple strategy performs comparably to the more complex regression analysis.  A 
comparison of columns 7 and 1 shows that, on average across all MSAs, the regression-based 
strategy saves just over 3 percent of rent more than the simple “last year” strategy. Only in a few 
of the most volatile housing markets – Los Angeles, Miami, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, 
and Tampa – does the regression-based strategy save considerably more than the simple “last-
year” strategy.  In a handful of housing markets – Austin, Dallas, Houston, and Seattle – the last-
year strategy actually saved slightly more on average over the 1980-2009 period than the 
regression-based strategy. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
predicting the first post-sample year.  However, this procedure limits our usable sample period, so we 
report use the in-sample prediction as our base case.  
 83 
The even-numbered columns of Table 4 contain the standard deviations of the 
corresponding savings estimates. Recall that there are two sources of error in our estimates: 
Year-to-year variation from the average, and estimation of the levels of prices and rents.  The 
standard deviations reported in this table include both sources. Column 2, which corresponds to 
the regression-based prediction, includes a third source of error: The prediction error from the 
model in Equation 4.  In the standard deviations reported in Table 4, we assume that !! from 
Equation 4 is independent of the other errors listed above. The standard deviations in Table 4 
reflect the certainty of the potential savings – trading strategies that are more consistently close 
to lowest-possible-cost optimum will have the lowest standard deviations.  Thus, it is 
unsurprising that we find that the trading strategies and cities that are closest to the least-cost 
optimum also generally exhibit the lowest standard deviations. 
The reason why one can save money trading on the serial correlation in housing costs 
may be seen in Figure 3, which plots the distribution of cost of owning minus cost of rent 
measures for a sample of cities from 1980-2009. The shaded areas represent the saving from 
renting, when the number is positive, or owning, when the number is negative.  The optimal 
tenure mode would be to rent when the shaded area is above the x-axis and own when it is 
below.  Deviations from that strategy pay the shaded area in the year of a “mistake.”  For 
example, the average cost of owning is less than the average cost of renting when the shaded 
area below the x-axis is larger than the area above the x-axis.  
The top panel shows that in cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, and New York, the 
difference between the cost of owning and rent is volatile across the sample period. These cities 
have experienced long periods where either renting or owning was less expensive, year after 
year.  During those periods, whether owning or renting was cheaper the prior year is a strong 
predictor of owning or renting being cheaper the following year.  Occasionally there is a regime 
switch and the other tenure mode becomes less expensive, but the difference in the cost is 
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usually quite small in the transition period.  That is, a city is unlikely to go from one year where 
owning is significantly cheaper than renting to a subsequent year where owning is wildly more 
expensive than renting.  Hence while the decision rule of “rent if renting was cheaper than 
owning last year” is wrong every so often, choosing the wrong tenure mode in that year is 
unlikely to be a costly mistake.  The saving in the meantime from profiting from the persistence 
in relative own/rent costs easily outweighs the loss from being wrong once or twice a decade.   
In other MSAs, !" − !" remains relatively stable over time. The bottom panel of 
Figure 3 provides some examples, such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Denver.  In fact in cities 
such as Atlanta and Charlotte, it is almost always cheaper to own from 1980 to 2009.  In these 
cities, households almost never need to switch tenure mode to save money.  However, the 
differences in annual cost between owning and renting are very slight.  
Of course, the savings from predicting whether renting or owning would be cheaper and 
switching tenure mode to take advantage of cost differences comes at a cost – every move incurs 
transaction costs.  These costs include paying realtors, searching for a new residence, and the 
pecuniary, time and psychic costs of moving.  Indeed, the classic literature on the predictability 
of house prices concludes that transaction costs in the housing market are too high to profitably 
arbitrage house prices by buying and selling homes.  However, the savings from arbitraging the 
own-rent gap may be larger than the returns on trading on house prices alone.  In addition, those 
savings differ across cities, so a switching-tenure-mode strategy might make financial sense in 
some cities but not in others. 
We find that at reasonable levels of transaction costs, a switching tenure mode based on 
the trading strategies described earlier, saves money on net relative to always-renting but not 
relative to always-owning in most cities.  For each of our trading strategies – the regression-
based strategy and the last-year strategy – we compute the break-even level of transaction costs 
as a percentage of the price of the house.  Specifically, we compute the savings from the trading 
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strategy over our sample period relative to a strategy of picking one tenure mode – renting or 
owning – and never moving.  We express the savings as a percent of house price and divide it by 
the fraction of years that a household would have to move in order to implement the strategy.  
We choose to express the savings in terms of a break-even level of transaction costs rather than 
netting out an assumed rate of costs because transaction costs might vary across households.  
However, a 10 percent transaction cost (6 percent realtor fees and 4 percent other costs) is a 
commonly used threshold. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The first two columns report the break-even level of 
transaction costs that could be covered by the regression-based strategy and the latter two 
columns correspond to the simple last-year strategy.  In each pair of columns, the counterfactual 
in the first column is a strategy of always owning and in the second column is always renting.  
On average (the first row), the trading strategies save enough relative to always-owning that 
transaction costs could be between 5 and 6 percent of the average house price.  This is not 
enough savings to cover even standard realtors’ fees (which are typically 6 percent of the 
purchase price).  However, relative to always-renting, a tenure mode-switching strategy saves 
enough to cover transaction costs of 15 to 17 percent of house price on average, enough to cover 
any reasonable assumption of transaction cost.16   
The breakeven level of transaction cost varies across MSAs due to differences in the 
efficacy of the trading strategies and the number of moves implementation would require.  Even 
relative to always owning, where an active strategy typically does save enough to cover 
transaction costs, households in Detroit, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Diego could afford 
double-digit trading costs and still come out ahead.  Furthermore relative to always-renting, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16!Due to the momentum in house prices seen in Figure 3, the trading strategies do not require very many 
switches (the average number of switches is four to five over a 29 year sample period).  Thus, households 
can afford higher transaction costs because they do not incur them very often. !
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where forecasting usually provides a considerable benefit, it would still not be worthwhile for 
typical households in Memphis, Nashville, and perhaps Seattle to bother switching. 
5 Predictability by Horizon 
 
Thus far we have followed prior studies by focusing on the one-year cost of owning or 
renting a home. Most households, however, intend to live in a home for longer than a year. Thus 
this section extends our analyses the costs of owning and renting for longer horizons. Using the 
formula detailed in equations 2 and 3, we first calculate the costs of owning and cost of renting a 
home for five years (k=5) and ten years (k=10) across the variety of methodologies and property 
types described in Section 2.  We then estimate the predictability of the relative cost of owning 
and renting over these longer horizons.  Next, we extend our trading rule to multi-year horizons 
and show that when owning was cheaper over the prior five- or ten-year period, it predicts that 
owning is less expensive than renting over the subsequent period.  Finally, we consider the case 
of chaining together sequential one-year rent/own decisions for households with multiple-year 
horizons. 
Analogous to our analysis for the one-year costs, we perform the following logit 
regression of the binary decision to own or rent for the five and ten year horizon: !(!" − !")!,!! = !! + !!!(!" − !")!,!!!! + !!!!!!!!!(8) 
where !(!" − !")!,!!  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if  the cost of owning exceeds the cost 
of renting (!" − !" > 0) over the next k years in a given city i and starting year t, and 0 
otherwise.  For example, !(!" − !")!,!""#! = 0 means that it was cheaper for a household to 
own from 1990 to 1995, rather than rent during that five-year period. We use the t-k lag of the 
own/rent decision to predict the binary decision in current year t, since this is the most recent lag 
over which a household would have information about costs at a k horizon. For example, if a 
household with a five-year horizon was deciding whether to buy or rent in 1990, the most recent 
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observable costs for a five-year tenure would start in 1985.  Thus !(!" − !")!,!!!!   indicates 
whether it was ex-post cheaper for the household to own or rent for the next k years starting in 
year t-k. 
Table 6 reports the estimated values of !! for horizons of both five and ten years. 
Columns 1 and 2 perform the above binary regression for the five-year horizon, first on the 
pooled sample with city effects, and then with both city and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 
implement the same respective specifications for the ten-year tenure horizon.17 Our results 
reveals that pooled estimates are still on average significant at longer horizons, but at smaller 
magnitudes than for the 1-year horizon. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate for the 5-year 
horizon is a fifth of the estimate for the 1-year horizon (0.5 versus 2.5). The pooled estimate of !! for the 10-year horizon is slightly greater in magnitude than the five-year at approximately 
0.93, though still less than half of the one-year horizon estimate. The exponent of the ten-year 
horizon estimate suggests that when it is cheaper to rent in the current year, it is likely to be 
cheaper in the following year by odds of approximately 2.53 to 1. Nonetheless, it is important to 
note that the forecasts for these longer horizons are estimated over smaller sample periods. Since 
our sample period ends in 2009, the final observable costs of a five and ten-year tenure occur in 
2004 and 1999 respectively.  
Using the estimated coefficients from Table 5, we forecast whether it was better to own 
or rent each year from 1980 given a five- and ten-year tenure horizon. We then compare the 
actual versus predicted results and calculate how often the predicted binary decision was correct. 
The binary prediction indicates whether a household with a five-year tenure horizon should start 
owning or renting in a given city and year, and we consider a forecast to be “correct” if it was 
indeed cheaper to own or rent throughout the next five years. Table 7 presents the share of years 
the in-sample prediction correctly forecasts the binary decision to own or rent by city. Each !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17!Though not shown, results are very similar if we exclude time and city fixed effects all together.!
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column corresponds to the respective specifications from Table 5. Column 1 shows that on 
average, from 1980 to 2004 the predicted decision from the pooled regression forecasts the own 
or rent decision correctly 82 percent of the time for a household with a five-year horizon. 
Column 3 shows that this predictability is even greater at the ten-year horizon, forecasting the 
binary decision correctly 93 percent of the time. This is driven by the fact it is more often better 
to own with a ten-year horizon. In some cities such as Atlanta, for example, it was cheaper to 
rent less than 3 percent of the time across the observed sample period and distribution of cost 
measures. Overall, the results show that if it was cheaper to own in a current year, it will be even 
more likely be cheaper to own again in the following year for households with longer horizons.  
We then use these predictions to simulate a simple trading rule: buy if the above results 
indicate that it is cheaper to own for the next five (or ten) years, and otherwise rent.  This trading 
strategy assumes that a household would have to buy or rent throughout the entire residence 
spell. As a performance benchmark, we estimate housing costs assuming that a household had 
perfect foresight and perfectly timed its shift from renting to owning (or owning to renting).  We 
limit the household to just one switching of tenure mode to hold transactions costs essentially 
constant.  For example, for a household with a five-year horizon, it may be ex-post less 
expensive to rent for the first two years of its tenure and then own a home for the remaining 
three years. Thus, for each MSA and year of our sample period, we calculate the least expensive 
tenure choice across our distribution of cost measures. We then use this option as a benchmark 
to compare the performance of different trading strategies.  
The first column of Table 8 indicates how close to the perfect-foresight optimum a 
household with a five-year horizon could have gotten by using the regression-based tenure 
choice criteria over the 1980-2009 period.  On average, the difference in cost would have 
equaled about six percent of annual rent.  In many MSAs, the regression-based model was 
within five percent of rent of the optimum strategy.  In other MSAs, such as Austin and San 
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Antonio Texas, annual ownership costs under this rule exceeded the optimum by more than 16 
percent of annual rent on average.  For most cities, however, always-owning (column 3) or 
always-renting (column 5), performs significantly worse:  for example, the cost of always-
owning in Boston exceeded the optimal strategy each year by about 23 percent of annual rent.  
Always-renting is worse, wasting about 52 percent of annual rent.  Using the regression-based 
strategy in Boston would have moved a household within seven percent of annual rent of the 
perfect-foresight ideal.   
Column 7 evaluates the “last year” strategy of owning over the next five years, if 
owning was cheaper over the prior five years.  In most cities, this strategy unsurprisingly 
performed like the average of the always-own and always-rent approaches.  Still, in a handful of 
cities where owning was almost always dominant – Atlanta, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Columbus, 
Kansas City, Sacramento, and Washington DC – this strategy did very well. 
However, it may be unrealistic to think that a renter would commit to renting for 5 
years.  (Conversely, homeownership is generally an absorbing state.) Instead, a more realistic 
trading rule is one that says a household should own if owning was less expensive the prior year, 
and then continue to own for the remainder of its horizon.  However, if renting is cheaper, the 
household should rent for another year and then reevaluate.  If owning turns out to have been 
cheaper, the household should then own.  But if not, it should rent again and reevaluate for 
another year.  In this way, the household ends up renting for its entire horizon only if renting 
was cheaper than owning for each of the first k-1 years. 
This strategy compares very favorably to the perfect-foresight ideal and almost always 
does better than the regression-based strategy.  Column 9 reports the average cost relative to 
optimal timing as a percentage of average annual rent.  On average, the year-at-a-time strategy 
costs just five percent of annual rent more than the best-case housing cost.  That is close to the 
regression-based cost from column 1.   
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A large portion of the savings from this strategy comes from the option to delay the 
switch from renting to owning for several years.  That savings can be seen by comparing 
columns 7 and 9.  Column 7’s cost premium to the lowest-cost strategy assumes the household 
commits upfront to either renting for 5 years or owning for 5 years.  In column 9, the household 
either owns for 5 years, or rents for one year and then reevaluates.  The difference between the 
two columns, then, is due to the option to have an intermediate number of years of renting before 
entering into a home owning commitment.  The savings is considerable – the average cost 
premium in column 7 is more than three times as large as the one in column 9.  Indeed, the year-
at-a-time strategy always is less expensive than the last-year strategy, and the greatest benefit 
accrues in the cities with cyclical housing markets such as San Francisco or Boston, where the 
commitment strategy does particularly poorly. 
Table 9 evaluates the same trading strategies for households with a ten-year horizon. We 
define the predicted strategy based on the results for the ten-year horizon in Table 6, and 
similarly define the naïve strategy as owning if it was cheaper to own over the last ten years. 
Results for the 10-year horizon are qualitatively the same as the 5-year horizon, but the savings 
differences between trading strategies are wider in magnitude.  
6 Effect of different tax rates 
One of the more significant determinants of the relative cost of owning and renting is a 
household’s tax bracket.  From equations 2 and 3, holding the housing constant, rents do not 
vary with a household’s tax rate but the annual cost of owning rises as the tax rate declines.  This 
implies that the difference between the cost of owning and rent is greater for low income, low 
tax-rate households.  The precise details of the U.S. tax treatment can be found in Poterba (1991) 
and Poterba and Sinai (2008).   
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In Table 10, we expand our analysis to consider how the own/rent balance varies across 
the income distribution.  We obtain average tax rates on mortgage interest, property taxes, and 
income at different points in each city’s income distribution.  Using household-level micro data 
from the 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 Decennial Censuses, we compute the average income of 
households whose house values are between zero and 75 percent of the median house value in 
their city (tier 1), 75-100 percent of the median house value (tier 2), 100-125 percent of the 
median house value (tier 3), and more than 125 percent of the median house value (tier 4).  It is 
worth underscoring that tiers have different meanings in different cities.  For example, 
households in in San Francisco have higher average incomes than households in the same tier in 
Columbus, Ohio.  For each household, we obtain the family structure from the Census and 
impute mortgage interest and opportunity cost of capital using the current 30-year mortgage 
interest rate.  We linearly interpolate the households’ characteristics incomes for each 
intervening year and use the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM tax model to 
impute state and federal taxes. 
Table 10 reports the probability that owning is cheaper than renting for five categories 
of households: Four categories corresponding to each of the house value tiers, and one where we 
assume zero tax rates.  Households in the highest house value tier in each city generally will find 
that owning is cheaper than renting (in column 5).  However, it is a toss-up in Palm Beach and 
renting is slightly cheaper on average in San Diego.  By contrast, a household with zero tax 
rates, and thus no tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing, would find that renting is less 
expensive most of the time in most cities (in column 1).  In Milwaukee, for example, in the 
absence of taxes owning is cheaper than renting just one-third of the years between 1980 and 
2009.  (For the highest tier households there, owning is cheaper than renting nearly 68 percent of 
the time.)  In the exceptions -- Austin, Charlotte, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Memphis, 
Miami, Nashville, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and St. Louis – owning is cheaper than 
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renting barely more than 50 percent in the absence of taxes, except for San Antonio where it is 
59 percent. 
The intervening columns vary on whether owning has typically been cheaper than 
renting or not, depending on the sensitivity of owning costs to the tax rate and on how the tax 
rates change across tiers.  In some cities, like Austin, owning is always more likely to be cheaper 
than renting.  In some, like Palm Beach, owning is typically more expensive in all tiers.  Other 
cities, like Baltimore, exhibit large differences between the lowest tier (owning is cheaper 41 
percent of the time) and the highest tier (owning is cheaper 65 percent of the time).  By contrast, 
San Francisco ranges little, from 48 percent (lowest tier) to 54 percent (highest tier). 
Whether owning or renting is cheaper on average due to taxes does not influence the 
efficacy of the owning/renting strategy – it just changes the frequency of the time that owning or 
renting are chosen.  We have replicated Table 4 for the various income tiers and even in the 
bottom tier, which is the most different from our baseline results, the savings from the last-year 
and regression-based strategies are not affected much.18  On average across all MSAs, the last-
year strategy is just 7.9 percent of annual rent more expensive than the lowest-possible-cost 
housing (versus 8.1 in Table 4) and the regression-based strategy is just 5.9 percent more 
expensive.  (The same as in Table 4.)  We do see some differences across MSAs, but they are 
slight and for every MSA where the trading strategy is slightly less efficient, there is another 
where it is slightly more effective. 
7 Conclusion 
We examine 30 years of data from 39 metropolitan areas to see if households could 
successfully time the housing market when deciding whether to own or rent their homes.  We 
find several home buying strategies that would have saved households money.  First, simply 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Savings for the lowest income tier can be found in Table 11. 
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choosing homeownership when in the previous year owning was cheaper than renting saves 13 
percent of annual rent on average relative to always-owning and 40 percent on average relative 
to always being a renter.  The potential savings varies across cities, but it is always positive.  
While we can improve upon this simple rule of thumb with a regression model to predict 
whether to own or rent, in most cities the gains from the additional complexity are small. 
 This approach also extends to the first-time buyer with a multi-year holding period.  If a 
household is otherwise indifferent between renting and owning, it should buy if owning was 
cheaper than renting the prior year.  However, if it was not, it should rent another year.  Not only 
does that save the difference between rent and ownership costs for that year, it preserves the 
option to keep renting.  In other words, if the first-time homebuyer defers ownership for a year, 
it can defer it again if conditions warrant.  Indeed, we find that if renting is chosen, the 
household should again evaluate whether to own or rent based on the relative cost in the prior 
year.  In this manner, a first-time homebuyer will not buy a house until owning is finally cheaper 
than renting.  We find that this option to keep renting is quite valuable and in many cities this 
strategy approaches the lowest-possible cost timing for becoming an owner. 
 The intuition behind these results is straightforward.  It is by now well-established that 
house prices exhibit short-run persistence and long-run mean reversion.  We find that statistical 
pattern is not undone by corresponding changes in rent.  From the perspective of a potential 
homebuyer, this means that a year when owning is cheaper than renting tend to be followed by 
another year when owning is cheaper than renting.  Thus, owning being less expensive than 
renting is a good signal to buy.  When owning finally becomes more expensive than renting, it is 
time to sell.  However, due to the slow-changing nature of house prices, owning initially is not 
much more expensive than renting, so the cost of getting the transition year wrong is low.  
Finally, because owning typically is cheaper than renting for many years in a row, not many 
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moves are needed to arbitrage relative costs of owning and renting.  Thus, even in the presence 
of high moving costs, it can be worthwhile in some cities to switch tenure mode.   
 This analysis emphasizes the importance of persistence in house price growth and the 
covariance of house price changes and rents in timing the home buying decision.  Indeed, the 
differences between our results and those in other papers are due to these factors.  For example, 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2010) conclude that waiting a year to own incurs considerable house price 
risk because the purchase price of the next year’s housing is uncertain.  However, they calibrate 
their model assuming no persistence in house prices; that persistence dampens the exposure to 
house price changes and increases the benefit from waiting a year.  In the four cities in their 
data, Case and Shiller (1989) exploit the serial correlation in house price changes and find a 
benefit to waiting a year to buy if their model does not predict housing excess returns to be 
positive.  However, they do not consider the additional benefit from potentially renting for 
multiple years. 
 In addition, we establish two empirical patterns that future research should try to 
explain.  First, housing markets do not seem to be in equilibrium either with rents and ownership 
costs being equal ex post, or in the Poterba (1984) sense that expected annual housing costs 
equal rents.  It is hard to reconcile the fact that in many cities owning is typically cheaper than 
renting, and the expected cost difference is positive, with an equilibrium that equates user cost 
and rent  (Verbrugge, 2008).  Second, the degree and frequency to which expected user cost is 
below rent varies across cities. 
 These patterns deserve investigation.  Possible explanations include taxes – which we 
find to have a big effect on the relative costs of owning and renting.19  Since tax rates are 
heterogenous across the population, the tax rate of the marginal homebuyer may differ across 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See also Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008). 
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cities.  Other possible explanations include differences in liquidity constraints, transaction costs, 
and risk. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RELATIVE COSTS OF OWNING V. RENTING 
  Pr(CO>CR) Average CO-CR (as % of CR) 
  Overall Overall if CO>CR if CO<CR 
All MSAs 65.1 -29.2 81.3 -73.7 
Atlanta 74.8 -31.0 29.5 -46.3 
Austin 69.6 -21.8 106.3 -61.4 
Baltimore 64.8 -38.6 59.7 -84.0 
Boston 57.5 -56.1 115.1 -155.0 
Charlotte 83.8 -40.0 31.7 -49.8 
Chicago 63.0 -14.3 69.2 -54.7 
Cincinnati 68.4 -14.2 52.0 -38.2 
Cleveland 64.7 -11.8 55.0 -40.2 
Columbus 74.2 -21.1 40.7 -37.2 
Dallas 63.4 -11.3 58.9 -39.6 
Denver 57.0 -20.0 61.7 -71.3 
Detroit 67.0 -19.7 88.5 -60.7 
Fort Lauderdale 64.0 -36.8 99.7 -92.6 
Houston 67.2 -15.2 91.9 -54.2 
Indianapolis 71.9 -21.4 38.9 -38.2 
Kansas City 74.2 -28.0 56.2 -49.0 
Los Angeles 54.7 -45.2 154.1 -184.3 
Memphis 71.9 -20.2 68.1 -45.8 
Miami 65.0 -34.8 98.6 -98.4 
Milwaukee 68.5 -15.2 60.3 -43.4 
Minneapolis 70.2 -30.2 57.9 -60.8 
Nashville 68.5 -26.5 44.8 -54.2 
New York 58.5 -52.7 115.6 -137.2 
Orlando 67.8 -35.5 72.9 -74.1 
Palm Beach 55.5 -28.0 87.3 -97.8 
Philadelphia 64.2 -40.5 51.9 -80.9 
Phoenix 66.2 -33.1 109.4 -91.7 
Pittsburgh 75.1 -25.2 57.9 -46.4 
Portland 60.8 -31.6 71.9 -93.7 
Richmond 70.0 -36.1 34.3 -59.8 
Sacramento 55.9 -29.2 155.7 -146.7 
San Antonio 69.6 -24.3 91.7 -61.1 
San Diego 50.6 -34.1 132.7 -176.5 
San Francisco 55.9 -49.9 164.6 -185.7 
San Jose 54.6 -53.4 155.0 -187.6 
Seattle 52.8 -20.2 84.2 -107.7 
St. Louis 73.6 -29.7 38.9 -48.7 
Tampa 65.4 -35.7 69.5 -79.2 
Washington, D.C. 59.7 -48.5 80.9 -118.7 
Note: The cost of owning is denoted by “CO”, and the cost of renting “CR”. Pr(CO>CR) is the probability that the owning is cheaper 
than renting. “Overall" is the average CO-CR across all cost measures and years in a given city. Cost measures are calculated by 
equation (4), assuming a loan-to-value constant of 0.8 and national average federal and state income tax for all tax rates. 
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TABLE 2. PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 2.38 2.52 
 
!
(0.11) (0.15) 
 Atlanta 
!  
3.00 
 !  
(0.07) 
Austin 
  
2.18 
   
(0.06) 
Baltimore 
  
1.25 
   
(0.05) 
Boston 
  
2.73 
   
(0.06) 
Charlotte 
  
2.56 
   
(0.07) 
Chicago 
  
2.07 
   
(0.05) 
Cincinnati 
  
3.52 
   
(0.07) 
Cleveland 
  
3.07 
   
(0.06) 
Columbus 
  
2.85 
   
(0.06) 
Dallas 
  
3.15 
   
(0.06) 
Denver 
  
3.73 
   
(0.07) 
Detroit 
  
3.87 
   
(0.07) 
Fort Lauderdale 
  
1.46 
   
(0.05) 
Houston 
  
2.53 
   
(0.06) 
Indianapolis 
  
2.36 
   
(0.06) 
Kansas City 
  
2.58 
   
(0.06) 
Los Angeles 
  
2.67 
   
(0.06) 
Memphis 
  
1.77 
!   
(0.06) 
Miami 
  
2.09 
   
(0.05) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.22 0.39 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is 
for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while 
column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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TABLE 2. (CONT’D) PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON 
  Coef/SE of (CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Milwaukee 
  
2.98 
   
(0.06) 
Minneapolis 
  
2.18 
   
(0.06) 
Nashville 
  
1.83 
   
(0.05) 
New York 
  
3.16 
   
(0.06) 
Orlando 
  
2.04 
   
(0.05) 
Palm Beach 
  
1.76 
   
(0.05) 
Philadelphia 
  
1.68 
   
(0.05) 
Phoenix 
  
1.66 
   
(0.05) 
Pittsburgh 
  
1.45 
   
(0.06) 
Portland 
  
3.15 
   
(0.06) 
Richmond 
  
1.70 
   
(0.05) 
Sacramento 
  
2.90 
   
(0.06) 
San Antonio 
  
2.11 
   
(0.05) 
San Diego 
  
3.48 
   
(0.06) 
San Francisco 
  
2.10 
   
(0.05) 
San Jose 
  
1.63 
   
(0.05) 
Seattle 
  
2.72 
   
(0.06) 
St. Louis 
  
3.32 
   
(0.07) 
Tampa 
  
1.52 
   
(0.05) 
Washington, D.C. 
  
2.18 
!
    (0.05) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.22 0.39 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is 
for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while 
column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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TABLE 3. FORECASTING THE 1-YEAR HORIZON OWN VERSUS RENT DECISION 
  % of Time Forecast is Correct 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 78.7 82.5 78.8 
Atlanta 84.9 87.6 84.9 
Austin 77.6 76.9 77.6 
Baltimore 67.6 74.6 67.6 
Boston 79.7 86.9 79.7 
Charlotte 85.9 84.8 85.9 
Chicago 75.4 82.8 75.4 
Cincinnati 86.8 90.3 86.8 
Cleveland 83.5 85.8 83.5 
Columbus 83.7 84.5 83.7 
Dallas 83.5 79.0 83.5 
Denver 86.5 87.4 86.5 
Detroit 88.5 86.7 88.5 
Fort Lauderdale 69.4 74.7 69.4 
Houston 79.7 73.8 79.7 
Indianapolis 79.6 80.6 79.6 
Kansas City 82.5 84.0 82.5 
Los Angeles 79.0 92.4 79.0 
Memphis 75.7 78.4 75.7 
Miami 75.5 79.8 75.5 
Milwaukee 83.6 86.4 83.6 
Minneapolis 78.5 80.8 78.5 
Nashville 75.0 75.8 75.0 
New York 83.2 89.5 83.2 
Orlando 75.9 84.5 75.9 
Palm Beach 70.8 79.7 70.8 
Philadelphia 71.8 77.7 71.8 
Phoenix 71.9 73.1 71.9 
Pittsburgh 74.7 82.1 77.7 
Portland 83.6 85.3 83.6 
Richmond 74.4 82.9 74.4 
Sacramento 81.1 83.0 81.1 
San Antonio 76.8 76.9 76.8 
San Diego 85.1 92.8 85.1 
San Francisco 74.5 80.9 74.5 
San Jose 69.4 85.7 69.4 
Seattle 79.7 76.3 79.7 
St. Louis 86.7 86.8 86.7 
Tampa 71.2 79.8 71.2 
Washington, D.C. 75.4 87.0 75.4 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: This table calculates the percent of the time the predicted binary rent v. own decision was “correct”, i.e. when it was actually 
better to own or rent. The columns correspond to the specifications in Table 2. 
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TABLE 4. ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM LEAST COSTLY BENCHMARK (% OF CR), 1980-2009, 1-YEAR 
 
v. Regression-
Based 
v. Always    
Owning 
v. Always   
Renting 
v. Last-Year 
Strategy 
  Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD 
All MSAs 5.9 18.2 21.5 41.7 48.5 58.1 8.1 21.4 
Atlanta 1.6 7.1 5.9 13.4 37.0 36.2 2.4 7.9 
Austin 7.3 19.4 25.0 61.0 46.7 50.1 5.7 15.3 
Baltimore 5.4 12.9 15.9 30.1 48.4 64.0 8.7 16.7 
Boston 5.1 22.1 29.4 44.6 68.5 82.8 8.7 25.3 
Charlotte 3.5 12.9 4.0 13.6 45.4 37.0 3.5 12.1 
Chicago 2.4 8.7 18.3 35.4 29.9 33.8 4.2 9.9 
Cincinnati 0.9 5.2 12.9 27.4 26.1 26.0 1.8 6.3 
Cleveland 1.9 7.9 15.1 28.4 26.1 28.2 2.9 8.9 
Columbus 4.1 16.7 8.0 20.8 27.9 26.4 4.4 16.3 
Dallas 5.0 14.6 18.8 39.4 31.3 36.7 3.9 12.4 
Denver 2.2 9.3 19.5 31.1 36.0 46.1 2.3 7.9 
Detroit 4.4 18.5 27.2 53.1 49.3 53.3 4.3 18.5 
Fort Lauderdale 7.3 17.7 30.4 73.5 68.9 91.3 9.3 19.1 
Houston 17.0 38.1 28.7 50.5 46.5 46.6 11.4 31.4 
Indianapolis 5.5 20.3 8.8 22.3 31.0 32.6 6.0 20.1 
Kansas City 8.3 30.3 12.7 33.1 44.2 41.0 8.6 30.0 
Los Angeles 2.1 10.1 41.7 68.6 71.5 90.7 8.4 21.3 
Memphis 14.7 47.1 16.3 43.0 37.7 41.0 15.6 46.8 
Miami 6.4 17.9 30.4 74.8 63.6 81.8 11.9 31.5 
Milwaukee 2.4 9.5 14.9 31.3 28.7 29.3 3.2 10.0 
Minneapolis 4.9 14.5 13.4 27.4 40.6 42.0 5.4 13.8 
Nashville 7.5 19.4 11.9 24.1 36.9 35.7 7.7 18.6 
New York 4.1 15.9 29.0 43.7 68.5 78.3 6.5 18.0 
Orlando 2.7 10.0 20.2 49.9 57.5 84.2 10.1 30.5 
Palm Beach 4.4 12.2 32.4 67.3 59.9 89.6 9.1 19.2 
Philadelphia 7.7 19.9 15.5 27.4 55.5 63.3 9.8 20.9 
Phoenix 14.0 30.5 29.9 60.6 61.0 92.5 15.5 32.6 
Pittsburgh 6.8 24.1 13.3 35.9 42.0 41.1 10.9 27.1 
Portland 4.4 14.5 21.6 35.8 47.0 56.6 4.5 12.8 
Richmond 2.6 8.9 8.4 17.2 43.5 50.0 5.5 12.1 
Sacramento 8.5 26.6 42.2 67.1 62.6 84.2 10.0 28.0 
San Antonio 16.7 45.9 27.2 58.3 57.2 62.0 17.5 46.0 
San Diego 1.7 7.9 40.4 58.8 62.9 80.8 8.9 24.7 
San Francisco 5.9 16.0 35.3 49.9 62.8 80.1 12.8 30.3 
San Jose 5.0 17.0 36.6 54.4 68.9 91.6 20.5 44.4 
Seattle 9.3 23.4 25.6 42.4 39.1 66.2 7.2 19.1 
St. Louis 2.3 10.0 8.7 20.9 39.5 36.4 2.3 8.8 
Tampa 9.8 32.2 21.8 49.6 60.1 78.9 17.1 41.7 
Washington, D.C. 3.8 12.9 22.7 41.5 61.4 78.5 7.8 17.5 
Note: Each column reports the expected money saved from following the least costly benchmark (correctly forecasting) against the 
indicated trading strategy. "Regression-Based " indicates a trading strategy in which one rents or buys given the predicted strategy 
from specification (2) in tables 1 and 2.  Always own and always rent is to apply a strategy of always owning or renting regardless of 
MSA or year. “Last-Year” refers to a strategy where one just owns or rent based on whether it was observed to be cheaper to own or 
rent in the previous year. 
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TABLE 5. TRANSACTION COST PER RENT-OWN SWITCH BEFORE ELIMINATE SAVINGS, 1980-2009 
  Transaction Cost Per Switch (as % of P) 
  
Regression-Based 
v. Always 
Owning 
Regression-Based 
v. Always 
Renting 
Last-Year       
v. Always 
Owning 
Last-Year       
v. Always 
Renting 
All MSAs 5.8 16.9 4.7 14.8 
Atlanta 1.8 14.8 1.8 17.6 
Austin 9.6 21.2 7.0 14.6 
Baltimore 3.1 12.3 1.6 8.8 
Boston 11.5 27.9 7.5 20.2 
Charlotte 0.2 21.1 0.2 25.5 
Chicago 7.5 15.6 3.4 7.7 
Cincinnati 6.4 16.6 5.0 13.7 
Cleveland 6.7 15.9 4.2 10.5 
Columbus 1.9 11.3 1.6 10.4 
Dallas 5.8 10.6 6.7 11.9 
Denver 10.1 19.0 9.8 18.4 
Detroit 13.5 28.8 13.6 28.9 
Fort Lauderdale 5.8 14.1 5.1 13.1 
Houston 2.9 9.2 5.5 12.8 
Indianapolis 1.7 11.8 1.1 8.4 
Kansas City 0.6 13.6 0.5 15.1 
Los Angeles 16.0 27.5 11.8 21.8 
Memphis -0.8 7.9 -1.0 7.1 
Miami 7.8 17.6 5.6 14.6 
Milwaukee 5.9 13.7 4.8 11.5 
Minneapolis 2.4 12.3 2.2 12.1 
Nashville 0.3 8.5 0.3 9.5 
New York 11.3 29.6 9.7 27.1 
Orlando 6.1 18.5 3.1 14.1 
Palm Beach 8.5 15.9 5.9 12.2 
Philadelphia 2.5 14.7 1.5 11.7 
Phoenix 4.2 11.7 3.8 11.3 
Pittsburgh 0.7 25.3 -0.9 9.4 
Portland 6.8 19.6 6.6 19.2 
Richmond 2.1 17.4 0.6 11.5 
Sacramento 8.5 13.5 12.6 20.5 
San Antonio 4.1 15.7 3.1 12.4 
San Diego 13.2 21.7 15.0 26.9 
San Francisco 7.4 14.6 6.4 14.5 
San Jose 12.5 24.2 3.9 11.1 
Seattle 2.6 6.8 4.8 11.6 
St. Louis 2.7 18.9 3.1 22.0 
Tampa 3.8 18.2 0.8 11.0 
Washington, D.C. 7.3 21.7 4.5 15.8 
Note: Each column reports average transaction cost each rent/own switch would have to equal in order completely eliminate savings 
from the predicted strategy versus the more naïve strategy in each column.. "Predicted" indicates a trading strategy in which one 
rents or buys given the predicted strategy from specification (2) in tables 1 and 2.  Always own and always rent is to apply a strategy 
of always owning or renting regardless of MSA or year. “Last-year” strategy is to buy or rent based on whether it was better to buy 
or rent in previous year. 
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TABLE 6. PREDICTING THE 5-YEAR AND 10-YEAR HORIZON OWN VERSUS RENT DECISION 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
 
5-Year Horizon 10-Year Horizon 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Pooled)     
All MSAs 0.45 0.48 0.74 0.94 
!
(0.13) (0.15) (0.25) (0.23) 
(MSA Dummies) 
    Atlanta -1.61 -0.59 -4.79 -5.66 
 
(0.36) (0.39) (0.56) (0.71) 
Austin -1.40 -0.41 -4.79 -5.77 
 
(0.49) (0.68) (0.39) (0.93) 
Baltimore -1.24 -0.05 -1.88 -2.38 
 
(0.40) (0.48) (0.58) (0.60) 
Boston -0.37 1.11 -2.77 -3.21 
 
(0.44) (0.43) (1.05) (0.88) 
Charlotte -2.46 -1.53 -3.75 -4.54 
 
(0.35) (0.39) (0.23) (0.62) 
Chicago -1.57 -0.48 -2.56 -3.38 
 
(0.37) (0.42) (0.45) (0.58) 
Cincinnati -2.23 -1.30 -2.80 -3.77 
 
(0.24) (0.38) (0.21) (0.91) 
Cleveland -1.75 -0.75 -1.78 -2.41 
 
(0.35) (0.55) (0.29) (1.03) 
Columbus -2.08 -1.13 -2.55 -3.35 
 
(0.29) (0.43) (0.23) (0.88) 
Dallas -0.90 0.31 -3.15 -3.99 
 
(0.36) (0.47) (0.35) (0.69) 
Denver -1.06 0.04 -5.58 -6.70 
 
(0.42) (0.65) (0.83) (1.24) 
Detroit -1.59 -0.57 -1.94 -2.58 
 
(0.51) (0.71) (0.67) (1.47) 
Fort Lauderdale -1.68 -0.68 -3.88 -4.80 
 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.69) (0.70) 
Houston -1.56 -0.59 -3.88 -4.90 
 
(0.37) (0.51) (0.32) (0.74) 
Indianapolis -1.75 -0.74 -2.05 -2.71 
 
(0.18) (0.37) (0.15) (0.82) 
Kansas City -2.03 -1.10 -4.80 -5.87 
 
(0.31) (0.36) (0.61) (0.79) 
Los Angeles -0.86 0.45 -1.07 -1.33 
 
(0.49) (0.52) (0.77) (0.78) 
Memphis -1.42 -0.37 -2.74 -3.55 
 
(0.29) (0.40) (0.16) (0.76) 
Miami -2.46 -1.59 -4.77 -5.89 
 
(0.33) (0.42) (0.69) (0.72) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects ! YES ! YES Pseudo R2 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.29 
Obs 224640 224640 112320 112320 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t-k. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is 
for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Each column performs pooled regressions with different specifications.  
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TABLE 6 (CONT'D). PREDICTING THE 5-YEAR AND 10-YEAR HORIZON OWN VERSUS RENT DECISION 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
 
5-Year Horizon 10-Year Horizon 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(MSA Dummies)     
Milwaukee -2.65 -1.77 -3.49 -4.59 
 
(0.41) (0.54) (0.36) (0.97) 
Minneapolis -1.82 -0.86 -7.55 -8.58 
 
(0.40) (0.48) (0.65) (0.84) 
Nashville -1.49 -0.46 -3.77 -4.68 
 
(0.43) (0.53) (0.19) (0.74) 
New York -0.52 0.90 -1.93 -2.29 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.75) (0.67) 
Orlando -1.47 -0.43 -3.56 -4.38 
 
(0.29) (0.35) (0.50) (0.63) 
Palm Beach -1.08 0.09 -3.21 -4.04 
 
(0.32) (0.31) (0.66) (0.68) 
Philadelphia -0.99 0.27 -1.64 -2.04 
 
(0.41) (0.47) (0.59) (0.61) 
Phoenix -1.32 -0.29 -5.41 -6.40 
 
(0.45) (0.57) (0.69) (0.72) 
Pittsburgh -2.19 -1.21 -2.19 -2.88 
 
(0.22) (0.39) (0.15) (0.72) 
Portland -3.16 -2.35 -6.11 -7.40 
 
(0.46) (0.65) (0.68) (1.16) 
Richmond -2.02 -1.02 -3.22 -4.05 
 
(0.34) (0.36) (0.49) (0.60) 
Sacramento -1.03 0.23 -1.52 -1.92 
 
(0.52) (0.61) (0.68) (0.67) 
San Antonio -1.49 -0.51 -3.76 -4.72 
 
(0.45) (0.62) (0.27) (0.78) 
San Diego -0.90 0.39 -1.99 -2.44 
 
(0.50) (0.54) (0.83) (0.74) 
San Francisco -0.91 0.36 -2.64 -3.19 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (1.09) (0.96) 
San Jose -1.18 0.01 -3.10 -3.73 
 
(0.52) (0.54) (1.03) (0.89) 
Seattle -1.77 -0.73 -2.75 -3.69 
 
(0.57) (0.63) (0.41) (0.70) 
St. Louis -1.77 -0.77 -3.76 -4.62 
 
(0.32) (0.34) (0.45) (0.61) 
Tampa -1.57 -0.56 -4.21 -5.08 
!
(0.32) (0.37) (0.55) (0.63) 
Washington, D.C. -0.96 0.32 -1.87 -2.33 
!
(0.45) (0.52) (0.72) (0.66) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects ! YES ! YES Pseudo R2 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.29 
Obs 224640 224640 112320 112320 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t-k. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is 
for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Each column performs pooled regressions with different specifications.  
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TABLE 7. FORECASTING THE 5-YEAR AND 10-YEAR HORIZON OWN VERSUS RENT DECISION 
  % of Time Forecast is Correct 
 
5-Year Horizon 10-Year Horizon 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All MSAs 78.2 82.1 92.2 92.9 
Atlanta 77.6 68.5 98.5 98.5 
Austin 74.5 77.7 84.4 87.0 
Baltimore 42.4 84.4 91.4 91.4 
Boston 91.7 91.7 97.5 97.5 
Charlotte 80.8 80.8 91.6 91.6 
Chicago 89.2 89.2 92.8 92.8 
Cincinnati 83.8 83.8 83.4 75.3 
Cleveland 88.1 88.1 91.6 91.6 
Columbus 66.0 70.5 92.4 92.4 
Dallas 70.3 60.0 99.4 99.4 
Denver 82.0 82.0 86.5 82.8 
Detroit 82.0 83.0 97.1 97.1 
Fort Lauderdale 79.3 77.3 96.5 96.5 
Houston 83.9 83.9 86.6 85.7 
Indianapolis 87.0 87.0 98.9 98.9 
Kansas City 66.3 75.4 69.2 89.2 
Los Angeles 78.2 80.6 91.7 91.7 
Memphis 91.0 91.0 98.8 98.8 
Miami 92.6 92.6 96.3 96.3 
Milwaukee 84.6 84.6 99.9 99.9 
Minneapolis 79.6 80.3 96.9 96.9 
Nashville 58.3 90.3 82.5 88.4 
New York 78.6 82.6 95.9 95.9 
Orlando 70.3 87.3 93.8 93.8 
Palm Beach 69.8 73.8 80.9 85.5 
Philadelphia 75.8 81.3 99.3 99.3 
Phoenix 88.9 88.9 88.3 86.4 
Pittsburgh 95.3 95.3 99.7 99.7 
Portland 87.0 87.0 95.3 95.3 
Richmond 69.3 60.1 79.7 86.8 
Sacramento 78.3 70.3 96.0 96.0 
San Antonio 67.0 80.2 85.0 85.6 
San Diego 67.6 91.8 91.7 91.7 
San Francisco 73.7 87.1 95.1 95.1 
San Jose 82.8 82.8 93.1 93.1 
Seattle 84.1 84.1 97.0 97.0 
St. Louis 80.6 82.7 97.9 97.9 
Tampa 68.8 82.3 84.3 90.8 
Washington, D.C. 80.6 81.8 97.9 95.0 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Obs 224640 224640 112320 112320 
   Notes: See Table 3 notes. 
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TABLE 8. AVERAGE ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM LEAST COSTLY BENCHMARK, 5-YEAR HORIZON, 1980-2009 
  Annual Savings from Least Costly Tenure Choice (as % of CR)  
  
v. Regression       
-Based 
v. Always 
Owning 
v. Always 
Renting 
v. Last-Year 
Strategy 
v. 1-Year 
Strategy 
All MSAs 6.4 7.8 54.1 17.9 4.7 
Atlanta 2.9 3.2 42.1 6.7 2.4 
Austin 23.7 19.1 47.5 28.5 8.9 
Baltimore 4.3 5.3 57.3 18.2 4.7 
Boston 6.9 23.0 51.7 40.0 11.1 
Charlotte 1.1 1.1 46.4 3.1 1.0 
Chicago 2.4 2.4 32.7 11.0 2.3 
Cincinnati 1.2 1.2 32.3 4.9 1.4 
Cleveland 2.5 2.5 31.6 6.7 2.4 
Columbus 1.4 1.4 31.7 2.9 1.3 
Dallas 11.1 14.9 34.9 11.2 4.6 
Denver 21.0 10.9 49.0 19.0 2.4 
Detroit 7.8 7.8 58.1 19.1 5.7 
Fort Lauderdale 3.0 3.3 82.2 6.3 3.8 
Houston 8.6 7.9 50.3 9.8 2.7 
Indianapolis 2.3 2.3 31.0 2.6 1.6 
Kansas City 2.5 2.5 53.1 4.8 1.5 
Los Angeles 16.1 23.0 84.7 53.2 11.2 
Memphis 3.8 4.4 33.6 5.0 3.2 
Miami 1.6 1.6 79.4 6.7 3.4 
Milwaukee 0.8 0.8 36.3 6.4 1.1 
Minneapolis 2.3 2.3 51.7 4.0 2.0 
Nashville 5.1 5.4 36.2 12.6 3.7 
New York 3.9 22.4 54.2 32.8 9.3 
Orlando 3.3 4.2 66.6 5.4 2.6 
Palm Beach 2.1 6.6 72.3 10.3 5.8 
Philadelphia 7.9 9.0 53.7 19.2 4.7 
Phoenix 6.2 8.1 65.7 12.2 5.4 
Pittsburgh 1.7 1.7 43.5 4.3 2.9 
Portland 2.1 2.1 63.7 22.2 2.0 
Richmond 2.0 2.0 53.1 5.2 2.5 
Sacramento 26.3 16.4 77.5 57.8 10.0 
San Antonio 16.8 12.8 54.9 15.4 9.8 
San Diego 11.5 18.4 80.2 56.3 10.5 
San Francisco 7.2 17.4 68.2 55.9 9.9 
San Jose 8.9 15.7 70.8 51.7 11.6 
Seattle 5.3 5.3 48.1 29.0 4.8 
St. Louis 2.7 2.7 42.6 4.1 1.3 
Tampa 3.3 3.7 69.6 4.9 2.5 
Washington, D.C. 5.2 9.4 69.6 28.5 6.3 
Note: Each column reports the expected money saved if a household was able to follow the least costly tenure choice perfectly 
against the indicated trading strategy. "Regression-Based” indicates a trading strategy in which one rents or buys given the predicted 
strategy from specification (2) in Table 5.  Always own and always rent is to apply a strategy of always owning or renting regardless 
of MSA or year. “1-year strategy” refers to a decision rule in which a household decides to start owning for the rest of the tenure 
choice horizon  if the observed 1-year cost of owning was cheaper than the cost of rent in the previous year. If not, then the 
household will continue to rent until the 1-year costs indicate it was cheaper to own in the prior year. 
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TABLE 9. AVERAGE ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM LEAST COSTLY BENCHMARK WITH 10-YEAR HORIZON,  
1980-2009 
  Annual Savings from Least Costly Tenure Choice (as % of CR)  
  
v. Regression-
Based 
v. Always 
Owning 
v. Always 
Renting 
v. Last-Year 
Strategy 
v. 1-Year 
Strategy 
All MSAs 2.1 5.7 50.2 15.1 3.9 
Atlanta 0.2 1.8 45.5 6.2 1.8 
Austin 0.1 9.9 48.1 30.2 5.1 
Baltimore 2.2 4.8 43.8 10.9 4.4 
Boston 5.0 17.9 53.0 34.3 9.3 
Charlotte 0.1 0.7 46.5 0.5 0.8 
Chicago 0.9 1.6 28.1 1.8 1.7 
Cincinnati 0.3 0.7 33.2 2.7 1.0 
Cleveland 2.0 1.3 31.7 2.2 1.6 
Columbus 0.4 0.8 32.7 1.0 0.9 
Dallas 0.8 9.3 34.4 23.7 4.4 
Denver 0.1 5.5 58.8 31.9 0.7 
Detroit 2.2 2.1 59.8 4.1 2.4 
Fort Lauderdale 0.7 2.2 74.1 18.1 3.0 
Houston 0.5 4.5 48.5 24.7 3.2 
Indianapolis 0.9 1.7 30.9 0.6 1.5 
Kansas City 0.1 1.2 56.9 8.5 0.8 
Los Angeles 8.7 21.9 62.9 43.5 13.0 
Memphis 0.6 2.7 33.5 4.3 2.5 
Miami 0.5 1.0 71.2 12.4 2.7 
Milwaukee 0.2 0.3 35.5 3.2 0.6 
Minneapolis 0.1 0.7 57.0 9.7 0.6 
Nashville 0.3 3.0 36.2 5.1 2.6 
New York 5.2 20.4 50.2 36.0 11.2 
Orlando 0.7 3.2 58.1 18.0 2.3 
Palm Beach 1.3 4.7 62.7 28.0 4.9 
Philadelphia 2.6 7.3 40.3 13.4 5.3 
Phoenix 0.2 4.2 62.4 28.2 3.1 
Pittsburgh 1.0 1.3 40.1 0.9 2.0 
Portland 0.3 1.4 61.4 8.9 1.2 
Richmond 0.5 1.5 45.7 4.6 2.0 
Sacramento 8.3 13.5 59.0 19.4 7.4 
San Antonio 0.3 5.9 48.1 24.9 6.1 
San Diego 10.3 17.3 71.0 33.3 9.8 
San Francisco 9.0 16.6 64.3 27.1 9.7 
San Jose 7.7 13.3 69.0 16.8 8.0 
Seattle 2.2 3.1 38.4 3.4 3.7 
St. Louis 0.2 1.6 42.4 4.5 1.2 
Tampa 0.5 2.6 65.3 19.0 2.4 
Washington, D.C. 4.1 9.0 56.4 20.8 6.8 
Note: This table reports the same as Table 8 except for the 10-year horizon. Each column reports the expected money saved if a 
household was able to follow the least costly tenure choice perfectly against the indicated trading strategy.  
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TABLE 10. PROBABILITY OWNING IS CHEAPER BY INCOME TIER, 1-YEAR HORIZON 
  PR(CO<CR) 
  
Zero Tax 
Baseline 
Low House 
Value Tier Tier 2 Tier 3 
High House 
Value Tier 
All MSAs 45.8 47.5 51.6 54.6 61.9 
Atlanta 45.7 47.4 58.4 64.7 74.9 
Austin 50.3 51.4 56.1 59.3 65.6 
Baltimore 39.7 41.1 49.9 56.2 64.6 
Boston 47.4 49.1 51.7 53.3 56.2 
Charlotte 54.3 56.1 61.4 66.5 80.7 
Chicago 38.7 40.2 47.1 54.5 62.8 
Cincinnati 36.1 39.4 43.7 48.0 62.0 
Cleveland 35.1 36.3 39.2 43.3 57.3 
Columbus 35.9 37.5 42.3 48.8 65.2 
Dallas 41.7 42.9 46.6 50.0 59.0 
Denver 39.0 40.9 46.5 49.3 56.5 
Detroit 51.1 52.1 55.1 57.6 64.5 
Fort Lauderdale 49.9 50.5 52.2 54.0 59.8 
Houston 56.9 57.6 57.8 58.8 62.6 
Indianapolis 42.4 44.3 47.1 50.9 64.2 
Kansas City 53.5 55.0 59.2 63.6 73.2 
Los Angeles 45.9 47.4 49.1 50.4 53.2 
Memphis 52.3 53.3 56.2 58.1 68.9 
Miami 52.2 52.7 53.5 55.1 61.0 
Milwaukee 33.7 35.8 48.4 57.3 67.7 
Minneapolis 41.9 45.3 54.9 61.4 69.9 
Nashville 53.3 54.3 56.5 58.3 64.2 
New York 47.4 49.7 53.3 54.3 57.4 
Orlando 48.0 48.8 52.3 54.4 62.2 
Palm Beach 42.7 43.4 44.9 45.5 50.0 
Philadelphia 47.2 48.1 51.5 54.4 61.9 
Phoenix 51.7 54.1 57.9 59.8 65.2 
Pittsburgh 53.0 54.4 55.0 56.5 64.9 
Portland 45.4 46.6 52.0 52.8 58.4 
Richmond 46.1 47.7 54.6 59.0 69.4 
Sacramento 42.1 42.7 46.2 48.1 51.8 
San Antonio 59.3 59.5 60.3 60.7 63.8 
San Diego 45.4 46.1 48.0 48.6 49.6 
San Francisco 43.2 47.6 50.7 52.0 53.8 
San Jose 41.0 48.0 52.4 53.1 54.5 
Seattle 38.6 39.2 43.4 47.1 51.5 
St. Louis 50.2 51.6 55.4 59.5 70.2 
Tampa 47.1 47.5 48.7 50.2 57.1 
Washington, D.C. 40.7 46.5 54.3 55.8 58.2 
Note: This table reports the probability owning is cheaper than renting by house value tiers. “Zero Tax Baseline” is the PR(CO<CR) 
assuming no taxes or deductions. “Low House Value Tier” corresponds to households with house values to 0.75*median house value 
or lower, Tier 2 households have house values between the low and the median, Tier 3 house values are between median and 
1.25*median, and “High House Value Tier” are those above 1.25*median house value. We assume loan-to-value equals 0.8 in these 
calculations. 
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TABLE 11. AVERAGE ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM LEAST COSTLY BENCHMARK WITH 1-YEAR HORIZON, 
LOWEST INCOME TIER, 1980-2009 
  Annual Savings from Least Costly Tenure Choice (as % of CR)  
 
v. Predicted v. Always Owning 
v. Always 
Renting 
v. Last-Year 
Strategy 
  Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD 
All MSAs 5.9 17.8 35.8 52.8 31.6 49.1 7.9 21.6 
Atlanta 1.4 6.8 20.2 26.7 18.1 27.6 2.8 9.9 
Austin 11.4 23.4 36.2 68.4 29.1 41.9 8.3 17.6 
Baltimore 2.6 10.4 32.3 40.9 31.3 56.4 5.9 15.9 
Boston 6.5 22.0 41.1 52.8 53.3 72.0 8.6 22.8 
Charlotte 3.8 12.5 15.5 27.9 21.8 29.0 4.0 11.6 
Chicago 3.0 10.1 34.4 47.4 14.7 23.8 3.9 11.4 
Cincinnati 2.0 7.5 30.2 43.7 8.9 16.0 2.4 7.8 
Cleveland 4.1 11.9 34.1 45.2 8.9 17.1 4.7 12.4 
Columbus 2.5 9.1 25.1 35.6 8.6 16.1 2.5 8.9 
Dallas 3.5 11.7 33.2 48.0 17.5 28.8 2.7 10.5 
Denver 2.5 9.1 34.1 41.8 21.0 35.6 1.7 7.8 
Detroit 3.6 13.8 41.5 65.1 29.1 41.6 3.1 13.2 
Fort Lauderdale 7.0 20.7 42.4 79.0 53.0 83.7 10.2 22.9 
Houston 9.5 26.4 40.8 63.9 30.1 36.4 10.6 27.3 
Indianapolis 5.3 21.1 21.9 34.8 13.7 22.7 6.4 21.6 
Kansas City 4.1 20.6 24.8 45.8 24.5 32.1 4.0 20.6 
Los Angeles 2.0 8.9 58.0 76.5 55.6 81.9 7.2 22.7 
Memphis 12.2 39.8 27.0 53.7 21.8 32.6 12.3 39.8 
Miami 9.5 22.5 42.4 80.7 47.9 75.4 15.9 36.1 
Milwaukee 2.3 8.7 34.9 47.8 9.6 19.0 2.2 9.1 
Minneapolis 2.0 8.5 28.3 38.8 21.1 31.9 3.6 11.6 
Nashville 6.6 17.7 22.7 37.0 20.9 27.1 7.6 18.1 
New York 6.7 21.7 43.5 55.4 50.1 65.4 7.9 23.0 
Orlando 3.3 10.7 32.0 55.3 41.4 78.7 9.7 32.4 
Palm Beach 4.7 14.7 46.7 72.5 46.3 82.6 9.9 23.1 
Philadelphia 5.1 14.9 29.3 39.4 37.1 53.2 6.6 16.2 
Phoenix 11.1 32.3 41.6 69.1 42.0 86.0 12.4 32.7 
Pittsburgh 7.8 21.1 25.5 50.0 22.7 32.1 10.4 23.6 
Portland 8.0 24.4 41.9 55.1 27.9 45.4 5.4 17.9 
Richmond 4.1 12.1 24.1 32.2 25.8 42.6 5.2 12.5 
Sacramento 9.4 25.5 62.9 76.3 45.7 73.4 10.9 33.7 
San Antonio 22.9 57.4 38.6 68.7 39.4 50.8 23.3 57.4 
San Diego 2.2 10.6 59.8 69.7 46.9 69.9 9.1 28.6 
San Francisco 4.8 14.7 47.7 59.0 51.3 72.6 12.9 34.6 
San Jose 9.4 24.9 48.9 63.3 56.2 85.7 23.5 50.0 
Seattle 7.6 19.5 40.9 52.7 28.2 58.7 8.0 20.7 
St. Louis 1.9 7.9 21.2 34.5 19.8 27.2 1.8 7.7 
Tampa 8.7 27.7 34.7 56.8 44.7 70.9 12.9 32.9 
Washington, D.C. 3.8 12.1 35.9 49.5 48.1 71.0 5.8 15.5 
Note: Each column reports the expected money saved if a household was able to follow the least costly tenure choice perfectly 
against the indicated trading strategy, but only for the lowest income tier. 
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FIGURE 1. ACTUAL V. PREDICTED COST OF OWNING MINUS COST OF RENTING 
 
 
 
Note: This figure plots the actual CO-CR against the predicted CO-CR across all MSAs and cost measures. 
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FIGURE 2. ACTUAL V. PREDICTED COST OF OWNING MINUS COST OF RENTING BY CITY 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure plots the actual CO-CR against the predicted CO-CR for a select sample of cities. 
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FIGURE 3. COST OF OWNING MINUS COST OF RENTING, 1980-2009 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure plots the average cost of owning minus cost of renting (CO-CR) for a 1-year horizon across a select sample of 
cities. The red dashed lined indicates where the cost of owning equals the cost of rent. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. PREDICTING CONTINUOUS CO-CR, 1-YEAR HORIZON 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 0.70 0.64 
 
!
(0.04) (0.04) 
 Atlanta 
!  
0.84 
 !  
(0.01) 
Austin 
  
0.71 
   
(0.01) 
Baltimore 
  
0.78 
   
(0.01) 
Boston 
  
0.79 
   
(0.01) 
Charlotte 
  
0.69 
   
(0.01) 
Chicago 
  
0.82 
   
(0.01) 
Cincinnati 
  
0.78 
   
(0.01) 
Cleveland 
  
0.71 
   
(0.01) 
Columbus 
  
0.63 
   
(0.01) 
Dallas 
  
0.81 
   
(0.01) 
Denver 
  
0.86 
   
(0.01) 
Detroit 
  
0.87 
   
(0.01) 
Fort Lauderdale 
  
0.82 
   
(0.01) 
Houston 
  
0.64 
   
(0.01) 
Indianapolis 
  
0.54 
   
(0.01) 
Kansas City 
  
0.53 
   
(0.01) 
Los Angeles 
  
0.82 
   
(0.01) 
Memphis 
  
0.03 
!   
(0.01) 
Miami 
  
0.90 
   
(0.01) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !R2 0.44 0.61 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is (CO-CR)t. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is for 
a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while 
column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONT'D). PREDICTING CONTINUOUS CO-CR, 1-YEAR HORIZON 
  Coef/SE of (CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Milwaukee 
  
0.67 
   
(0.01) 
Minneapolis 
  
0.84 
   
(0.01) 
Nashville 
  
0.45 
   
(0.01) 
New York 
  
0.83 
   
(0.01) 
Orlando 
  
0.72 
   
(0.01) 
Palm Beach 
  
0.84 
   
(0.01) 
Philadelphia 
  
0.70 
   
(0.01) 
Phoenix 
  
0.53 
   
(0.01) 
Pittsburgh 
  
0.40 
   
(0.01) 
Portland 
  
0.76 
   
(0.01) 
Richmond 
  
0.75 
   
(0.01) 
Sacramento 
  
0.77 
   
(0.01) 
San Antonio 
  
0.30 
   
(0.01) 
San Diego 
  
0.82 
   
(0.01) 
San Francisco 
  
0.66 
   
(0.01) 
San Jose 
  
0.51 
   
(0.01) 
Seattle 
  
0.45 
   
(0.01) 
St. Louis 
  
0.81 
   
(0.01) 
Tampa 
  
0.61 
   
(0.01) 
Washington, D.C. 
  
0.79 
!
    (0.01) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !R2 0.44 0.61 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is (CO-CR)t. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is for 
a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while 
column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2. PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON, IV RESULTS 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 2.17 2.55 
 
!
(0.09) (0.11) 
 Atlanta 
!  
1.72 
 !  
(0.07) 
Austin 
  
1.83 
   
(0.05) 
Baltimore 
  
2.18 
   
(0.03) 
Boston 
  
2.15 
   
(0.04) 
Charlotte 
  
2.21 
   
(0.08) 
Chicago 
  
2.14 
   
(0.04) 
Cincinnati 
  
2.44 
   
(0.05) 
Cleveland 
  
2.41 
   
(0.04) 
Columbus 
  
2.50 
   
(0.05) 
Dallas 
  
2.51 
   
(0.04) 
Denver 
  
2.27 
   
(0.05) 
Detroit 
  
2.53 
   
(0.05) 
Fort Lauderdale 
  
2.24 
   
(0.03) 
Houston 
  
2.66 
   
(0.03) 
Indianapolis 
  
2.38 
   
(0.05) 
Kansas City 
  
2.63 
   
(0.05) 
Los Angeles 
  
1.52 
   
(0.06) 
Memphis 
  
1.93 
!   
(0.07) 
Miami 
  
2.11 
   
(0.05) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.22 0.39 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t. This table instrument I(CO-CR)t-1 with I(CO-CR)t-2. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-
year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform 
pooled regressions with different specifications, while column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 (CONT’D). PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON, IV RESULTS 
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Milwaukee 
  
2.29 
   
(0.05) 
Minneapolis 
  
2.39 
   
(0.05) 
Nashville 
  
1.86 
   
(0.07) 
New York 
  
2.02 
   
(0.05) 
Orlando 
  
1.82 
   
(0.06) 
Palm Beach 
  
2.28 
   
(0.02) 
Philadelphia 
  
2.28 
   
(0.03) 
Phoenix 
  
2.36 
   
(0.03) 
Pittsburgh 
  
2.04 
   
(0.06) 
Portland 
  
2.04 
   
(0.05) 
Richmond 
  
2.26 
   
(0.03) 
Sacramento 
  
1.39 
   
(0.06) 
San Antonio 
  
2.19 
   
(0.04) 
San Diego 
  
1.36 
   
(0.07) 
San Francisco 
  
1.77 
   
(0.05) 
San Jose 
  
1.29 
   
(0.08) 
Seattle 
  
1.43 
   
(0.07) 
St. Louis 
  
1.57 
   
(0.07) 
Tampa 
  
2.42 
   
(0.02) 
Washington, D.C. 
  
1.94 
!
    (0.05) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.22 0.39 !Obs 314496 314496 8064 
Note: Dependent variable is I(CO-CR)t. This table instrument I(CO-CR)t-1 with I(CO-CR)t-2. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-
year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is for a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 
perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while column 3 performs individual regressions by city. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3. PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON, 2 BEDROOM  
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 2.38 2.24 
 
!
(0.13) (0.18) 
 Atlanta 
!  
2.57 
 !  
(0.19) 
Austin 
  
2.96 
   
(0.13) 
Baltimore 
  
0.73 
   
(0.11) 
Boston 
  
3.20 
   
(0.12) 
Charlotte 
  
0.74 
   
(0.44) 
Chicago 
  
2.43 
   
(0.13) 
Cincinnati 
  
4.07 
   
(0.17) 
Cleveland 
  
4.07 
   
(0.16) 
Columbus 
  
2.35 
   
(0.17) 
Dallas 
  
3.06 
   
(0.14) 
Denver 
  
3.68 
   
(0.13) 
Detroit 
  
3.39 
   
(0.14) 
Fort Lauderdale 
  
1.63 
   
(0.11) 
Houston 
  
3.06 
   
(0.13) 
Indianapolis 
  
2.70 
   
(0.18) 
Kansas City 
  
1.69 
   
(0.18) 
Los Angeles 
  
2.45 
   
(0.11) 
Memphis 
  
1.56 
!   
(0.17) 
Miami 
  
2.72 
   
(0.12) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.24 0.42 !Obs 81432 81432 2088 
Note: The cost of owning is denoted by “CO”, and the cost of renting “CR”. Pr(CO>CR) is the probability that the owning is cheaper 
than renting. “Overall" is the average CO-CR across all cost measures and years in a given city. Cost measures are calculated by 
equation (4), assuming a loan-to-value constant of 0.8 and national average federal and state income tax for all tax rates. The 
calculations in this table are restricted to 2 bedroom units only. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 (CONT'D). PREDICTING BINARY RENT V. OWN DECISION, 1-YEAR HORIZON, 2 BEDROOM  
  Coef/SE of I(CO-CR)t-1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Milwaukee 
  
1.63 
   
(0.14) 
Minneapolis 
  
1.80 
   
(0.10) 
Nashville 
  
1.20 
   
(0.11) 
New York 
  
1.62 
   
(0.11) 
Orlando 
  
2.31 
   
(0.18) 
Palm Beach 
  
3.07 
   
(0.12) 
Philadelphia 
  
1.47 
   
(0.19) 
Phoenix 
  
2.47 
   
(0.11) 
Pittsburgh 
  
2.55 
   
(0.12) 
Portland 
  
3.29 
   
(0.12) 
Richmond 
  
2.12 
   
(0.10) 
Sacramento 
  
1.75 
   
(0.10) 
San Antonio 
  
2.44 
   
(0.11) 
San Diego 
  
2.54 
   
(0.18) 
San Francisco 
  
0.98 
   
(0.13) 
San Jose 
  
1.91 
   
(0.11) 
Seattle 
  
2.44 
   
(0.11) 
St. Louis 
  
2.56 
   
(0.18) 
Tampa 
  
0.98 
   
(0.13) 
Washington, D.C. 
  
2.06 
!
    (0.11) 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !!
Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Pseudo R2 0.24 0.42 !Obs 81432 81432 2088 
Note: Dependent variable is (CO-CR)t. Standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and in parentheses. Each unit of observation is for 
a given MSA, year, method, and type of home. Columns 1 and 2 perform pooled regressions with different specifications, while 
column 3 performs individual regressions by city. The calculations in this table are restricted to 2 bedroom units only. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 4. FORECASTING THE 1-YEAR HORIZON OWN VERSUS RENT DECISION, 2 BEDROOM 
  % of Time Forecast is Correct 
  (1) (2) (3) 
All MSAs 82.8 84.9 83.2 
Atlanta 90.1 90.8 90.1 
Austin 85.4 81.5 85.4 
Baltimore 68.0 77.2 73.3 
Boston 83.6 86.7 83.6 
Charlotte 95.9 95.7 95.9 
Chicago 82.3 88.9 82.3 
Cincinnati 91.5 92.6 91.5 
Cleveland 91.2 91.4 91.2 
Columbus 88.8 88.8 88.8 
Dallas 86.0 80.2 86.0 
Denver 86.7 84.9 86.7 
Detroit 87.7 89.9 87.7 
Fort Lauderdale 73.9 76.0 73.9 
Houston 84.5 67.7 84.5 
Indianapolis 90.2 91.4 90.2 
Kansas City 91.1 88.8 91.1 
Los Angeles 77.4 91.5 77.4 
Memphis 90.0 87.2 90.0 
Miami 81.7 83.6 81.7 
Milwaukee 86.0 86.5 86.0 
Minneapolis 81.1 84.9 81.3 
Nashville 80.5 78.1 82.7 
New York 82.8 86.2 82.8 
Orlando 80.8 87.8 82.5 
Palm Beach 73.0 78.0 73.0 
Philadelphia 71.5 80.3 73.1 
Phoenix 72.8 73.9 72.8 
Pittsburgh 92.5 92.2 92.5 
Portland 83.6 85.4 83.6 
Richmond 89.6 89.1 89.6 
Sacramento 78.1 82.7 78.1 
San Antonio 82.3 78.9 82.3 
San Diego 83.9 92.6 83.9 
San Francisco 74.9 80.7 74.9 
San Jose 70.8 87.7 70.8 
Seattle 78.1 76.3 78.1 
St. Louis 90.3 89.8 90.3 
Tampa 74.9 78.7 81.2 
Washington, D.C. 74.3 87.0 74.3 
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES !Time Fixed Effects ! YES !Obs 81432 81432 2088 
Note: This table calculates the percent of the time the predicted binary rent v. own decision was “correct”, i.e. when it was actually 
better to own or rent. The columns correspond to the specifications in Table 2. The calculations in this table are restricted to 2 
bedroom units only. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 5. AVERAGE ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM LEAST COSTLY BENCHMARK WITH 1-YEAR 
HORIZON, 2 BEDROOM  
  Annual Savings from Least Costly Tenure Choice (as % of CR)  
 
v. Regression-
Based 
v. Always 
Owning 
v. Always 
Renting 
v. Last-Year 
Strategy 
  Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD Savings SD 
All MSAs 4.5 14.3 13.2 29.3 49.8 49.5 6.1 17.5 
Atlanta 0.8 4.3 1.0 4.9 45.8 31.9 1.1 4.8 
Austin 6.5 20.5 16.7 46.1 47.1 43.2 3.5 13.2 
Baltimore 3.3 9.1 8.6 20.4 47.7 54.0 6.9 13.7 
Boston 4.0 15.7 19.8 32.5 61.3 70.1 6.6 19.5 
Charlotte 0.9 6.0 0.9 6.0 57.6 29.3 2.2 9.8 
Chicago 1.3 6.6 11.0 25.0 31.8 30.0 3.0 9.4 
Cincinnati 0.7 4.3 5.5 16.5 34.1 24.0 1.4 6.7 
Cleveland 0.9 4.6 7.0 16.6 32.5 25.7 1.1 5.0 
Columbus 3.0 12.3 2.8 12.0 37.0 23.3 3.1 12.4 
Dallas 5.2 15.2 9.2 26.4 39.7 34.8 3.3 12.0 
Denver 2.3 8.4 11.8 21.5 34.8 40.3 1.9 7.7 
Detroit 4.2 18.7 15.4 35.0 56.7 49.2 5.0 19.5 
Fort Lauderdale 5.0 12.8 20.3 56.6 64.8 75.5 6.3 15.6 
Houston 20.7 37.6 17.6 33.9 51.8 42.4 8.9 27.9 
Indianapolis 2.4 11.6 2.7 11.8 42.0 28.8 2.8 12.0 
Kansas City 6.0 22.2 5.7 21.0 54.7 36.5 6.9 22.7 
Los Angeles 1.8 8.5 31.1 53.6 60.5 74.5 6.9 17.4 
Memphis 6.8 26.9 8.1 28.8 47.3 36.2 12.5 39.0 
Miami 4.1 14.2 20.9 58.2 57.5 67.3 8.2 24.9 
Milwaukee 2.6 9.6 8.0 20.6 34.0 26.8 2.9 10.4 
Minneapolis 3.8 12.4 7.7 18.8 41.2 35.6 4.5 12.7 
Nashville 5.4 16.5 4.6 13.1 42.8 32.6 5.2 16.2 
New York 5.2 17.4 21.9 34.2 57.6 64.7 5.2 14.7 
Orlando 1.9 7.9 11.0 36.0 61.9 70.2 7.3 23.0 
Palm Beach 3.5 9.4 20.9 51.9 55.3 74.3 6.4 14.8 
Philadelphia 5.8 16.7 7.1 15.7 56.5 55.3 8.7 18.9 
Phoenix 11.3 23.9 21.0 46.1 55.5 75.4 13.5 27.7 
Pittsburgh 2.2 10.7 5.7 21.4 54.9 36.1 6.4 23.9 
Portland 3.0 10.7 13.6 25.5 43.9 48.6 3.7 11.3 
Richmond 1.8 7.5 1.9 7.8 48.4 42.7 2.9 9.7 
Sacramento 6.5 21.9 30.1 51.1 56.0 70.4 8.6 22.1 
San Antonio 11.4 30.9 16.2 40.8 63.6 54.7 10.4 30.6 
San Diego 1.1 5.6 29.0 45.2 54.5 67.5 7.0 19.7 
San Francisco 4.3 11.5 26.8 39.0 52.5 65.6 10.1 24.0 
San Jose 3.3 12.2 26.6 41.9 59.6 76.0 14.6 32.9 
Seattle 6.7 18.5 16.5 31.5 36.0 55.5 5.5 15.1 
St. Louis 2.4 10.4 2.3 9.5 49.0 31.1 2.5 10.5 
Tampa 11.9 34.7 12.4 36.2 59.7 66.1 13.5 35.2 
Washington, D.C. 2.0 8.5 14.4 30.8 56.2 66.0 6.6 15.5 
Note: Each column reports the expected money saved from following the least costly benchmarket (correctly forecasting) against the 
indicated trading strategy. "Regression-Based " indicates a trading strategy in which one rents or buys given the predicted strategy 
from specification (2) in tables 1 and 2.  Always own and always rent is to apply a strategy of always owning or renting regardless of 
MSA or year. “Last-Year” refers to a strategy where one just owns or rent based on whether it was observed to be cheaper to own or 
rent in the previous year. The calculations in this table are restricted to 2 bedroom units only. 
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Abstract 
 
Financial literacy and schooling attainment have been linked to household wealth accumulation. Yet prior 
findings may be biased due to noisy measures of financial literacy and schooling, as well as unobserved 
factors such as ability, intelligence, and motivation that could enhance financial literacy and schooling but 
also directly affect wealth accumulation. Here we use a new household dataset and an instrumental 
variables approach to isolate the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling on wealth accumulation. 
While financial literacy and schooling attainment are both strongly positively associated with wealth 
outcomes in linear regression models, our approach reveals even stronger and larger effects of financial 
literacy on wealth. It also indicates no significant positive effects of schooling attainment conditional on 
financial literacy in a linear specification, but positive effects when interacted with financial literacy. 
Estimated impacts are substantial enough to suggest that investments in financial literacy could have large 
positive payoffs.  
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1    Introduction 
Traditional economic theory posits that forward-looking individuals maximize expected 
lifetime utility using economic information to accumulate and then decumulate wealth effectively 
over their lifetimes.  Yet survey evidence reveals that fewer than half of U.S. workers have even 
attempted to estimate how much money they might need in retirement, and many older adults 
face significant retirement saving shortfalls (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a and b; Mitchell and 
Moore 1998; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006). Numerous economic explanations for 
these phenomena have been suggested including dispersion in discount rates, risk aversion, and 
credit constraints, but the empirical literature exploring such factors thus far has been unable to 
account for much of the observed differentials in wealth (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 
2001; Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997).  
The present study seeks to evaluate whether people who find it difficult to understand 
their financial environment are also less likely to accumulate wealth. Specifically, we examine 
the links between financial literacy, by which we mean the ability to process economic 
information and make informed decisions about household finances, and wealth accumulation 
and pension contributions. Previous studies have reported strong correlations between financial 
literacy and asset accumulation as well as retirement planning.1 These findings have prompted 
policymakers to support efforts to enhance household wealth accumulation and welfare through 
increasing financial literacy. For instance, the U.S. President’s Advisory Council on Financial 
Literacy recently stated that (PACFL, 2008, np):  "While the crisis has many causes, it is 
undeniable that financial illiteracy is one of the root causes... Sadly, far too many Americans do 
not have the basic financial skills necessary to develop and maintain a budget, to understand 
                                                
1 For instance, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverley (2003) show that more financially knowledgeable US 
respondents are also more likely to engage in a wide range of recommended financial practices; Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2007a, b) find that more financially literate elderly U.S. respondents are also more likely to 
plan, to succeed in planning, and to invest in complex assets; and Campbell (2006) reports that more 
educated Swedish households also diversify their portfolios more efficiently. Cole, Sampson, and Zia 
(2009) find that the financially more literate are more likely to have bank accounts in India and Indonesia. 
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credit, to understand investment vehicles, or to take advantage of our banking system. It is 
essential to provide basic financial education that allows people to better navigate an economic 
crisis such as this one.” Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD nd) has recently launched a major initiative to “identify individuals who are most in need 
of financial education and the best ways to improve that education.”  
Despite these and other enthusiastic endorsements for programs to boost financial 
literacy, questions have been raised about whether these associations reflect causality (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2008, 2010).  For example, individuals who fail to save also may be financially 
illiterate due to some underlying and usually unobservable factor such as impatience, making it 
difficult to assess whether boosting financial education would, in fact, enhance household wealth 
accumulation. Moreover, in simple bivariate associations of financial literacy with wealth, 
financial literacy might be proxying, in part, for other factors such as schooling attainment.  
Empirical measures of financial literacy are also likely to have considerable measurement error 
that, ceteris paribus, is likely to bias standard estimates of the impacts of financial literacy 
towards zero.  Instrumental variable (IV) estimates in principle can control for both the 
unobserved variable and the random measurement error biases, and schooling attainment can be 
included in the same specification to control for the possibility that financial literacy proxies for 
schooling.  To our knowledge, however, no studies have yet used IV methods to estimate the 
impact of financial literacy and schooling attainment on wealth, as we do here.2  
                                                
2 Some studies have looked at related issues using IV methods. For instance, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) 
test the possible causal effect of wealth on financial planning using changes in regional housing prices as an 
instrument for wealth, but they limit their study to older respondents in the U.S. Health and Retirement 
Study and do not consider the possible impact of financial literacy on wealth as we do in this study.  
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001), Cole and Shastry (2009), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) investigate 
how changes in U.S. schooling laws and state mandates requiring schools to offer financial literacy relate to 
financial market participation, but these studies do not focus on wealth accumulation as we do here. 
Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) explore instruments for planning by U.S. respondents but they are 
silent on the role of financial literacy. 
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In what follows, we draw on a unique microeconomic dataset, the Chilean Social 
Protection Survey, to explore how financial literacy and schooling attainment influence wealth.3 
This dataset includes extensive information on household wealth as well as individual and 
household characteristics for a representative sample of prime-age adults, permitting us to 
evaluate the effects of financial literacy using a richer range of ages and schooling than heretofore 
available.4 Using a set of plausibly exogenous instrumental variables that satisfy critical 
diagnostic tests to isolate the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling attainment on 
wealth, we show that both financial literacy and schooling attainment are positively associated 
with wealth outcomes. Moreover, our IV estimates indicate even stronger effects of financial 
literacy on wealth than suggested by OLS models, while the opposite is true for schooling in 
linear specifications; interactive specifications imply that both schooling and financial literacy 
have significant positive effects.  
Our results are relevant for financial educational policy in that we find that improved 
financial literacy can make a significant difference for financial behavior, even after controlling 
for schooling. This rigorous analysis of the impact of financial literacy on wealth accumulation 
should be useful in informing governments and their policy advisers around the world, as they 
consider new initiatives for financial education.5  
2    Empirical Framework 
  Several prior studies have shown that financial literacy and schooling are significantly 
correlated with positive financial behavior, but few have controlled for (usually) unobserved 
                                                
3 The Social Protection Survey is described at 
www.microdatos.cl/interior_areasMT.php?id_s=2&id_ss=2&id_proy=1 
4 Ameriks et al. (2003) examine highly-educated TIAA-CREF survey participants; Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007a) use Health and Retirement Study respondents over age 50. In contrast, the dataset we use below is 
a nationally representative sample of men age 24-65 and women age 24-60. 
5 For instance the World Bank and the Russian Federation have recently announced a multi-million dollar, 
multi-year collaborative to improve financial literacy in low- and middle-income countries (see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:21936796~
menuPK:2643854~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:282386,00.html) 
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factors such as risk aversion, self-esteem, innate ability, intelligence, and motivation that may 
shape the relationship between financial literacy and financial behaviors.6 For this reason, it is 
difficult to conclude, based on the scientific evidence, that improvements in financial literacy 
actually enhance financial planning and saving, or whether, instead, wealth and financial literacy 
are both the result of some other unobserved factors. For this reason, analyses that do not control 
for such unobserved factors may be vulnerable to biases in the estimated effects of schooling and 
financial literacy on financial wellbeing.  Moreover, empirical indicators of schooling and 
financial literacy are noisy measures, and as is well-known, random measurement error in right-
side variables tends to bias their coefficient estimates towards zero.  Estimates of noise-to-signal 
ratios for schooling attainment are often about 10 percent (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; 
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994), producing a bias towards zero of almost that 
magnitude.  Measures of financial literacy are likely subject to greater measurement errors, and 
thus, greater biases.  Instrumental variable estimates are one way to eliminate the attenuation bias 
towards zero due to measurement error. 
Our goal is to assess whether wealth accruals could be enhanced with greater financial 
literacy and schooling. Suppose the true relationship between financial literacy, schooling, and 
wealth could be described for the ith person as: 
 Wi =β0 +β1FLi +β2Si +β3FLi *Si +β4Ci +β5Ei + εi , (1) 
where wealth Wi depends linearly on financial literacy FLi, schooling Si, their interaction FLi *Si, 
other observed individual characteristics Ci, unobserved individual characteristics Ei, and 
unobserved random shocks εi.  We include in relation (1) both linear terms in FLi and Si and their 
interaction. We include the interaction because it is possible that the effects of financial literacy 
FL depend on the level of schooling Si and vice versa.  This coefficient of this interaction term 
                                                
6 Both Lusardi (2003) and Ameriks et al. (2003) use IV strategies, but they focus on financial planning 
rather than financial literacy. 
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may be positive if financial literacy FLi and schooling Si are complements and reinforce each 
other or negative if they are substitutes in determination of wealth accumulation.  Below we 
consider three variants of relation (1):   
(1a) only linear terms,7  
(1b) both the linear and interaction terms, and  
(1c) only the interaction term.  
  Equation (1) posits that there are no other endogenous variables beyond financial literacy 
and schooling that directly determine wealth.  For example, the time one devotes to schoolwork 
and how that time is divided between arithmetic and other topics might affect wealth, but our 
assumption is that such effects are indirect via financial literacy and schooling.  Likewise, there 
could be other behavioral channels through which FLi and Si affect Wi.  For instance, part of the 
effects on wealth may work through choosing to contribute more to pensions, or by increasing 
understanding of business news and market predictions.  Estimating equation (1) does not 
illuminate such possibilities, though formulations similar to equation (1) but using some saving 
pathway as the dependent variable could illuminate the roles of FLi and Si in determining the 
relevant mechanism. In what follows, we offer analysis of two such pathways, the density of 
pension contributions and whether the individual attempted to calculate money needed for 
retirement.   
  We further posit that financial literacy and schooling are determined by observed 
personal characteristics Ci* (that may overlap with Ci), some factors in C* and Xi  that affect 
learning and schooling but do not directly affect Wi , unobserved individual characteristics Ei, and 
error terms ui and vi:8  
                                                
7 We also consider two sub-variants of the linear case with only financial literacy or only schooling. 
8 We also could include another equation parallel to (2) and (3) for the interaction, but since the points 
made here for the case in which FLi and Si enter in equation (1a) only linearly carry over to the case with 
the interaction, we limit this discussion to the simpler case in which they only enter linearly.  We have 
written equations (2) and (3) as if FLi and Si have the same determinants except for ui and vi, which are 
likely to be correlated (perhaps perfectly correlated).  This is the usual setup in household models if 
decisions regarding FLi and Si are made at the same time – in principle, all concurrent decisions are made in 
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FLi =η0 +η1Ci* +η2Xi +η3Ei + ui   (2) 
Si =α0 +α1Ci* +α2Xi +α3Ei + vi    (3) 
In general, for consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression requires that the covariance between the disturbance terms in equations (1) and (2) and 
(1) and (3) be zero: that is, there can be no unobserved factors that are correlated with financial 
literacy or schooling but also affect the outcome of interest Wi. Nevertheless, the unobserved 
individual factors vector Ei appears in the compound disturbance terms for all relations, implying 
that OLS estimates are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. The direction of the bias 
depends on whether the true values of β5 and η3 (and similarly, of β5 and α3) have the same or the 
opposite signs.  For example, if the unobserved factor is ability that positively affects financial 
literacy and also directly positively affects wealth, both β5 and η3 are positive and OLS estimates 
of β1 are biased upward, overestimating the magnitude and significance of financial literacy as a 
determinant of wealth. Conversely, if some unobserved factor such as innate caution produced 
greater investment in financial literacy, but ceteris paribus reduced wealth due to too great 
caution in investment behavior, OLS estimates of β1 are biased downward, underestimating the 
magnitude and significance of financial literacy as a determinant of wealth accumulation. In 
addition to the possibility of such omitted variable biases, financial literacy and schooling 
measures are potentially subject to measurement error as noted above, which would tend to bias 
OLS estimates towards zero. 
  A similar point holds with regard to estimates that include only FLi or only Si – one at at a 
time – if the true relation is actually equation (1a) with both entering linearly.9  Equations (2) and 
                                                                                                                                            
light of all the variables that determine household behaviors – though, of course, the coefficients could 
differ and some may not be significantly different from zero.  If decisions are made at different times, the 
right-side determinants in equations (2) and (3) may differ; for example, some expectations that determine 
the earlier decision could be replaced by realized outcomes that occurred prior to the later decision.  Our 
microeconomic dataset, like most, does not permit empirical representations of such possibilities.  
9 Some other endogenous variable Yi might also be included in equation (1)  but our maintained hypothesis 
for our estimates, as in other instrumental variable estimates, if that this is not the case.  
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(3) show that it is highly likely that FLi and Si are correlated because their determinants are 
basically the same.10 Accordingly, if the true relation is equation (1a) with both FLi and Si entering 
linearly but analysts include either FLi or Si, the coefficient estimate for the included variable is 
biased because it is correlated with the excluded factor.  
To handle this problem, we use an IV approach with robust standard errors to estimate 
the three variants of equation (1) in light of (2) and (3), seeking to isolate the causal effects of 
financial literacy and schooling, and to control for random measurement errors.  Good 
instruments are ones that are sufficiently correlated with financial literacy FLi and with schooling 
Si, but that are independent of unobserved effects in equation (1) determining wealth. The Xi 
vector and elements of the Ci* vector excluded from Ci in equations (2) and (3) refer to such 
instruments.  For the IV estimation, we begin by estimating the “first stage” determinants of 
financial literacy and schooling in (2) and (3); next we use these estimates to predict financial 
literacy and schooling and employ them in the “second stage” estimate of equation (1). Note that 
with the above assumptions, predicted financial literacy and predicted schooling are independent 
of the compound error term in (1).  Therefore, if equation (1) is the true relation, the IV or two-
stage least squares procedure leads to consistent estimates of β1 and β2.   
In what follows, we utilize a set of plausible instruments and diagnostic tests to determine 
whether our instruments are (a) sufficiently strong (using F tests for excluded instruments, 
Angrist-Pische multivariate F tests for excluded instruments, and the Kleibergen-Paap weak 
identification tests), and (b) independent of the second-stage compound disturbance term (β4Ei + 
εi) using the Hansen J statistic overidentification test.11  Our candidate instruments, on which we 
                                                
10 It is possible but highly unlikely in such household models that the coefficients of the variables in 
equations (2) and (3) differ so that financial literacy and schooling are orthogonal.  
11 There recently has been what Stock (2010) calls a “transformation” in econometric tools for making 
inferences, including development of some of the diagnostic tools that we use here(see Stock (2010) and 
the references therein).  As is well-known, the J statistic only tests the overidentifying restrictions, not the 
exogeneity of all the first-stage instruments (e.g., Stock and Watson 2007, Wooldridge 2002).  As also is 
well known  (e.g. Wooldridge 2002), the failure to reject the null in overidentification tests may be because 
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elaborate below, include (1) age-related factors such as governmental policies and 
macroeconomic conditions, (2) family background, and (3) personality traits. We find that many 
of these candidates are good by conventional criteria. Nevertheless, some are insufficiently strong 
predictors of the endogenous FLi and Si right-side variables, and some are not independent of the 
second-stage disturbance term.  Therefore, arguably, this latter group should be included as 
controls in the second-stage relation (i.e., in the vector Ci in relation 1). 
3    Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our primary data source is the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protecion Social, 
EPS) administered by us in collaboration with the Microdata Center of the University of Chile 
(Arenas et al., 2008; Bravo et al. 2004, 2006, 2010). This survey is comparable to the U.S. Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) that provides a nationally-representative stratified random survey on 
respondents over the age of 50, covering, inter alia, their wealth, schooling, financial literacy, 
work history, childhood background, and selected personality traits. In contrast to the HRS, 
however, the EPS covers all adults, not just respondents over age 50. In what follows, we limit 
our attention to 13,054 prime-age respondents surveyed in 2006, namely men age 24-65 and 
women age 24-60 (since in Chile the legal retirement age is 60 for women but 65 years for men).  
As noted below, we also have linked these data to some information on policies, markets and 
macroeconomic conditions at critical junctures in respondents’ lives. 
Wealth and Pension Contribution Outcomes:  Our outcomes of interest are components of net 
wealth, drawing on four EPS measures summarized in Table 1 (wealth in US$2006): 
• Pension wealth averages $38,600 or 54 percent of total net wealth, though with 
considerable variance across respondents and about a quarter (25 percent) of 
respondents have zero pension wealth.  In 1981, the Chilean government terminated 
                                                                                                                                            
the test has low power for detecting the endogeneity of some of the instruments.  As discussed below, 
however, in our case, the overidentification test does have power to reject a number of candidate 
instruments.  
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the old insolvent pay-as-you-go retirement system and replaced it with a national, 
mandatory defined-contribution scheme known as the AFP system (Mitchell, Todd, 
and Bravo, 2008). This reform required all new formal sector employees to 
contribute at least 10 percent of their salaries to one of several licensed defined 
contribution pension funds.12 We believe that pension wealth is likely to be relatively 
accurately reported in Chile because respondents receive annual statements from the 
government summarizing their defined contribution pension system accruals.   
• Net housing wealth averages $22,100 or 31 percent of total wealth, again with 
considerable variance across respondents (though with a standard deviation only 
about half as large as for pension wealth despite a greater range); about a quarter (26 
percent) of respondents report none and 1 percent report negative net housing wealth. 
We calculate net housing wealth based on self-reported data on market values (either 
for sale or for rent) minus estimated mortgage debt.  Our measure of housing wealth 
is probably noisier than our measure of pension wealth and some of the other wealth 
components. 
• Other net wealth averages $10,600 or 15 percent of total net wealth, with greater 
variance across respondents than either pension or housing wealth but again about a 
quarter (25 percent) of respondents report zero and more (31 percent) report negative 
values.  We calculated other net wealth by summing self-reported business wealth, 
agricultural assets, other real estate assets, and financial investments and subtracting 
all forms of household debt.  This other net wealth measure probably also is a noisier 
than the measure of pension wealth. 
• Total net wealth averages $71,500, with greater variance and greater range than the 
other wealth measures just described.  Total net wealth is the sum of the three 
components above.  
 
In addition to these wealth measures, we also explore two possible channels via which 
financial literacy and schooling might affect particularly pension wealth. The first is the “density 
of pension contributions.”  This concept refers to the fraction of months each individual 
contributed to the pension system, from age 18 to the survey date, and therefore is indicative of 
                                                
12 Those who started working prior to 1980 could elect to join the new scheme or remain covered by the 
previous system.  
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how attached the worker is to the pension saving system. We derive this measure by tracking 
respondent self-reports of the number of months they worked in covered jobs over time and 
contributed to a pension fund, compared to the number of months when they could have 
contributed. On average respondents report that they contributed to their pension almost half the 
time they were eligible to do so, though there is again wide dispersion over the sample.13 About 
10 percent of individuals contributed all of the available time, while 17 percent report they never 
contributed. The second channel that we explore is a retirement planning indicator of whether the 
individual has attempted to calculate the money he or she needs for retirement. The survey 
question for this retirement planning variable is as follows: 
• Have you attempted to calculate the money needed in order to retire? [yes/no] 
We create a dummy indicator in which 1 indicates a yes response, and 0 represents a negative 
response. 
Explanatory Variables: Schooling and Financial Literacy:  Our key explanatory variables are 
schooling attainment and financial literacy. Schooling attainment is measured in a fairly 
conventional manner (e.g., Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd 2010), with primary school 
referring to grades 1-8, secondary school to grades 9-13, and post-secondary school to grades 
beyond that, to a maximum of 20.  The average schooling attainment in our sample (see Table 2) 
is 10.4 grades, with a standard deviation of 3.9 grades.  Only about one percent of the respondents 
have no schooling, and about the same fraction has the maximum of 20 years.    
Financial literacy is measured using a rich set of 12 questions. The first three ‘core’ 
questions cover basic economics and finance including an understanding of risk and simple 
interest; the second more ‘sophisticated’ set of three pertains to more elaborate financial 
concepts; and a third set of six covers knowledge of retirement system rules including the legal 
retirement age and how to calculate AFP pension benefits.   
                                                
13 Our density estimates conform to those reported in Arenas et al. (2008). 
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The “core” first three financial literacy queries were developed and implemented in the 
HRS (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007c); they have also been adopted by several other international 
surveys.  They are as follows: 
• If the chance of catching an illness is 10 percent, how many people out of 1000 would get the 
illness? 
• If 5 people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is 2 Million pesos, how much 
would each receive? 
• Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate you earn on this money 
is 2 percent a year. If you keep this money in the account for 5 years, how much would you 
have after 5 years? [more than $120, exactly $120, less than $120] 
 
The second more sophisticated set of three questions has also been fielded in a special HRS 
module (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009) intending to measure more complex concepts such as 
compound interest, inflation, and risk diversification. The specific questions are: 
• Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the interest rate that you earn on these 
savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in the account after 2 years? [exact 
number] 
• Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate that you earn on these 
savings is 1 percent a year. Inflation is 2 percent a year. After one year, if you withdraw the 
money from the savings account you could buy more/less/the same? 
• T/F: Buying shares in one company is less risky than buying shares from many different 
companies with the same money. 
 
The third set of questions is specific to the EPS, and it touches on some of the key aspects of the 
Chilean retirement system focusing on the mandatory contribution rate, the legal retirement age 
for women and men, how pension benefits are computed in the defined contribution system, 
whether people are aware of the government’s welfare benefit for the elderly, and whether people 
know they can contribute to the Voluntary Pension system even when they are not in covered-
sector jobs. The specific wording of these questions is: 
• Do you know what percentage of income is (has been or would be) deducted monthly for 
pension system contributions? [yes/no] 
• Do you know the legal retirement age for women? [60] 
• Do you know the legal retirement age for men? [65] 
• Do you know how to calculate pensions in the AFP? [yes, by balance of individual account 
and other elements such as age of retirement] 
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• Do you know there is a minimum state guaranteed old age pension for people aged 65 and 
over? [yes/no] 
• Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system introduced in 2002? [yes/no] 
 
Table 3 lists all 12 financial literacy questions along with a summary of how the 
individuals in our sample answered them. As is clear from Column 1, only half of the respondents 
knew the correct answer to the core questions (1-3), and fewer knew the sophisticated financial 
literacy questions (4-6). While people did score relatively well on the risk diversification 
question, they could have been guessing as only a true/false response was required.14 Patterns are 
more variable for questions regarding knowledge of pension system benefit rules and provisions: 
most knew the legal retirement ages, but only about one-third knew the mandatory contribution 
rates and only 10 percent could say how benefits are computed.  About half the sample knew 
about both the guaranteed minimum benefit and the Voluntary Savings plan.  
Previous authors have measured financial literacy by selecting one or two key questions 
and reporting whether respondents answered each one correctly (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a). 
With such a rich set of financial literacy measures available in the EPS, however, it is inefficient 
to limit ourselves to a question or two; instead, we seek to use all the information contained in the 
dozen questions. A conventional way to aggregate responses would be to assign one point to each 
question answered correctly and calculate an overall percentage correct score. Yet this approach 
has the disadvantage of weighting each question equally and hence does not allow distinctions 
among questions either in difficulty or information.   
A more sophisticated approach to measuring financial literacy employs a weighted 
scoring mechanism called PRIDIT, first designed to deal with difficult-to-observe outcomes 
where indicator variables that proxy for the dependent variable are binary or categorical. For 
example, Brockett et al. (2002) use the approach to assess insurance fraud, where investigators 
use several indicator variables (such as whether an individual had time gaps between medical 
                                                
14 This pattern is similar to that reported for India and higher than for Indonesia (Cole, Sampson, and Zia 
2009). 
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treatments or experienced many hospital visits) to assess whether a given claim might be 
fraudulent. PRIDIT has also been used in the health economics field to evaluate hospital care, 
where indicators of quality are used to generate a ‘best’ or most informative quality index 
(Lieberthal, 2008).  
In what follows, we use the PRIDIT approach to develop financial literacy scores and 
highlight which questions are the most informative indicators of financial literacy.15 This 
approach involves a two-step weighting scheme, where the first step links each individual’s 
responses on particular questions to others’ responses to the same question. One goal is to 
determine which questions are more difficult – ones that few people answer correctly – and then 
it gives more credit to particularly difficult questions that few people can answer correctly. A 
simple aggregation would simply assign zero credit for an incorrect answer and a full point for 
each correct answer; by contrast, PRIDIT applies a negative penalty for an incorrect answer and a 
greater penalty for a question that more of the population answers correctly. As an example, a 
small fraction of the sample answered question 4 correctly (Table 3, Column 1), so question 4 is 
considered a difficult question. Consequently, answering question 4 correctly is assigned a greater 
reward, while answering it incorrectly results in only a relatively small penalty. Unlike simple 
integer scoring, this method captures the degree and direction to which an individual’s response 
stands out relative to the population.   
The second PRIDIT step applies a principal components analysis to take into account 
correlations across questions.16  The resulting PRIDIT scores indicate how financially literate an 
individual is in relation to the average population and to specific questions asked. Questions tend 
to be informative, ceteris paribus, the less they are correlated with other questions. The bivariate 
                                                
15 A related approach was implemented in Mitchell et al. (2008) in an analysis of pension switching 
patterns. 
16 Specifically, we calculate the first principal component vector for each of the 12 questions and the 
eigenvalue of the first principal component. The eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue captures more of 
the variance in the data than any other eigenvector. Using these values, we then calculate a weight for each 
question that gives more weight to questions that are more informative on financial literacy. 
  137 
correlations are suggestive though not conclusive in this regard, because correlations of the 
answers to a question with a linear combination of the answers to other questions may differ from 
the bivariate correlations. The bivariate correlations among the correct answers to the questions 
vary considerably, from 0.04 (for the correlations between question 4 and questions 8, 9, and 11) 
to 0.63 (for the correlation between questions 8 and 9).  Also the mean correlations of each 
question with the other 11 questions vary considerably, with those for questions 4 and 10 only 
about half of those for questions 1, 2 and 12 (third column from right in Table 3).  By this 
criterion, in isolation, questions 4 and 10 seem to be relatively important.  But this is not the only 
criterion.  Questions also tend to be more important on average, ceteris paribus, if the proportions 
correct are closer to one half, rather than almost zero or almost one.  The intuition for this is clear 
by considering the extremes: questions for which the proportion correct is zero or one provide no 
information because the answers are the same for everyone, whereas questions for which the 
proportion correct is close to zero or close to one provide substantial information to distinguish 
among those in the tails of the distribution. However, if the distribution of the underlying latent 
variable for true financial literacy is normal, relatively few individuals will  be in the tails of the 
distribution, versus in the middle.  By this criterion, questions 4 and 10 are relatively 
unimportant, particularly in comparison to the three ‘core’ HRS questions (1-3) and questions 6, 
11 and 12 (penultimate column in Table 3).  
The last column of Table 3 reports PRIDIT weights for each question that are indicative 
of how “informative” a given question is regarding the underlying latent financial literacy 
variable, relative to other questions based on both criteria. The ‘core’ HRS financial literacy 
questions receive the greatest weight compared to the other financial literacy questions included 
in the EPS.  Next most informative are the queries on pension system knowledge (e.g. question 7 
“Do you know what percentage of income is deducted for monthly pension system 
contributions?” and  question 12 “Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system 
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introduced in 2002?”).   Despite being most informative by the criterion of being least correlated 
with other questions, question 4 “Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the 
interest rate that you earn on these savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in the 
account after 2 years?” and question 10 “Do you know how to calculate pensions in the AFP?”) 
have the smallest PRIDIT weights because of the second criteria discussed in the previous 
paragraph (i.e., proportions correct close to zero).  
The PRIDIT score thus computed is highly correlated with a simple percentage correct 
tally, and results using either type of aggregation are very similar. Nevertheless, we favor the 
PRIDIT approach as it incorporates additional information about the relative difficulty of each 
question and value-added of each question, and we use it in estimates presented below.   
Control Variables. Demographic controls included in our specification for equation (1) include 
Age in a quadratic form to account for the typical hump-shaped life-cycle pattern of wealth 
accumulation.   The mean age of our respondents is 43 years, with a standard deviation of 11 
years. We also control on the variable Male, a dichotomous variable to allow for shifts on average 
between wealth accumulations for men versus women.  Just over half (52 percent) of our 
respondents are male.  
 We do not include in the set of controls any variables likely to be determined in part by 
schooling and financial literacy, and hence possibly affect wealth, such as marital status and 
current residence.17  We do include as controls some of the candidate instruments that do not 
satisfy the second condition for a good instrument, independence of the disturbance term in 
equation (1), which are apparently correlated with factors that have direct effects on wealth 
                                                
17 We adopt this approach because we are interested in the gross effect of schooling and financial literacy, 
not net of effects through such behaviors as marital status and current residence. Moreover, if we were to 
include such variables it would be necessary to treat them as endogenous, but it is difficult to increase the 
number of endogenous variables beyond the two on which we focus. For this reason, our approach thus 
assumes that these are among the channels through which schooling and financial literacy work to affect 
wealth.  (Below we explore the robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of such factors in the second-
stage estimates, but without treating them as behaviorally-determined.)   
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accumulation in addition to any effects that work through schooling and financial literacy. We 
indicate which variables these are in our discussion of the results below. 
Candidate First-Stage Instruments: As is generally the case, we cannot identify good instruments 
a priori, only possible candidate instruments that might predict schooling and financial literacy 
well, while not being correlated with the second-stage disturbance. Even experiments that directly 
affect schooling and financial literacy might not be good instruments if they have weak effects on 
schooling and financial literacy (and therefore do not satisfy the first condition), or if they affect 
wealth directly through some other channel than schooling and financial literacy (and therefore 
do not satisfy the second condition).  In what follows, we consider as three broad sets of 
candidate instruments:  Age-dependent variables, Family Background factors, and Respondent 
Personality traits. We describe each in turn. 
  For the Age-dependent variables, we include factors indicative of where the respondents 
attended primary school as children, how old they were when an innovative national voucher 
program was implemented by the government in 1981, what macroeconomic conditions were 
when they were of an age to have been making marginal schooling and  labor market entry 
decisions, and what pension marketing practices prevailed when they were of an age to have 
completed initial job searches and to have settled in more permanent positions. These four 
variables are as follows: 
− Primary School in Urban Area:  In Chile, as in many countries, urban primary schools on 
average tend to be better and have a wider range of options, which may lead to more 
learning relevant for financial literacy and greater schooling attainment.  Chile is a fairly 
urban country and 81 percent of the respondents did attend primary school in urban areas. 
− School Voucher Exposure (years of school age under voucher system):  In 1981, the 
Chilean government adopted a national school voucher system for primary and secondary 
school.  Anyone turning age 18 prior to 1981 therefore had no exposure, whereas younger 
individuals had varying numbers of years of exposure to the new school voucher 
program. We posit that this exogenous policy change may have had significant effects on 
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individual schooling attainment and financial literacy. At the same time, the introduction 
of school vouchers could also have had direct effects on wealth accumulation through 
increasing schooling quality, beyond direct effects on financial literacy and schooling 
attainment.  For instance, Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd (2010) report that this 
schooling reform improved schooling quality and resulted in subsequent higher labor 
market earnings for adults exposed to the voucher system when they were children.  Our 
respondents averaged 2.2 years of exposure to the voucher system when they were of 
primary school age and 1.8 years of exposure to the voucher system when they were of 
secondary school age, but with a fair amount of variance among respondents depending 
on when they were born.  In fact, a substantial majority of our respondents (73 percent) 
had no exposure to the school voucher system at all due to having been older than age 18 
at the time of the reform.  
− Macroeconomic conditions around the time of the school-leaving/labor-market-entry 
decision: It is also likely that the state of the macroeconomy around the age respondents 
made school-leaving and labor market entry decisions influenced both their schooling 
attainment and financial literacy.  For this reason we control for the unemployment rate in 
the Santiago metropolitan area at the time the individual was age 16, since these rates 
(but not national rates) are available for a sufficiently long time period and a large 
fraction of the population lives in the capital city.  
− Pension marketing activities around end of early adult job search:  We also posit that 
AFP marketing agents and expenditures early in a respondent’s work life could increase 
financial literacy, by enhancing awareness of wealth accumulation in general and of 
pensions in particular.  Accordingly, we measure the number of marketing agents and 
AFP marking expenditures around the time the individual completed initial labor market 
search and settled down in more permanent employment, around age 24. But such AFP 
marketing activities might also have direct effects on wealth accumulation in addition to 
indirect effects through financial literacy (or possibly schooling, though most respondents 
completed their schooling prior to age 24), a pathway we test below.  In fact, there was 
substantial variation in the number of AFP marketing agents and marketing expenditures 
across respondent birth cohorts; at the same time, almost 40 percent of respondents were 
older than 24 before the AFP system was implemented, so for them marketing activities 
around this age were zero. 
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We posit that these four conditions are unlikely to have been affected by conscious decisions by 
either the respondents when they were young, or their families, to increase respondents' 
subsequent wealth levels.  That is, we assume that respondents’ parents did not move to urban 
areas when the children were in primary school for reasons correlated with the respondents' later 
wealth accumulations, and that neither the respondents nor their parents could affect national 
schooling voucher policies, macroeconomic conditions, or AFP marketing.  Nevertheless, some 
of these variables might not satisfy the second condition for good instruments, as we note above 
and test in the empirical work. 
  For the Family Background Variables, it is well-known that there are strong empirical 
links between family background and schooling attainment, and family background is included 
among instruments in some previous studies where schooling attainment is a right-side 
explanatory variable.18  We argue that a similar association exists with financial literacy (though 
there is no literature to date on the topic), and accordingly family background should meet the 
first condition for a good financial literacy instrument as well. Nevertheless, it seems a priori 
plausible that family background could also proxy for factors such as intergenerationally 
correlated ability endowments via channels other than schooling and financial literacy that 
directly affect wealth.19 Accordingly, we include indicators of family background in our set of 
candidate instruments, but we test whether they satisfy the second condition for being good 
instruments.  The specific family background indicators we include are: 
− Paternal and Material Schooling Attainment: These averaged 7.2 and 6.6 grades, 
respectively, indicating considerable intergenerational increases in schooling attainment 
given the respondents’ average of 10.4 grades of schooling completed.  
                                                
18 See Hanushek and Welch (2006), as well as studies mentioned in the next note and the citations therein. 
19 For example, studies of the impact of maternal schooling on child schooling find that significantly 
positive associations become much smaller or even reversed in sign if estimation techniques using twins 
data, adopted children, or policy changes are used to control for unobserved intergenerationally-correlated 
endowments such as ability (e.g., Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, 2005; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2005; Plug, 2004). 
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− Poor Economic Background when Child: Some eight percent of respondents 
characterized their childhood family economic background as poor. 
− Respondent Worked when Under 15 Years of Age:  Child labor generally is associated 
with poorer family backgrounds; in our sample; 7 percent of respondents reported that 
they had started to work when younger than 15 years of age. 
 
Respondent Personality Traits are enduring individual characteristics that generally 
reflect genetic endowments and earlier life experience rather than states that change over fairly 
short time periods for adults. McCrae and Costa (1990), for example, report that both many 
longitudinal studies following the same individuals over time and cross-sectional comparisons 
across different age groups show a high degree of stability in personality traits during 
adulthood.20 Heritability variance decompositions using twins data typically attribute half (and 
sometimes much more) of the overall variance of personality traits to genetic variation, and the 
remaining variance is mostly due to early life experience. 21 For this reason, we posit that some 
personality traits observed in our data are relatively stable and may have significant effects on 
schooling and financial literacy. Of course they may also have direct effects on wealth 
accumulation in addition to indirect effects through schooling and financial literacy, and thus they 
could violate the second condition for good instruments, something that we also test below.  The 
specific variables we use from the EPS are as follows: 
                                                
20 For some other examples see Kahnemann (1999:14) who argues that, with respect to wellbeing or 
happiness, “each individual may be on a personal treadmill that tends to restore well-being to a 
predetermined setpoint after each change of circumstances.” Csikszentmihalyi and Jeremy (2003: 185–186) 
conclude that “chance events like personal tragedies, illness, or sudden strokes of good fortune may 
drastically affect the level of happiness, but apparently these effects do not last long.” And Costa et al. 
(1987: 54) report that “objective circumstances appear to be limited in the magnitude, scope, and 
particularly duration of their effects on psychological well-being, which, in the long run, is likely to reflect 
instead stable characteristics of the individual.” Easterlin (2005) reviews the psychological literature with 
respect to this “set-point theory” of happiness. 
21Lykken and Tellegen (1996) report that variation in the well-being component of the Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire for twins in the Minnesota Twin Registry is primarily associated with genetic 
variation; that is, genetic effects account for up to 80 percent of the variance in happiness indicators 
obtained by averaging repeated measures of well-being. Moreover, socioeconomic status, schooling, family 
income, marital status, and religious commitment do not account for more than three percent of the 
variance in these averaged measures of well-being.  In another example, Bouchard and McGue (2003) 
summarize the estimated heritabilities for the “Big Five” personality traits to be about one-half.  
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− Risk Aversion, referring to a respondent’s reluctance to accept a risky but possible more 
rewarding alternative versus a choice with a more certain but lower expected payoff.  
This is measured using a dichotomous variable for a positive answer for Alternative A to 
the following question:22 
Suppose that you, as the only source of household income, have to choose between 
the following two jobs. What alternative would you choose in [this] situation? 
Alternative A. A fixed income job that is stable for life. 
Alternative B. A job where you have the same possibility of earning double or only 
three quarters of your income for the rest of your life. 
By this measure almost two-thirds (65 percent) of our sample is risk averse.23 
− Self Esteem is used by psychologists to refer to an individual’s overall evaluation of his 
or her own worth (Mruk 2006).  For empirical research, this is usually assessed with a 
self-report inventory such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale that usually uses a 10-
question battery scored on a four-point response system that requires participants to 
indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements about themselves.   The 2006 
EPS applied a version of the Rosenberg test as follows: 
Finally, we ask about the level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements: [Scale: 1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Agree, 4. Strongly 
Agree] 
1. I feel that I am a valuable person, at least with respect to others 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
3. I definitely tend to think that I am a failure 
4. I can do things as well as other people 
5. I do not feel that I have much to be proud of 
6. I have a positive attitude about myself 
7. All in all, I am happy with myself 
8. I would like to have more self-respect 
9. I sometimes feel useless 
10. I sometimes feel that I am good for nothing. 
 
 In our analysis, we focus on a measure of positive self-esteem defined as the sum of the 
answers to questions 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, as well as a measure of negative self-esteem defined as the 
sum of the answers to questions 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10.24  Both sums range from 1 to 20, with a mean 
                                                
22 This is third question in a series of three alternative pairs, where the previous two indicate riskier options 
for Alternative B.   
23 For other recent studies linking risk aversion and economic behavior, see Dohmen et al. (2010 a, b), 
Eckell et al. (2005); and Guiso et al. (2005, 2008).   Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and ter Weel (2008) 
provide another recent discussion about personality traits and economics. 
24 We also considered a combined index defined as positive self-esteem – negative self-esteem, but the two 
separate indices have greater predictive power so we include them separately in our estimates.  
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for positive self-esteem of 16.1 and for negative self-esteem of 10.5.  Each of the five respective 
components in each sum is weighted equally, so we also investigate whether any of the 
components has significantly different effects than the sums.  
Finally we also include a vector of other respondent characteristics for robustness tests 
in some alternative specifications. We do not include these in our basic estimates because many 
could argue they are endogenous, including residence in the Santiago metropolitan area at the 
time of the survey (38 percent), self-reported bad (6 percent) or good health (69 percent), being 
never married (23 percent) or married at the time of the survey (66 percent), being a household 
head (56 percent) or spouse of household head (24 percent) at the survey date.     
4    Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
  Since most prior studies have used ordinary least squares (OLS) models that did not treat 
schooling and financial literacy as behaviorally determined or imprecisely measured due to 
random measurement errors, we also begin with OLS estimates to describe the associations 
among schooling, financial literacy, and the wealth, pension density and retirement planning 
outcomes. Results appear in Table 4 (control variables are identical to those used later in IV 
models so estimates can be compared across results). 
Table 4 here 
 Panel I of Table 4 reports estimated coefficients for a specification that includes only the 
PRIDIT index of financial literacy and excludes schooling (equation 1a-subvariant 1). Results 
indicate that the PRIDIT index is positive and strongly statistically significant in all four wealth 
equations, the density of pension contributions, and the probability of calculating the money 
needed for retirement. Moreover, the estimates are quantitatively important, implying that a 0.2 
standard deviation increase in the PRIDIT index (taken from Table 2) is associated with an 
average $4,000 increase in net wealth, or almost 6 percent increase in mean net wealth.  The 
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largest response is for pension wealth ($2,200), with other wealth ($1,000) and housing wealth 
($800) less than half as large.  A 0.2 standard deviation increase in PRIDIT is also associated 
with an average increase of 1.4 percent in the density of pension contributions and 0.8 percent 
increase in the probability of calculating the money needed for retirement. 
  Panel II of Table 4 provides coefficient estimates for an OLS specification that includes 
schooling as an explanatory variable but excludes the PRIDIT financial literacy measure 
(equation 1a-subvariant 2).  Schooling coefficient estimates are positive and highly significant for 
all four wealth measures, the density of pension contributions, and retirement planning. Moreover 
they are substantial and even somewhat larger than the PRIDIT effects in that they imply that that 
a 0.2 standard deviation increase in schooling (taken from Table 2) is associated with an average 
$5,900 increase in net wealth, or 8.3 percent of mean net wealth.  The largest component of this 
overall wealth increment again is pension wealth ($3,000), with other wealth ($1,600) and 
housing wealth ($1,300) taken together almost as large.  A 0.2 standard deviation increase in 
schooling is associated with an average increase of 1.4 percent in the density of pension 
contributions and 0.6 percent increase in the probability of calculating money needed for 
retirement. 
  Yet the PRIDIT financial literacy index and schooling are significantly positively 
correlated (r=0.51), so their coefficients estimates are anticipated to change when both are 
included in the same regression. Indeed this is the case, as is shown in Panel III of Table 4 
(equation 1a), where the PRIDIT coefficient estimates drop by a quarter for the density of pension 
contributions to two-thirds for housing wealth, with total wealth in between, dropping by half.  
The schooling coefficient estimates also decline, though by less, around 10 percent for housing 
wealth and 16 percent for total wealth.  Consequently, one can conclude that including only one 
of these two explanatory variables in OLS regressions produces larger estimates for each, than if 
both are included. Nevertheless, when both are included, the associations remain significant and 
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fairly large in magnitude for both. 
  As noted in the discussion of equation (1), having only linear terms for schooling and 
financial literacy is but one possible specification choice. Adding interactions between schooling 
and the PRIDIT financial literacy index in addition to the linear terms alters the results somewhat 
(Panel IV of Table 4, equation 1b). The linear schooling coefficient estimates remain about the 
same magnitudes as without the interaction term, and they are estimated with greater precision. 
Yet the linear PRIDIT coefficient estimates become negative and significant for three of the four 
wealth outcomes (of course, the total association of PRIDIT with the wealth outcomes for any 
schooling attainment must include the interaction with schooling attainment).  For the density of 
pension contributions, in contrast, the coefficient estimates of both the PRIDIT and the schooling 
terms remain significantly positive and the coefficient estimates of the interaction is significantly 
negative.   For the retirement planning variable, the coefficient estimates on both the PRIDIT and 
the schooling terms also remain significantly positive but the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction is insignificant. 
  If the specification of the effects of financial literacy and schooling is limited to only the 
PRIDIT-schooling interaction term (Panel V in Table 4, equation 1c), the coefficient estimates of 
the interaction are positive, significant, and fairly substantial for all of the wealth outcomes and 
for the density of pension contributions and retirement planning. 
5    Instrumental Variable Estimates 
  As noted above, omitted variables and/or measurement error can bias measured OLS 
coefficients, so next we turn to instrumental variable (IV) estimates using the candidate 
instruments discussed above.  Some of the candidate instruments – namely, years of exposure to 
school vouchers when of school age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk 
aversion – do not appear to be independent of the second-stage disturbance term but do seem to 
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affect wealth accumulation and the density of contribution directly, in addition to indirect effects 
through schooling and financial literacy.  This result suggests that the Hansen J statistic has some 
power in identifying problematic candidate instruments, and we include all these variables as 
controls in results to follow (as well as in the OLS estimates discussed above).  Our remaining 
instruments, discussed at the end of this paragraph and listed in Appendix Table B, work quite 
well.  First, they predict both financial literacy and schooling well as is required by the first 
condition for good instruments. For instance, when financial literacy and schooling enter linearly, 
the F tests for excluded instruments respectively are 156.56 and 215.57 (prob > F = 0.0000 in 
both cases), the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments respectively are 
17.19 and 24.58 (prob > F = 0.0000 in both cases), and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F weak 
identification test statistic is 15.767, indicating between 5 percent and 10 percent maximal IV 
relative bias according to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values. Second, they are 
independent of the second-stage disturbance term as required by the second condition for good 
instruments.  The Hansen J statistic for the overidentification test of all instruments’ p values are 
from 0.26 to 0.92 for the linear specification in equation 1a (see Table 5), indicating that our 
instruments are independent of the disturbance term in the second-stage relation.25 The patterns of 
significant coefficient estimates are also plausible a priori: positive effects are recorded for 
having had primary schooling in an urban area and positive self-esteem, and negative effects of 
unemployment rates when age 16 and negative self-esteem (with some significant deviations 
from equal weighting for some of the components of esteem).26  Interestingly, negative self-
esteem is a much more important predictor of both financial literacy and schooling than is 
positive self-esteem. 
                                                
25 The p values also are satisfactory for the specification with only the PRIDIT measure of financial literacy 
in Panel I of Table 5.  For the specification with only schooling in Panel II of Table 5 the p values for four 
of the outcomes are below 0.011.  However if the true relation is equation (1a), this relation is actually mis-
specified because financial literacy is excluded, which could account for this result.   
26 See Appendix B for a complete set of estimates. 
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  When only the PRIDIT financial literacy index is included and instrumented (equation 
1a-subvariant 1), the coefficient estimates are positive, significant, substantial, and twice to three 
times larger than the OLS estimates presented earlier (compare Panel I of Table 5 with Panel I of 
Table 4). When only schooling is included and instrumented (equation 1a-subvariant 2), the 
coefficient estimates are positive, significant, substantial, and from 16-84 percent larger than the 
comparable OLS estimates (Panel II of Table 5 versus Panel II of Table 4).  But when we include 
both the instrumented schooling and the PRIDIT financial literacy variables (equation 1a), the 
schooling effects mostly become statistically insignificant and negative, whereas the PRIDIT 
effects are positive, significant, substantial and much larger than the OLS results (compare Panel 
III in Tables 4 and 5; the latter effects are 282-1775 percent larger for the PRIDIT variable) for all 
of the dependent variables except retirement planning. The effect of financial literacy on 
retirement planning is no longer statistically significant when we instrument both financial 
literacy and schooling. 
  This pattern suggests that, if equation (1a) is the true model, OLS coefficient estimates 
substantially understate the effect of financial literacy on wealth accumulation, due to random 
measurement error and omitted variable bias.  This may be due to omitted factors in the OLS 
framework that are negatively associated with wealth accumulation but positively correlated with 
financial literacy. For example, as noted above, over-cautious individuals who invest more in 
financial literacy may be less successful in accumulating wealth.27  If the IV estimates can be 
interpreted causally, as we argue is appropriate, these estimates mean that financial literacy is a 
powerful determinant of wealth and pension contributions.  Specifically, they imply that a 0.2 
standard deviation increase in the PRIDIT financial literacy score could, on average, raise net 
wealth by $13,800, broken down into about a $5,200 boost in pension wealth, a $1,600 rise in net 
                                                
27 Another example of such positive selection is offered by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) who show that 
long-term health care insurance buyers tend to be healthier, which they interpret to indicate that cautious 
people buy insurance and take good care of their health.  
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housing wealth, and a gain of $6,900 in other wealth. The same 0.2 standard deviation increase in 
the PRIDIT financial literacy score would also boost the density of pension contributions by on 
average of 3 percent and the probability of calculating retirement money by an average of .5 
percent. In other words, increased financial literacy can have relatively large payoffs in wealth, 
particularly pension and other wealth, and less so in terms of housing wealth.  
  Since the two sets of the HRS questions have also been introduced recently in other 
international surveys, we assess the marginal impacts of correct responses of the individual 
questions on each of the six outcomes of interest. Table 6 gives simulated impacts for the “core” 
as well as the “sophisticated” HRS questions, based on the linear specification of 0.2 standard 
deviation increases in correct responses to individual questions underlying the PRIDIT estimates.  
The findings suggest that knowing the correct answers to the HRS ”core” questions has a 
particularly strong impact. It is also of interest that schooling has only a small and insignificant 
impact when both factors are instrumented.  In other words, if the true model is equation (1a) for 
these outcomes, mis-specifying the relation by leaving out financial literacy (as Table 5, Panel II) 
leads to rather misleading estimates of the impact of schooling on household wealth 
accumulations.28  Our preferred linear estimates (Table 5, Panel III) for these outcomes suggest 
that it is financial literacy that actually counts, rather than increasing general schooling 
attainment.29    
  Adding a PRIDIT-schooling interaction term in Panel IV of Table 5 (equation 1b) results 
in coefficient estimates for the interaction terms that are positive for all wealth components 
(though not for the density of pension contributions or retirement planning) and substantially 
                                                
28As well as problems with the Hansen’s J-test for overidentifying restrictions that suggests that the second 
condition for good instruments is not satisfied, as noted above.  
29 For other wealth, the schooling coefficient estimate is significant and fairly large but negative (which 
carries over at the 10% significance level for total wealth); this result is surprising and may be implausible.  
We conjecture that this negative schooling coefficient estimate may reflect some interaction with financial 
literacy that also probably underlies the relatively large coefficient estimate for financial literacy for this 
outcome.   
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more precisely estimated than the linear PRIDIT and schooling terms for three of the four wealth 
components. Indeed the interactions are the only variables that have significantly nonzero 
coefficient estimates for the wealth components at even the 0.10 level (and for total wealth at the 
0.05 level), which suggests a specification that includes only the interaction between PRIDIT and 
schooling (as in Panel V of Table 5, equation 1c).  The diagnostics for such estimates are good: 
the F test for excluded instruments30 is 109.74 (prob > F = 0.0000) and the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F weak identification test statistic is 109.74, indicating substantially less than 5 percent 
maximal IV relative bias according to the Stock-Yogo weak IV test critical values.  With regard 
to the second condition for good instruments, the Hansen J statistic for the overidentification test 
of all instruments p values are from 0.39 to 0.95 for the wealth components (last row of Table 5), 
suggesting that our instruments are independent of the disturbance term in the second-stage 
relation.31   The root mean squared errors are somewhat smaller for the interactive specification in 
Panel V (equation 1c) than for the linear specifications for other wealth and total wealth (Panel 
III, equation 1b), but slightly larger for pension wealth, household wealth, the density of pension 
contributions, and retirement planning.   
  These findings indicate that a case can be made to favor the interactive over the linear 
specification for other wealth and total wealth, though the estimated effects for the interactive 
specification are, in any case, substantial for the wealth components and similar to those for the 
linear model in Panel III of Table 5 discussed above.  They imply that a 0.2 standard deviation 
increase PRIDIT in the interactive format would induce a $11,600 increase in total net wealth, 
attributable to a $5,900 increase in pension wealth, a $3,600 increase in other wealth, and a 
$2,100 increase in housing wealth.  These are somewhat bigger than the implied effects the same 
PRIDIT change in the linear model for pension wealth (13 percent bigger) and housing wealth 
                                                
30 In the one endogenous variable case, this also is the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded 
instruments. 
31 For the density of contributions this test also is satisfactory with a probability of 0.21.  For the financial 
planning indicator, however, it is less so with a probability of 0.06.  
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(by 28 percent), but substantially smaller for other wealth (48 percent smaller) and somewhat 
smaller for total wealth (by 16 percent).32    
 Finally, we assess how robust our estimates are to specification changes (results available on 
request). For example, given intergenerational correlations in schooling (significant correlations 
of 0.34 with fathers, 0.38 with mothers), including parental schooling as a control in the second-
stage could change estimated impacts of respondent schooling attainment.  Interestingly, we find 
no substantial changes in our variables of interest.  Similarly, it might be thought that including 
the family background variables as second-stage controls could make a difference, but again there 
are no substantial changes in results.  Finally, we allow for the possibility that respondent 
characteristics at the time of the survey, such as current urban residence, current health, marital 
status, household head/spouse, could enter the second stage; again the relevant coefficient 
estimates are robust.    
6    Discussion and Implications  
 In this paper we use an instrumental variable approach to identify the impact of financial 
literacy and schooling on wealth accumulation and pension contribution patterns.  Prior studies 
have linked financial literacy and schooling with positive financial outcomes, but they usually do 
not control for unobserved factors that might shape both financial literacy and schooling, as well 
as wealth outcomes, nor do they control for possible measurement error in financial literacy and 
schooling. Using an IV approach (and conditional on our specification assumptions), we have 
isolated the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling on wealth outcomes using plausibly 
exogenous variation of instruments available in the Chilean Social Protection Survey. Results for 
a nationally-representative sample of adults indicate that financial literacy and schooling 
                                                
32 The interactive estimates seem more plausible for other wealth and possibly total net wealth, because the 
relatively large positive coefficient estimate for financial literacy in the linear case (Table 5, Panel III) may 
compensate for the substantial significantly negative coefficient estimate for schooling.  
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attainment are both positively and significantly correlated with wealth, pension contributions, and 
retirement planning using OLS, while the IV estimates uncover an even stronger positive impact 
of financial literacy. They also indicate no significant positive effects of schooling attainment, 
conditional on financial literacy, in a linear specification, though the effect is positive when 
interacted with financial literacy.  
 There are several implications of our findings. First, prior studies using OLS models to 
estimate the effects of financial literacy and schooling are likely to be misleading due to 
measurement error and unobserved factors. IV estimates indicate that financial literacy is at least 
as important, if not more so, than schooling, in explaining variation in household wealth and 
pension contributions. Second, our improved estimates of the impact of financial literacy are 
economically meaningful and potentially quite important. Indeed, in our view they are substantial 
enough to imply that investments in financial literacy could well have high payoffs. Third, our 
estimates indicate that some components of financial literacy, such as the HRS ”core” questions, 
are particularly important. This insight would not have been gained with the most representations 
of financial literacy (e.g., percentage correct) used in the previous literature, Fourth, our paper 
contributes to a growing body of research on the factors influencing peoples’ attachment to 
financial markets.  Households that build up more net wealth, particularly via the pension system, 
may be better able to smooth consumption in retirement and thus enhance risk-sharing and 
wellbeing in old age. Our finding that financial literacy enhances peoples’ likelihood of 
contributing to their pension saving suggests that this is a valuable pathway by which improved 
financial literacy can build household net wealth. 
In future work we hope to evaluate in more detail the costs as well as the benefits of 
enhancing financial literacy levels. Nevertheless, we view as very important the central finding of 
this paper that individuals, firms, and governments can enhance household wealth and wellbeing 
by investing in financial literacy.   
  153 
Bibliography 
 
Ameriks, John, Caplin, A., and Leahy, J. (2003). “Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to 
Plan.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 68, 1007-1047. 
 
Arenas de Mesa, A., Bravo, D., Behrman, J. R., Mitchell, O.S., and Todd, P. E. (2008). “The 
Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: Lessons from the Social Protection Survey.”  In Stephen 
Kay and Tapen Sinha. eds. Lessons from Pension Reform in the Americas, eds.  Oxford: 
OUP 23-58. 
 
Ashenfelter, O. and Krueger, A. (1994). "Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a 
New Sample of Twins," American Economic Review 84:5 (December), 1157-74. 
 
Barsky, R., Juster, T., Kimball, M., Shapiro, M., Bernheim, D., Skinner, J., and Weinberg, S. 
(2001). “What Accounts for the Variation in Retirement Wealth among U.S. Households.” 
American Economic Review 91, 832-857. 
 
Barsky, R., Juster, T., Kimball M., and Shapiro, M. (1997). “Preference Parameters and 
Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement 
Survey.” NBER Working Paper. 
 
Behrman, J. R. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2002). “Does Increasing Women’s Schooling Raise the 
Schooling of the Next Generation?” American Economic Review 92:1(March), 323-334. 
 
Behrman, J. R. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2005). “Does Increasing Women’s Schooling Raise the 
Schooling of the Next Generation? – Reply” American Economic Review 95:5 (December), 
1745-1751. 
 
 Behrman, J. R., Rosenzweig, M. R. and Taubman, P. (1994). “Endowments and the Allocation of 
Schooling in the Family and in the Marriage Market:  The Twins Experiment.” Journal of 
Political Economy 102:6 (December), 1131-1174. 
 
Bernheim, D., Garrett, D., and Maki, D. (2001). “Education and Saving: The Long-term Effects 
of High School Financial Curriculum Mandates”, Journal of Public Economics, 85, 435-
565. 
 
Bernheim, D., Skinner, J., and Weinberg, S. (2001). “What Accounts for the Variation in 
Retirement Wealth among U.S. Households”, American Economic Review, 91(4), 832-857. 
 
Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes.  2005. “Why the Apple Doesn’t Fall 
Far: Understanding Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital,” American Economic 
Review 95:1 (March), 437-449. 
 
Borghans, L., Duckworth, A.L., Heckman, J.J., and terWeel, B. (2008). The Economics and 
Psychology of Personality Traits.  Journal of Human Resources, 43(4), 972-1059. 
 
Bouchard T.J. Jr, and McGue, M.  (2003). "Genetic and Environmental Influences on Human 
Psychological Differences." Journal of Neurobiology, 54, 4-45 
 
  154 
Bravo, D., Behrman, J., Mitchell, O. S., and Todd, P. (2004). Análisis y Principales Resultados: 
Primera Encuesta de Protección Social (Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social, 2002). 
www.proteccionsocial.cl/english/docs/AnalisisPrincipalesResultadosPrimeraEncuestaProtec
cionSocial.pdf  
 
Bravo, D., Behrman, J., Mitchell, O. S., and Todd, P.  (2006). Encuesta de Protección Social 
2004: Presentación General y Principales Resultados. http://www.proteccionsocial.cl/ 
english/docs/Encuesta_Protección_Social%2020041.pdf 
 
Bravo, D., Mukhopadhyay, S., and Todd, P. (2010). “How Universal School Vouchers Affect 
Educational and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Chile.” Quantitative Economics.  
 
Brockett, P., Derrig, R.A., Golden, L.L., Levine, A., Alpert., M. (2002). “Fraud Classification 
Using Principal Component Analysis of RIDITs.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 69, 341-
371. 
 
Campbell, J. (2006). “Household Finance,” Journal of Finance, 61, 1553-1604. 
 
Cole, S. and Shastry, G. (2009). “Smart Money: The Effect of Education, Cognitive Ability, and 
Financial Literacy on Financial Market Participation.” HBS Working Paper 09-071.  
 
Cole, S., Sampson, T., and Zia, B. (2009). “Money or Knowledge?” HBS working paper 09-117. 
 
Costa, P. T., Zonderman, A. B., McCrae, R. R., Cornonihuntley, J., Locke, B. Z., and Barbano, H. 
E. (1987). “Longitudinal analyses of psychological well-being in a national sample—
Stability of mean levels,” Journal of Gerontology 42(1): 50–55. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. and H. Jeremy. (2003). “Happiness in Everyday Life: The Uses of 
Experience Sampling,” Journal of Happiness 4(2): 185–189. 
 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., and Sunde, U. (2010a). “Are Risk Aversion and Impatience 
Related to Cognitive Ability?” American Economic Review 100 (June): 1238–1260. 
 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J. and Wagner, G. G. (2010b). 
“Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, Representative, Experimentally-
Validated Survey.” Journal of the European Economic Association. (forthcoming). 
 
Easterlin, R. A. (2005). “Is there an ‘Iron Law of Happiness?” Working paper, Department of 
Economics, University of Southern California. 
 
Eckel, C., Johnson, C., and Montmarquette, C. (2005). “Saving Decisions of the Working  Poor: 
Short- and Long-Term Horizons.” In Research in Experimental Economics. Vol. 10: Field 
Experiments in Economics, ed. J. P. Carpenter, G. W. Harrison, and J. A. List, 219–60. 
Amsterdam:  Elsevier. 
 
Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. K. (2006). “Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: 
Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.” American Economic Review, 
(September) 96(4): 938–958. 
 
  155 
Guiso, L., and Paiella, M. (2005). “The Role of Risk Aversion in Predicting Individual 
Behavior.” Bank of Italy Economic Working Paper No. 546. 
 
Guiso, L., and Paiella, M. (2008). “Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk.” Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 6(6): 1109–50. 
 
Hanushek, E. and Welch, F. (2006). The Handbook of the Economics of Education, Amsterdam:  
Elsevier-North-Holland. 
 
Hilgert, M., Hogarth, J., and Beverley, S. (2003). “Household Financial Management: The 
Connection between Knowledge and Behavior.” Federal Reserve Bulletin Report #309-322. 
 
Kahneman, D. (1999). “Objective Well-being,” in D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz 
(eds.), Well-Being: Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 3–25. 
 
Lykken, D. T. and Tellegen, A. (1996). “Happiness is a Stochastic Phenomenon,” Psychological 
Science 7(3): 186–189. 
 
Lusardi, A. (2003). “Planning and Saving for Retirement.” Working Paper, Dartmouth 
        College. 
 
Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O. S., and Curto, V. (2010). “Financial Literacy among the Young: 
Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy.” Journal of Consumer Affairs. (44, 2): 358-
380. 
 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2007a). “Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of 
Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 
205-224. 
 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2007b). “Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning: New 
Evidence from the RAND American Life Panel.” NBER Working Paper. 
 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2007c). “Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness:  
Evidence and Implications for Financial Education.” Business Economics 42, 35-44. 
 
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2008).  “Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do Women 
Fare?” American Economic Review P&P, 98, 413-417. 
   
Lusardi, A. and Mitchell, O. S. (2009). “How Ordinary Consumers Make Complex Economic 
Decisions: Financial Literacy and Retirement Readiness.” Cambridge, MA: NBER Working 
Paper. 
 
McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T. (1990). Personality in Adulthood. New York: The Guildford Press. 
 
Mitchell, O. S. and Moore, J. (1998).  “Can Americans Afford to Retire? New Evidence on 
Retirement Saving Adequacy.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65 (3) December: 371-400. 
   
 
  156 
Mitchell, O. S., Todd, P., and Bravo, D. (2008). “Learning from the Chilean Experience: The 
Determinants of Pension Switching.” In Annamaria Lusardi, Ed. Overcoming the Saving 
Slump: Making Financial Education and Saving Programs More Effective. University of 
Chicago Press, 301-323. 
 
Mruk, C. (2006). Self-Esteem Research, Theory, and Practice: Toward a Positive Psychology of 
Self-esteem (3rd ed.). New York: Springer 
 
OECD.Nd. “Financial Education.” Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs.  
www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_15251491_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
Plug, E. (2004). “Estimating the Effect of Mother's Schooling on Children's Schooling Using a 
Sample of Adoptees,” American Economic Review 94:1 (March), 358-368. 
 
President’s Advisory Committee on Financial Literacy (PACFL). (2008). Annual Report to the 
President: Executive Summary.  www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-
institution/fin-education/council/exec_sum.pdf  
 
Scholz, J. K., Seshadri, A. and Khitatrakun, S. (2006). “Are Americans Saving 'Optimally' for 
Retirement?” Journal of Political Economy, 114 (August), 607-643.  
 
Srivastava, S., John, O. P., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2003). “Development of Personality in 
Early and Middle Adulthood: Set like Plaster or Persistent Change?” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 84, 1041-1053 
 
Staiger, D. and Stock, J. H. (1997). "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments."  
Econometrica 65:3, 557-586. 
 
Stock, J. H. (2010). "The Other Transformation in Econometric Practice:  Robust Tools for 
Inference," Journal of Economic Perspectives 24:2 (Spring), 83-94. 
 
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2007). Introduction to Econometrics, Boston, San Francisco, 
New York: Peason-Addison Wesley. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  157 
 
 
 TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES.  
    Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Wealth components (2006 US$ 1000s) 
     Pension Wealth  38.6 87.3 0 1076.8 
!
Housing Wealth  22.1 43.7 -223 1395.8 
!
Other Wealth 10.9 123 -553.8 11572 
!
Total Wealth 71.5 166.1 -519.7 11985 
Pension Density (%) 47.7 34.8 0 100 
Calculated Retirement Money (%) 7.9 26.9 0 100 
 
Note:  Calculated from Chilean 2006 Social Protection Survey (EPS) on a sample of 13,054 respondents 
age 24-retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men) for whom key variables (including wealth outcomes, 
financial literacy, schooling) are available. See text. 
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TABLE 2.  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR RIGHT-SIDE VARIABLES AND CANDIDATE INSTRUMENTS. 
       Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Key Right-Side Variables ! ! ! !
! ! Financial Literacy PRIDIT Score 0.6 7.7 -15.3 23.3 
! ! Schooling Attainment (Grades) 10.4 3.9 0 20 
! ! PRIDIT*Schooling Attainment 15 84.3 -259.5 466.4 
Right-Side Demographic Controls ! ! ! !
! ! Age (Years) 42.7 10.6 24 65 
! ! Male (%) 51.9 50 0 100 
Candidate First-Stage Instruments ! ! ! !
! I. Age-Related Variables ! ! ! !
! ! Primary School Urban (%) 80.9 39.3 0 100 
! ! School Vouchers ! ! ! !
! ! ! Primary Ages 2.2 3.2 0 8 
! ! ! Secondary Ages 1.8 1.9 0 4 
! ! ! Total 4 4.9 0 12 
! ! AFP Activities at Age 24 ! ! ! !
! ! ! Number of Agents (10^3) 6.2 6.9 0 23.7 
! ! ! Marketing Expenditures (P10^9) 2.2 2.7 0 10.1 
! ! ! No AFP Activities (%) 39.2 48.8 0 100 
! ! Macroeconomy at Age 16 ! ! ! !
! ! ! Unemployment Rate (%) 10.3 5.2 3 23.2 
! II. Family Background ! ! ! !
! ! Father Schooling Attainment (Grades) 7.2 3.5 0 20 
! ! Mother Schooling Attainment (Grades) 6.6 3.4 0 20 
! ! Poor Economic Background (%) 8 27.1 0 100 
! ! Respondent Worked < 15 Y of Age (%) 6.9 25.4 0 100 
! III. Personality Traits ! ! ! !
! ! Risk Aversion (%) 64.5 47.9 0 100 
! ! Positive Self Esteem (Sum) 16.1 2.5 5 20 
! ! ! Valuable Person 3.2 0.7 1 4 
! ! ! Number of Good Qualities 3.2 0.6 1 4 
! ! ! Can Do Well As Others 3.3 0.7 1 4 
! ! ! Positive Attitude about Self 3.2 0.7 1 4 
! ! ! Happy with Self 3.2 0.7 1 4 
! ! Negative Self Esteem (Sum) 10.5 2.6 5 20 
! ! ! Think I am a Failure 1.8 0.7 1 4 
! ! ! Not Much to be Proud of 2.1 0.9 1 4 
! ! ! Like More Self Respect 2.6 0.8 1 4 
! ! ! Sometimes Feel Useless 2.2 0.8 1 4 
! ! ! Feel Good for Nothing 1.9 0.8 1 4 
Selected Current Characteristics ! ! ! !
! ! Santiago Metropolitan Residence (%) 38.4 48.6 0 100 
! ! Health Bad (%) 6.4 24.5 0 100 
! ! Health Good (%) 68.7 46.4 0 100 
! ! Never Married (%) 22.8 41.9 0 100 
! ! Now Married (%) 65.7 47.5 0 100 
! ! Household Head (%) 55.5 49.7 0 100 
! ! Spouse of Household Head (%) 24.3 42.9 0 100 
Note: For sample see Table 1. 
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TABLE 3. FINANCIAL LITERACY QUESTIONS: PERCENT CORRECT AND PRIDIT WEIGHTING 
SCHEME 
  Question Correct (%) 
PRIDIT 
weights 
Concepts of basic economics and finance   
Main HRS questions:   
(1) If the chance of catching an illness is 10%, how many people out of 1000 would get the illness? 50% 0.64 
(2) If 5 people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is 2 Million pesos, how much would each receive? 44% 0.59 
(3) 
Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the 
interest rate you earn on this money is 2% a year. If you keep 
this money in the account for 5 years, how much would you 
have after 5 years? [over $120, exactly $120, less than $120] 
50% 0.59 
Additional questions:   
(4) 
Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the 
interest rate that you earn on these savings is 10% a year. How 
much would you have in the account after 2 years? [exact 
number] 
2% 0.29 
(5) 
Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the 
interest rate that you earn on these savings is 1% a year. 
Inflation is 2% a year. After one year, if you withdraw the 
money from the savings account you could buy more/less/the 
same? 
26% 0.42 
(6) T/F: Buying shares in one company is less risky than buying shares from many different companies with the same money. 46% 0.44 
Knowledge of benefit rules and institutions   
(7) 
Do you knows what percentage of income is (has been or 
would be) deducted monthly for pension system contributions? 
[yes/no] 
37% 0.54 
(8) Do you know the legal retirement age for women? [60] 79% 0.44 
(9) Do you know the legal retirement age for men? [65] 84% 0.41 
(10) 
Do you know how to calculate pensions in the AFP? [yes, by 
balance of individual account and other elements such as age 
of retirement] 
10% 0.37 
(11) Do you know there is a minimum state guaranteed old age pension for people aged 65 and over? [yes/no] 53% 0.42 
(12) Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system introduced in 2002? [yes/no] 55% 0.58 
Note: For sample see Table 1. The PRIDIT financial literacy score is calculated using the 12 financial literacy questions in the 2006 
EPS. Column 1 lists the % of people that answered the question correctly; Column 2 provides PRIDIT weights for each question (see 
text).    
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TABLE 4.  OLS MODELS OF WEALTH AND PENSION DENSITY: PRIDIT ALONE, SCHOOLING 
ALONE, AND BOTH, PLUS INTERACTIONS 
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housin
g 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT Index Alone       
 
PRIDIT 1.46 0.49 0.62 2.57 0.91 0.51 
 
t 12.48 8.43 5.82 14.24 25.24 14.72 
II. Schooling Alone       
 
Schooling 3.89 1.7 2.01 7.59 1.76 0.80 
  t 14.52 12.92 5.78 15.59 21.89 9.93 
III. Both PRIDIT and Schooling       
 PRIDIT 0.81 0.17 0.25 1.23 0.69 0.44 
 
t 6.61 2.82 2.58 6.91 16.98 11.37 
 
Schooling 3.07 1.53 1.75 6.35 1.06 0.36 
  t 10.75 11.13 4.87 12.46 11.78 4.07 
IV. Linear and Interaction Effects      
 
PRIDIT -0.32 -0.87 -1.17 -2.36 1.5 0.29 
!
t -1.02 -4.9 -2.74 -3.92 14.95 3.01 
!
Schooling 3.14 1.59 1.84 6.56 1.01 0.37 
!
t 10.75 11.62 4.83 12.4 11.22 4.09 
!
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.01 
!
t 3.56 5.54 3.3 5.83 -8.89 1.56 
V. Interaction Effect Alone       
 PRIDIT*Schooling 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.04 
!! t 11.13 8.69 5.18 12.48 19.77 12.99 
Note:  For sample size see Table 1. A complete set of coefficient estimates is provided in Appendix A. Pension density is included in 
the estimates as proportion between 0 and 1 but the coefficient estimate is multiplied by 100 in this table to be of the same magnitude 
as the other coefficient estimates. Other control variables include age, age squared, male, years of exposure to school vouchers when 
of school age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk aversion. “t” refers to t-statistic.  
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TABLE 5. IV MODELS OF WEALTH AND PENSION DENSITY: PRIDIT ALONE, SCHOOLING ALONE, 
AND BOTH, PLUS INTERACTIONS 
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT Index 
Alone       
 
PRIDIT 3.23 1.14 1.83 6.2 1.88 0.62 
 
z 9.18 7.46 4.47 10.31 15.15 5.58 
 
Hansen J p 0.35 0.40 0.09 0.14 0.96 0.29 
II. Schooling Alone      
 
Schooling 5.55 1.98 2.66 10.18 3.23 1.12 
 
z 9.12 7.28 4.01 10.23 14.22 5.68 
  Hansen J p 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 
II. Both PRIDIT and Schooling      
!
PRIDIT 3.4 1.06 4.46 8.93 1.94 0.31 
!
z 3.23 1.9 3.64 4.77 4.92 0.90 
!
Schooling -0.34 0.14 -5.05 -5.25 -0.12 0.58 
!
z -0.18 0.14 -2.6 -1.68 -0.17 0.95 
!! Hansen J p 0.26 0.30 0.82 0.34 0.92 0.26 
IV. Linear and Interaction Effects     
          PRIDIT -2.28 -1.51 0.28 -3.51 2.15 2.19 
!
z -0.67 -1.01 0.09 -0.65 1.83 1.97 
!
Schooling 2.44 1.4 -3.01 0.82 -0.23 -0.34 
!
z 0.99 1.24 -1.22 0.21 -0.25 -0.41 
!
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.44 0.2 0.33 0.97 -0.02 -0.15 
!
z 1.75 1.7 1.26 2.36 -0.19 -1.80 
Hansen J p 0.41 0.39 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.5 
V. Interaction Effect Alone      
 PRIDIT*Schooling 0.34 0.12 0.2 0.66 0.19 0.06 
!
z 9.03 7.3 4.35 9.91 14.25 5.01 
!! Hansen J p 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.95 0.21 0.06 
 
Notes: For sample size see Table 1. A complete set of coefficient estimates is provided in Appendix B. Pension density is included in 
the estimates as proportion between 0 and 1 but the coefficient estimate is multiplied by 100 in this table to be of the same magnitude 
as the other coefficient estimates. Other control variables include age, age squared, male, years of exposure to school vouchers when 
of school age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk aversion. “z” refers to z-statistic; see text. 
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TABLE 6. PREDICTED CHANGE IN MEASURED OUTCOMES FOR CORRECT ANSWER TO FINANCIAL 
LITERACY QUESTION 
    
Pension  
Wealth 
($000) 
Housing 
Wealth 
($000) 
Other 
Wealth 
($000) 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
($000) 
Pension 
Density 
(% pts) 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money      
(% pts) 
        Core HRS Questions:       
(1) 
If the chance of catching 
an illness is 10%, how 
many people out of 1000 
would get the illness? 
1.2 0.4 1.6 3.1 0.7 0.11 
(2) 
If 5 people share winning 
lottery tickets and the 
total prize is 2 Million 
pesos, how much would 
each receive? 
1.1 0.4 1.5 2.9 0.6 0.10 
(3) 
Assume that you have 
$100 in a savings account 
and the interest rate you 
earn on this money is 2% 
a year. If you keep this 
money in the account for 
5 years, how much would 
you have after 5 years? 
1.1 0.3 1.4 2.9 0.6 0.10 
Sophisticated HRS:       
(4) 
Assume that you have 
$200 in a savings account, 
and the interest rate that 
you earn on these savings 
is 10% a year. How much 
would you have in the 
account after 2 years? 
0.6 0.2 0.7 1.5 0.3 0.05 
(5) 
Assume that you have 
$100 in a savings account 
and the interest rate that 
you earn on these savings 
is 1% a year. Inflation is 
2% a year. After one year, 
if you withdraw the 
money from the savings 
account you could buy 
more/less/the same? 
0.8 0.2 1.0 2.1 0.4 0.07 
(6) 
T/F: Buying shares in one 
company is less risky than 
buying shares from many 
different companies with 
the same money. 
0.8 0.3 1.1 2.1 0.5 0.07 
Note: The table presents simulated marginal effects of increasing the probability of answering each question correctly by a quarter 
standard deviation (Table 2 indicates mean responses) on outcomes, holding population responses to other questions constant. 
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APPENDIX A:  COMPLETE SET OF OLS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR TABLE 4* 
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT Index Alone       
 
PRIDIT 1.46 0.49 0.62 2.57 0.91 0.51 
 
Male 15.74 -3.18 0.18 12.95 19.22 2.27 
 
Age 4.63 -0.09 1.38 5.52 2.36 0.65 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -3.99 -1.17 -3.43 -8.18 0.90 -0.14 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.55 0.27 0.38 1.15 0.98 0.02 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 5.13 1.10 5.09 10.84 4.05 0.13 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.52 0.87 0.69 2.05 0.00 -0.03 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.48 0.79 1.31 2.58 -0.15 0.03 
 
Poor economic background  -21.54 -1.14 0.76 -22.18 -36.35 -2.17 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -4.84 -4.62 -7.20 -16.90 -5.33 0.08 
 
Constant -90.09 3.46 -47.90 -127.14 -22.22 -11.80 
II. Schooling Alone       
 
Schooling 3.89 1.70 2.01 7.59 1.76 0.80 
 
Male 19.70 -1.81 1.86 19.75 21.34 3.40 
 
Age 4.02 -0.21 1.25 5.05 2.30 0.64 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.29 -0.62 -2.79 -5.71 1.47 0.15 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.42 0.22 0.32 0.96 0.99 0.03 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.01 0.75 4.70 9.46 3.88 0.08 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.04 0.61 0.39 0.97 -0.18 -0.08 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.16 0.61 1.10 1.87 -0.22 0.02 
 
Poor economic background  -19.68 0.30 2.31 -17.07 -36.27 -2.50 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 0.62 -1.88 -4.04 -5.30 -3.22 0.87 
 Constant -121.33 -12.29 -66.67 -200.30 -41.48 -21.24 
III. Both PRIDIT and Schooling       
 
PRIDIT 0.81 0.17 0.25 1.23 0.69 0.44 
 
Schooling 3.07 1.53 1.75 6.35 1.06 0.36 
 
Male 18.02 -2.16 1.35 17.21 19.93 2.51 
 
Age 3.97 -0.22 1.23 4.98 2.26 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.62 -0.69 -2.89 -6.21 1.19 -0.03 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.39 0.21 0.31 0.91 0.96 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 3.93 0.74 4.68 9.35 3.82 0.04 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.05 0.61 0.39 0.94 -0.19 -0.09 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.09 0.60 1.08 1.77 -0.28 -0.01 
 
Poor economic background  -18.28 0.59 2.74 -14.95 -35.09 -1.75 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 0.39 -1.93 -4.11 -5.65 -3.42 0.73 
 Constant -109.59 -9.81 -63.05 -182.45 -31.53 -14.97 
IV. Linear and Interaction Effects       
 
PRIDIT -0.32 -0.87 -1.17 -2.36 1.50 0.29 
!
Schooling 3.14 1.59 1.84 6.56 1.01 0.37 
!
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.01 
!
Male 17.98 -2.21 1.29 17.05 19.96 2.50 
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!
Age 3.94 -0.25 1.19 4.88 2.28 0.62 
!
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
!
Risk averse -2.25 -0.35 -2.42 -5.02 0.92 0.02 
!
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.35 0.18 0.27 0.79 0.99 0.00 
!
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
!
No AFP activities 4.13 0.92 4.93 9.97 3.68 0.07 
!
Mother schooling attainment -0.10 0.56 0.33 0.79 -0.16 -0.10 
!
Father schooling attainment 0.05 0.56 1.03 1.63 -0.24 -0.02 
!
Poor economic background  -19.51 -0.54 1.16 -18.89 -34.18 -1.91 
!
Worked when <15 years of age 0.42 -1.90 -4.07 -5.54 -3.44 0.73 
!
Constant -109.92 -10.12 -63.48 -183.52 -31.28 -15.02 
V. Interaction Effect Alone       
 PRIDIT*Schooling 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.04 
 Male 15.97 -3.33 -0.04 12.60 19.59 2.32 
 Age 4.22 -0.11 1.35 5.45 2.38 0.65 
 Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 Risk averse -3.13 -1.00 -3.22 -7.35 1.10 0.01 
 Voucher exposure primary ages 0.47 0.25 0.35 1.06 1.00 0.01 
 Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 No AFP activities 4.95 1.18 5.18 11.31 4.30 0.24 
 Mother schooling attainment 0.46 0.84 0.64 1.94 0.03 -0.03 
 Father schooling attainment 0.46 0.76 1.26 2.47 -0.10 0.03 
 Poor economic background  -23.71 -1.58 0.26 -25.02 -37.96 -2.90 
 Worked when <15 years of age -5.33 -4.55 -7.07 -16.95 -5.81 -0.05 
  Constant -82.94 3.99 -47.08 -126.02 -23.91 -12.08 
 Note: *italics indicate significance at 5% level or better. See also Table 4. 
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APPENDIX B:  COMPLETE SET OF IV ESTIMATES FOR TABLE 5; FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATES AND 
DIAGNOSTICS, AND SECOND-STAGE ESTIMATES AND DIAGNOSTICS* 
 
 Components of Wealth 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT Index Alone       
 
PRIDIT 3.23 1.14 1.83 6.20 1.88 0.62 
 
Male 12.66 -4.30 -1.91 6.44 17.54 2.09 
 
Age 4.32 -0.22 1.12 5.22 2.19 0.63 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -4.19 -1.23 -3.56 -8.99 0.79 -0.15 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.38 0.20 0.27 0.86 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.43 0.83 4.57 9.83 3.66 0.09 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.08 0.71 0.38 1.18 -0.25 -0.05 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.01 0.62 0.99 1.62 -0.40 0.01 
 
Poor economic background  -15.08 1.17 5.18 -8.72 -32.83 -1.79 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.50 -3.67 -5.01 -10.17 -3.51 0.28 
 
Constant -77.73 8.15 -38.71 -108.28 -15.48 -11.08 
 
Hansen J p 0.35 0.40 0.09 0.14 0.96 0.29 
II. Schooling Alone       
 
Schooling 5.55 1.98 2.66 10.18 3.23 1.12 
 
Male 19.95 -1.73 2.08 20.30 21.78 3.50 
 
Age 4.22 -0.25 1.12 5.09 2.13 0.61 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.21 -0.53 -2.58 -5.32 1.95 0.24 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.38 0.20 0.29 0.88 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 3.98 0.66 4.47 9.11 3.40 -0.02 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.38 0.55 0.24 0.41 -0.51 -0.16 
 
Father schooling attainment -0.14 0.56 0.99 1.42 -0.49 -0.03 
 
Poor economic background  -16.27 0.81 3.57 -11.90 -33.51 -1.89 
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Worked when <15 years of age 4.51 -1.50 -2.67 0.34 0.00 1.57 
 
Constant -140.83 -14.26 -70.93 -226.01 -52.21 -23.58 
  Hansen J p 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 
III. Both PRIDIT and Schooling       
 
PRIDIT 3.40 1.06 4.46 8.93 1.94 0.31 
 
Schooling -0.34 0.14 -5.05 -5.25 -0.12 0.58 
 
Male 12.25 -4.13 -8.01 0.11 17.39 2.79 
 
Age 4.33 -0.22 1.26 5.36 2.19 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -4.31 -1.18 -5.33 -10.83 0.75 0.05 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.39 0.20 0.30 0.89 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.46 0.82 5.11 10.38 3.67 0.02 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.11 0.70 0.88 1.69 -0.23 -0.11 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.03 0.61 1.21 1.85 -0.40 -0.02 
 
Poor economic background  -15.09 1.18 5.12 -8.79 -32.84 -1.78 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.90 -3.50 -11.08 -16.47 -3.66 0.98 
 
Constant -74.03 6.58 16.60 -50.84 -14.12 -17.47 
  Hansen J p 0.26 0.30 0.82 0.34 0.92 0.26 
IV. Linear and Interaction Effects       
 
PRIDIT -2.28 -1.51 0.28 -3.51 2.15 2.19 
!
Schooling 2.44 1.40 -3.01 0.82 -0.23 -0.34 
!
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.44 0.20 0.33 0.97 -0.02 -0.15 
!
Male 14.32 -3.19 -6.48 4.65 17.31 2.11 
!
Age 4.06 -0.34 1.06 4.79 2.20 0.70 
!
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
!
Risk averse -1.91 -0.09 -3.57 -5.57 0.66 -0.75 
!
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.42 0.90 0.08 
!
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
!
No AFP activities 4.88 1.01 5.42 11.30 3.66 -0.12 
!
Mother schooling attainment -0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48 -0.21 0.07 
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!
Father schooling attainment -0.38 0.43 0.91 0.96 -0.38 0.12 
!
Poor economic background  -18.83 -0.52 2.36 -17.00 -32.70 -0.54 
!
Worked when <15 years of age 2.09 -1.69 -8.14 -7.74 -3.80 -0.34 
!
Constant -99.93 -5.14 -2.47 -107.54 -13.18 -8.88 
!
Hansen J p 0.41 0.39 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.50 
V. Interaction Effect Alone       
 PRIDIT*Schooling 0.34 0.12 0.20 0.66 0.19 0.06 
 
Male 11.71 -4.64 -2.67 4.40 17.11 2.03 
 
Age 4.18 -0.26 1.01 4.93 2.12 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -3.11 -0.85 -2.92 -6.88 1.41 0.04 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.55 0.81 -0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.97 1.02 4.86 10.85 3.99 0.20 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.13 0.64 0.23 0.74 -0.35 -0.07 
 
Father schooling attainment -0.20 0.54 0.83 1.17 -0.51 -0.01 
 
Poor economic background  -18.00 0.16 3.83 -14.01 -34.69 -2.51 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.02 -3.49 -4.51 -9.03 -3.35 0.24 
 
Constant -74.43 9.35 -35.96 -101.04 -14.03 -10.94 
  
Hansen J p 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.95 0.21 0.06 
Notes: also Table 4. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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APPENDIX B. FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES 
  PRIDIT Index Schooling PRIDIT*Schooling 
    Male 1.77 -0.25 19.87 
Age 0.07 0.09 1.22 
Age-squared 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Risk averse 0.17 -0.25 -1.65 
Voucher exposure primary ages -0.04 0.03 0.13 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No AFP activities 0.04 0.18 -1.28 
Mother schooling attainment 0.17 0.18 2.31 
Father schooling attainment 0.19 0.13 2.50 
Poor economic background  -2.96 -1.51 -20.16 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.41 -1.90 -15.13 
Primary school urban 2.92 2.32 20.18 
Unemployment rate at age 16 -6.21 -1.32 -58.02 
Think I am a Failure 0.08 0.12 1.87 
Can Do Well As Others 0.46 0.19 4.05 
Positive Attitude about Self 0.28 0.16 1.91 
Like More Self Respect 0.04 -0.14 -2.06 
Postive Self Esteem (Sum) 0.10 0.01 1.36 
Negative Self Esteem (Sum) -0.58 -0.24 -6.04 
Constant -3.25 8.11 -31.71 
    F test stat: 156.56 215.57 109.72 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F 
stat:  
       III. Both PRIDIT and 
Schooling 17.19 24.58 
 IV. Linear and Interaction Effects 2.32 19.05 3.16 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat: 
       III. Both PRIDIT and 
Schooling 15.77 
  IV. Linear and Interaction Effects 9.43     
Note: *italics indicate significance at 5% level or better 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
